Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Hedley Bull
Colin S. Gray
F. Stephen Larrabee
Tania A. Jacques
Stephen B. Young

CP Checklist

Richard F. Staar

MARCH–APRIL 1981

USSR AND NORTHERN EUROPE

Trond Gilberg, George K. Osborn, William J. Taylor, Jr., and John R. Fairlamb

Catalan Challenge

Eusebio Mujal-León

Cuba in the 1980's

Jorge I. Domínquez

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Problems of Communism

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Cover: The tail section of a Soviet Tu–95 "Bear" reconnaissance plane photographed over the North Atlantic on September 28, 1980, by US interceptors stationed at Keflavik, Iceland. US Air Force photo.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

The Soviet Union and Northern Europe
Trond Gilberg, George K. Osborn, William J. Taylor, Jr., and John R. Fairlamb

In recent years, the Soviet Union has played an increasingly active role in Northern Europe. Soviet politico-ideological and economic approaches to the region have generally met with little success. But Soviet military-strategic influence is significant and growing. This growth has evoked a noticeable reaction in the Nordic countries, among both policymakers and the general public. In the 1980's, Northern Europe, once considered Europe's "quiet corner," is likely to come under increasing Soviet pressure.

Cataluña, Carrillo, and Eurocommunism
Eusebio Mujal-León

The Catalan challenge to Eurocommunism that surfaced in January 1981 is in many respects symptomatic of the problems facing the national Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and other West European Communist parties today. At the same time, there are unique aspects to the Catalan party's status within the PCE, and there is a special quality of resentment toward the heavy-handed leadership style of PCE Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo. For now, the threat to Carrillo seems manageable, but the future is by no means certain.

Cuba in the 1980's
Jorge I. Domínguez

The Cuban revolutionary government confronts a complex mixture of accomplishments and problems in the 1980's. While the former render it probable that the regime will stay in power, the latter make it likely that the Cuban leadership will have to exercise greater care in selecting precise objectives to pursue than it did in the 1970's. Indeed, it may have to sacrifice some goals it deems desirable, in order to achieve others.

. . .

Essay-Reviews

The Rise of Soviet Naval Power
Hedley Bull

The Soviet Union, whether it has sought this as an object of policy or not, has in recent years built up its naval forces to the point where the distribution of world naval power is now best described in terms of equilibrium. This does not mean that the USSR has become the leading naval power. The United States is still vastly superior in several key aspects of force projection. But the Soviet buildup has forced the US to share control of the sea. Such equilibrium is an exceptional situation in ocean affairs, and its implications for world politics are not yet fully apparent.

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Understanding Soviet Military Power
Colin S. Gray

There is now a rough consensus in the West that the Soviet Union is far more powerful in relative terms than ever before, and there is growing awareness that Moscow does not share many crucial Western strategic concepts. The reviewer sees the Soviet military buildup as due to traditional Russian/Soviet views that one can never have too much military power, to the importance of a perpetual state of mobilization for Soviet domestic stability, to a need to inspire awe among Soviet citizens and allies of the USSR and to deter any possible attacks, to a sense that this is one area where the Soviet Union can successfully compete with the West, and to a sheer drive for power and influence.

Moscow and the German Question: Continuities and Changes
F. Stephen Larrabee

Germany has long had a special place in Soviet policy toward Europe, and the same remains true today. Despite the new status accorded the German Democratic Republic in the Basic Treaty of 1970 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, the authority of the Communist regime in the GDR continues to be fragile. At the same time, Bonn's strong stake in its *Ostpolitik* has provided Moscow with new opportunities to manipulate the German problem and an incentive "to play the German card" to further its regional (and even global) interests.

Mongolia and Socialism
Tania A. Jacques

As the present leaders of the Mongolian People's Republic celebrate the regime's 60 anniversary, they have emphasized the MPR's emergence as a "rapidly developing socialist state." Nonetheless, nationalism remains a vital force among Mongols, and among all the peoples of Inner Asia—a fact that has significant strategic implications within the region and beyond.

Communism and Nationalism in Vietnam
Stephen B. Young

There is a common view in the West (one clearly encouraged by the Hanoi regime) that the Communist victory in Vietnam was inevitable, stemming from the Communists' successful assumption of the mantle of Vietnamese nationalism. However, such analyses overlook important and deep-rooted native currents of nationalism that might have triumphed in post-World War II Vietnam had they been recognized and adequately supported. They also tend to ignore the cynical and "internationalist" Leninist orientation of Vietnam's Communist movement.

Notes and Views

Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1980
Richard F. Staar

By arrangement with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, the Editors present a slightly modified version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1980" which is to appear in the forthcoming 1981 edition of the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, edited by Mr. Staar.

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The Soviet Union and Northern Europe

By Trond Gilberg, George K. Osborn, William J. Taylor, Jr., and John R. Fairlamb

Since the end of World War II, Northern Europe has justifiably been known as Europe's "quiet corner." Elsewhere in Europe, where the Soviet Union and the Western allies have eyed each other warily across the East European buffer zone, there have been recurring problems. In Central Europe, the "traditional" invasion route into Russia and a region historically of the utmost importance to the Soviet Union, major crises have broken out periodically—as in Berlin in 1948 and 1962, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In Southeastern Europe, another region historically of great importance to the USSR, there have also been sporadic upheavals, as in the Greek civil war of 1946–49 and the Yugoslav withdrawal from the Soviet bloc in 1948. Only Northern Europe, where the USSR faces the Western allies directly across a common frontier, has been spared major crises.

In recent years, however, there have been indications that Moscow is taking an increasing interest in Northern Europe. The Soviet Union has become more and more active in the region in pursuit of both regional and global objectives, and there is every reason to believe that this trend will continue in the years immediately ahead.

The present article is devoted to an assessment of Soviet policy toward Northern Europe. It will begin by describing some of the opportunities and challenges that the region presents to the Soviet Union. It will next examine the various dimensions of Soviet policy toward the region—political-ideological, economic, and military-strategic. It will then discuss the specific regional security factors that Soviet policy must take into consideration. Finally, it will look briefly at prospects for the 1980's.

Opportunities and Vulnerabilities

Northern Europe, for the purposes of this article, comprises the five Nordic states of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, the three Soviet Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and adjacent waters. As so defined, it is a region of considerable similarities and diversities, none of which the Soviet Union can afford to ignore in its approach to the area.

The five Nordic countries are similar in many respects. In terms of politics, all are parliamentary democracies, with long traditions of "state socialism." All have strong labor organizations. In Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the social democratic parties have for many years been the dominant political force, with the

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local Communist parties of decidedly secondary importance. In Finland and Iceland, the local Communist parties have been relatively more influential.[1] With respect to socioeconomic structure, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are similar, with economies and class distributions typical of advanced industrial societies. Finland, because of accelerated industrial development since World War II, is now approaching the level of its three neighbors. Iceland is a special case—a single-industry economy, in which fish and fish products account for most exports (74.7 percent by value in 1980) and the fishing industry employs a large part of the labor force (14.7 percent in 1980).[2] In cultural terms, all the Nordic countries are essentially pro-Western in outlook.[3] All are overwhelmingly Protestant (Evangelical Lutheran). Four of the five are of Germanic origin, with languages closely related to one another. Finland is the exception: Finnish is not an Indo-European language, but a language of the Finno-Ugric group, and is related to Estonian and Hungarian. Finland, in addition, retains an element of Russian cultural influence, the legacy of its century under Russian rule (1809–1917).

With regard to foreign policy, by contrast, the Nordic countries are diverse. Denmark, Norway, and Iceland belong to NATO and, as members of a politico-military alliance directed against the Soviet Union, stand apart from the other Nordic countries in a military and strategic sense. Sweden and Finland are officially neutral. Finland, in particular, has a treaty relationship with the Soviet Union that allows for a good deal of Soviet influence in Finnish politics, especially in Finnish military and security affairs.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the three Baltic Soviet republics—make up a special category. In cultural terms, they have been traditionally oriented toward the West. The Lithuanians, a Baltic nation, are staunchly Catholic and have a long history of association with the Poles in the Polish-Lithuanian state (1386–1795). The Latvians, also a Baltic nation, are predominantly Protestant; Latvian areas have at various times been parts of the Hanseatic League, Poland-Lithuania, and Sweden. The Estonians are related to the Finns, so closely that, for example, they are able regularly to follow Finnish radio and television broadcasts from across the Gulf of Finland. Like the Latvians, they are mostly Protestant, and have had long associations with Sweden. All three republics at one time had German minorities. As far as socioeconomic characteristics are concerned, the Baltic republics, though not so highly developed as the Nordic states, are nonetheless the most advanced republics in the Soviet Union. In political terms, the Baltic republics have had some experience with political pluralism, however inadequate and short-lived, during the years of independence (1918–40) before their forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, for its part, performs a variety of roles in the region. First of all, it is hegemon, or imperial master, in its relationship with the Baltic republics.[4] As such, it attempts to control and change these republics' social systems in accordance with its own political and socioeconomic norms and within the parameters of sovereignty and political dominance.

The Soviet Union is also a major regional power in Northern Europe—in fact, *the* most important regional power in the area. As a regional power, it acts in two roles: it is both a Baltic power and a power of the so-called Northern Cap (the area above the Arctic Circle, which includes parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the USSR). Thus, it has two sets of regional relationships, the *only* state to be so situated in the region: it deals with the Baltic states of Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in its capacity as a Baltic power, and with Norway, Sweden, and Finland on matters pertaining to the Northern Cap. Iceland remains outside these circles of regional relationships, but is of great strategic relevance to the Soviet Union as a global power.

In its capacity as a global power, the Soviet Union views the Nordic states in a special light. In particular, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea represent major areas of potential military conflict with the United States. If the Soviet navy and air force were to move aggressively out of the Murmansk area and through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (G-I-UK) gap, the Kremlin would be well on its way toward cutting off the major supply route for US forces in Europe. Were such a mission of interdiction and disruption successful, it could mean the end to a major conflict in Europe very quickly. Even if the principal military action were in Central Europe, the Nordic

[1] Gilberg has discussed the complexities of the Nordic systems in his "Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland: The Struggle Between Nationalism and Internationalism," in David E. Albright, Ed., *Communism and Political Systems in Western Europe*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979, esp. pp. 267–86.

[2] See National Economic Institute, *Basic Statistics of Iceland 1980*, Reykjavik, Gutenberg, 1980.

[3] This issue has been examined in A.F. Upton, Ed., *Communism in Scandinavia and Finland*, Garden City, NY, Anchor Press, 1973.

[4] See, for example, Jaan Pennar, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the Estonian Communist Elite," in Tonu Parming and Elmar Jarvesoo, Eds., *A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978, pp. 120–31.

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

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states, especially Norway, would be crucial in a strategic and military sense.[5]

The Nordic countries are of interest to the Soviet Union in yet other senses. For example, they have strong local labor movements. Moreover, even though the Nordic countries are Western in political orientation and practice, important segments of Nordic public and elite opinion emphasize the region's peculiar position in the confrontation between the Western alliance and the Soviet bloc—specifically, they harbor tendencies toward neutralism and "bridge-building." Such factors provide openings for the Soviet Union in its competition with the "capitalist" world, and they enhance the significance of the Nordic states in the broader global and European contexts.[6]

The Nordic countries also present challenges to the Kremlin. Situated in close proximity to the USSR, they have done much better in terms of political legitimacy, economic performance, and social policy than has the USSR. Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, as members of NATO, are involved in the wider global confrontation between East and West. Sweden, as a highly successful (and militarily strong) neutral with a penchant for harsh criticism of both global powers, is also not to be disregarded. And Finland, despite the liabilities stemming from a foreign policy inextricably tied to that of its outsized neighbor, nevertheless retains its political and economic stability, its national commitment to sovereignty, and its anti-Russian feelings. Seen from Moscow, the Nordic states represent a not inconsiderable, if occasionally intangible, threat.

The threat is exacerbated by the traditional ties of friendship and cultural affinity between the Nordic countries and the Baltic nations. In the Baltic republics, national separatism and a religious revival, especially in Lithuania, have combined to erect major obstacles to Russian influence in a strategically sensitive area. To the extent that the Nordic countries are a point d'appui for centrifugal tendencies within the Soviet empire, then, the challenge represented by the Nordic countries reaches to the very heart of Soviet

[5] See, for example, William K. Sullivan, "Soviet Strategy and NATO's Northern Flank," *Naval War College Review* (Newport, RI), July–August 1979, pp. 26–39.

[6] Ibid.



The American frigate USS Pharris steams alongside a Soviet "Golf-II" class missile submarine which it had detected by sonar in the Baltic Sea on June 10, 1978.

—US Navy photo.

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national sovereignty—a major vulnerability indeed.[7] Even the role of hegemon and imperial master is an uncomfortable one in Northern Europe.

Soviet Policies

Out of the complex interactions of opportunity, vulnerability, and strategy, Soviet decision-makers must fashion global, regional, and bilateral policies toward Northern Europe and the various states therein. For present purposes, these policies can best be described in terms of their politico-ideological, economic, and military-strategic dimensions.

Politico-ideological. The Kremlin has three major politico-ideological objectives in Northern Europe.

First, the Soviet Union has sought to encourage continued neutrality for Sweden and Finland, and to use them both as crucial "bridge-builders" in Europe and elsewhere. It clearly regards the status of Swedish and Finnish security policies as settled and, under the prevailing circumstances of regional politics, views these arrangements as acceptable. Finland played a prominent part in the negotiations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the final signing of the Helsinki accords in 1975, both of which ratified the de facto expansion of Soviet power and influence to the Elbe River and thus satisfied a major Soviet security goal in Europe. Sweden's occasionally strident anti-Americanism, especially during the Vietnam war, was seen as enhancing Soviet interests in the region as well as in Europe generally, while reducing the status of the United States in an area traditionally pro-Western. In both cases, the very status of formal neutrality ensures that societies which are culturally and politically Western will, in fact, remain outside the formal perimeters of the Western alliance system. In this case, Soviet policy seems to be concerned as much with denial of an area to an adversary as with gaining advantages for the USSR.[8]

The Soviet quest for continued Swedish and Finnish neutrality manifests itself in a variety of ways. In the

Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev, left, welcomes Finland's President Urho Kekkonen to Moscow on November 12, 1980.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

case of Finland, the Soviet Union can rely upon a series of formal treaties sanctifying the Finnish position.[9] Moreover, political leaders in Finland, particularly President Urho Kekkonen, have accepted the principle of neutrality and have been working actively to promote it for years. Periodic consultations take place between Moscow and Helsinki, no major foreign policy move is undertaken by the latter before discussion with the former, and there appears to be broad acceptance of this relationship among the Finnish public and political elites. Specific treaty agreements limit the size and equipment of Finland's armed forces, and a mutual defense pact specifies military cooperation in the event of direct military threat to either party. On the whole, Moscow can look upon its relations with Helsinki with a great deal of satisfaction. On the other hand, Finland remains politically and economically pluralistic, with a strong Western cultural bent. Soviet influence, therefore, remains limited in Finland.[10]

Sweden, on the other hand, represents a different brand of neutrality. Unlike Finland, which has an ele-

[7] Outside influence is offset by Soviet control mechanisms. See, for example, Bruno Kalnins, "How Latvia Is Ruled: The Structure of the Political Apparatus," *Journal of Baltic Studies* (Brooklyn, NY), Spring 1977, pp. 70–79.

[8] We have derived this summary from a multitude of sources, including the press in Northern Europe, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), *Pravda* (Moscow), and *Izvestiya* (Moscow). For an example of Soviet statements concerning the necessity of Finnish and Swedish neutrality in the face of NATO's decision to develop nuclear weapons in Western Europe, see a statement by Yuriy Kommissarov in *Suomen Kuvalehti* (Helsinki), November 1978, discussed in *Arbeiderbladet* (Oslo), Dec. 14, 1979.

[9] For the official treaties establishing parameters for Finnish foreign policy, see, for example, General Headquarters, Information Section, Army of Finland, *Finnish National Defence*, Helsinki, n.d., pp. 9–13.

[10] Table 1 shows the strong nonsocialist and non-Communist tendencies in the Finnish electorate.

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ment of foreign policy dependence upon the Soviet Union, Sweden is truly neutral by choice, and it is an armed neutral as well. Sweden has one of the most efficient standing armies in all of Europe, it is capable of mobilizing large numbers of reserves on short notice, and its air force is one of the most powerful on the continent. Under these circumstances, the Soviets are likely to have less influence here than in Finland. One of the Kremlin's primary objectives is the maintenance of Sweden's traditional neutrality, which from the Soviet point of view translates into "area denial"; a neutral country, if not a friend, is at least *not* an enemy. Sweden's consistent support for détente, arms limitation, and disarmament, and its penchant for criticism of Washington, are also positive traits in Soviet eyes and hence clearly to be encouraged.[11]

Second, the Soviet Union has sought to pry Denmark, Norway, and Iceland away from the NATO alliance and other Western cooperative efforts. During the 1970's, Soviet hopes of reviving the neutralist possibility in Denmark and Norway were periodically rekindled, especially during the acrimonious debates in both countries on possible membership in the European Economic Community (EEC).

In Norway especially, this debate brought together a motley coalition of anti-EEC forces, including Conservatives, Agrarians, and Communists, the last of which became rather prominent in the coalition. Since the referendum, which was strongly against Norwegian membership, older political dividing lines have reasserted themselves, and the local Communists have dwindled into relative insignificance after a disastrous split in the party in the mid-1970's. Therefore, the chances of significant Soviet gains in political acceptance in Norway have dwindled, and the Kremlin is apparently resigned to limiting Oslo's attachment to NATO and the West generally.[12]

Soviet pressure has nonetheless become particularly prominent during the last year, when the Norwegian government decided to accept a US proposal for the prepositioning of US military equipment in northern Norway. Throughout 1980, the Soviet government, in a series of messages to Oslo, hammered on the claim that prepositioning would mean an abandonment of what it sees as the traditional Norwegian policy of stationing no foreign troops on Norwegian territory in peacetime. This kind of pressure culminated in a visit to Moscow by Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund around Christmas of 1980. Despite harsh negotiating tactics and considerable political pressure, Moscow failed to dislodge Oslo from its acceptance of prepositioning. Nevertheless, in a decision based as much upon domestic political considerations as upon military-strategic considerations, the Norwegians did agree to move military stocks from the border area to areas in central Norway, in the Trondelag provinces.[13]



Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund, left, in Moscow on December 22, 1980, for talks with Nikolay Tikhonov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

—TASS via NTB.

During the 1970's, Moscow's policy toward Norway also became increasingly strident over issues of territorial delimitation and economic rights in disputed zones. As Norway grew to become a major oil power and as prospecting north of the Arctic Circle increased the likelihood of finding major oil deposits in an area claimed by both Norway and the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders became increasingly truculent, resorting to harsh negotiating stances on the questions of territorial waters and economic rights on Spitsbergen (the Norwegians administer it, but the Soviets have some economic rights specified by international treaty). At the same time; the Soviets undertook a massive buildup of military forces on the Kola Peninsula, which increased the pressure on Oslo and made Soviet policies toward Norway the most dynamic

[11] An excellent survey of the various factors involved in Swedish foreign and defense policies can be found in Nils Andren, *The Security and Defense of Sweden,* Stockholm, National Defense Research Institute, 1976.

[12] A major article in *Arbeiderbladet* (the chief press organ of the Norwegian Labor Party), Dec. 10, 1979, discussed the relations between Norway and the Soviet Union on this and other planes.

[13] The Norwegian press reported extensively on the most recent meeting between Norwegian and Soviet officials, at which prepositioning was discussed. See, for example, *Dagbladet* (Oslo), Dec. 22, 23, 24, 1980.

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and most disturbing in the entire Nordic theater. This set of policies continues to be employed in 1981.[14]

In the case of Denmark, Soviet policy is designed primarily to foster long-standing local tendencies toward pacifism and disarmament. Even though Denmark is not as important strategically as Norway, it does hold the keys to the straits of Oresund, a vital choke point for Soviet access to the North Sea and the Atlantic proper. If the Danish commitment to NATO can be weakened and if the neutralist tendencies in the country can be strengthened, together with increased emphasis on pacifism and unilateral disarmament, the Soviet Union can only benefit, both in its capacity as a regional power in the Baltic area and as a global power confronting the NATO alliance.[15]

Soviet policies toward Iceland reflect yet a separate set of concerns. While Iceland is located outside the immediate spheres of the Baltic Sea and the Northern Cap, it has a uniquely important location, from which a good part of the Atlantic can be surveyed and watched. The withdrawal of Iceland from NATO, or the removal of the US air base at Keflavik, would indeed represent a major foreign policy victory for the Kremlin. Given the Icelanders' traditional tendencies toward pacifism and neutralism, and adding in the persistent anti-Americanism among important leftist elements of the population, the Soviet Union appears to be pursuing a consistent and well-conceived policy toward Iceland, one that essentially aims at "area denial" of this important island to the United States and the Western alliance, or, at least, reduction of the Icelanders' commitment to that alliance.[16]

Third, the Soviet Union has sought to enhance the role of the domestic Left in the Nordic countries. This goal has derived from complex considerations.

For much of the postwar period, the balance of political forces in the Nordic countries has not favored Soviet interests (see Table 1). Specifically, the USSR has not been able to rely on the local Communist parties as effective instruments for its policies. In Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, for example, the local Communist parties have been weak and isolated, in recent years gaining no more than 6 percent of the votes cast in parliamen-

Table 1: Party Vote in Recent Parliamentary Elections in Nordic Countries[a]
(in percent)

	Share of vote (Year of election in parentheses)				
DENMARK[b]	(1971)	(1973)	(1975)	(1977)	(1979)
Social Democrats	37.3	25.6	29.9	37.0	38.3
Radical Liberals	14.4	11.2	7.1	3.6	5.4
Conservatives	16.7	9.2	5.5	8.5	12.5
Liberals	15.6	12.3	23.3	12.0	12.5
Communists	1.4	3.6	4.2	3.7	1.9
Left Socialists	1.6	1.5	2.1	2.7	(1979)
FINLAND		(1975)		(1979)	
Social Democrats		24.9		23.8	
Communists		18.9		17.9	
Center		17.6		17.2	
National Coalition		18.4		21.6	
Swedish People's Party		4.7		4.2	
Liberals		4.4		3.7	
Rural Party		3.6		4.6	
ICELAND		(1978)		(1979)	
Independence Party		32.8		35.5	
People's Alliance		23.0		19.4	
Social Democrats		22.1		17.7	
Progressives		17.2		25.9	
Union of Liberals and Leftists		3.2		—	
NORWAY		(1973)		(1977)	
Labor		35.3		42.3	
New Liberals		3.4		1.4	
Conservatives		17.4		24.8	
Christian Democrats		12.3		12.4	
Communists		—[c]		0.4	
Center		11.0		8.6	
Socialist Left Party		11.2		4.2	
Liberals		3.5		3.2	
Progress Party		5.0		1.9	
SWEDEN	(1968)	(1970)	(1973)	(1976)	(1979)
Conservatives	13.9	11.5	14.3	15.6	20.3
Center Party	16.1	19.9	25.1	24.1	18.1
Liberals	15.0	16.2	9.4	11.1	10.6
Christian Democrats	1.5	1.8	1.8	1.4	1.4
Social Democrats	50.1	45.3	43.6	42.7	43.2
Left Party of Communists	3.0	4.8	5.3	4.8	5.6

[a] For selected political parties.
[b] Among the parties not mentioned is the Progress Party, which has garnered as much as 15 percent of the vote in recent elections.
[c] In Socialist Left Party.

SOURCES: *Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 1979*, Stockholm, Nordic Council, p. 312; *Statistik Arbog 1980* (1980 Statistical Yearbook), Copenhagen, Central Statistical Bureau, 1980, pp. 350-51; *Statistisk Arbok 1979* (Statistical Yearbook 1979), Oslo, Central Statistical Bureau, 1979, p. 380; *Statistik Arsbok For Sverige 1979* (Statistical Yearbook for Sweden 1979), Stockholm, Central Statistical Bureau, 1979, p. 413.

[14] An excellent analysis of the Soviet buildup can be found in Christoph Bertram and Johan J. Holst, Eds., *New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1977.

[15] The NATO discussion about the need for additional and improved nuclear weapons in Western Europe sparked a bitter public debate in Denmark. The Danish foreign minister, Kjeld Olesen, demanded that Danish views be given special consideration in the debates, so that the Danish government could better deal with hostile public reactions to the NATO decisions. In the end, the Danish government did agree to the final NATO communique. See *Arbeiderbladet*, Dec. 13, 1979.

[16] See Gilberg, op. cit., esp. pp. 274–75, 285–86, and 290–91.

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tary elections. As far as the Danish party (Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti, or DKP) and especially the Norwegian party (Norges Kommunistiske Parti, or NKP) are concerned, this lack of popularity has stemmed in part from the success of the leftist socialists, who have become major forces in national politics. In the Swedish case, it has stemmed partly from a split in the party in the 1970's, in which the critical attitudes of leaders of the Left Party of Communists (Vansterpartiet Kommunisterna, or VPK) toward the Soviet Union led to a schism and the formation of a pro-Moscow party, the Swedish Communist Party (Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti, or SKP). In Iceland and Finland, by contrast, the local Communist parties are fairly substantial. Nevertheless, because of pronounced nationalist tendencies in the Icelandic party (Sameiningar flokkur altydu-Socialista flokkurinn, or SA-SF) and ideological splits in the Finnish party (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue, or SKP), neither is as strong as circumstances might otherwise allow.[17]

Instead of relying on the local Communists, therefore, the Soviet Union has had to seek accommodation with additional elements on the Nordic political spectrum. Obviously, it has had no basis for turning to the nonsocialist parties and groups, which are clearly anti-Soviet and pro-Western. Nor has it had the inclination to work with the plethora of small Maoist, Trotskyist, and other extreme left-wing groups, which are often hostile to the Soviet Union. It has perforce sought to make use of the full spectrum of forces in between these poles—an extraordinarily complex amalgamation of parties and groups formed out of the recurrent splits and schisms of the postwar era.

This approach has had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the combined Left is much stronger than any of the Communist parties. On the other hand, serious ideological differences, together with outright hostility toward the Soviet Union among many non-Communist groups on the left, have sharply reduced the opportunities available to the Soviets. This is particularly true because the Social Democrats have long espoused anticommunism at home and abroad and have been among the chief architects

[17] Ibid., esp. pp. 304–14.

Danish citizens protest delivery of ammunition to NATO depots from a freighter in the Danish town of Esbjerg. The poster reads: "Fight NATO—the Instrument of Imperialism."

—Erik Friis/Politikens Presse Foto via UPI.

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of the region's various security policies, which even in the neutral countries have had distinct anti-Soviet overtones.

Throughout the 1970's and into the 1980's, then, Soviet policy toward the Nordic Left has had to steer a delicate course. As self-proclaimed leader of the world Communist movement, the Soviet Union can hardly denounce the official Communist parties of the region, even though some have been rather vociferous in their criticism of such Soviet actions as the invasion of Afghanistan and the violation of human rights within the USSR. Yet it cannot allow friendly (if cautious) relations with the local Communists to jeopardize its formal ties with the moderate social democrats in countries where the latter either rule alone (Norway and, during part of the period, Sweden) or in coalition (Denmark and Finland), or its formal ties with leftist socialists (Iceland, in the leftist coalition known as the People's Alliance—Althydubandalagid, or AB—which is under Communist leadership). In the case of Iceland, furthermore, relations with a broad spectrum of the Left are complicated by the AB's strong anti-Soviet stance on many issues, a fact that has curtailed any opportunities for Soviet foreign policy there.[18]

In concrete terms, therefore, Soviet policies toward the Left have meant support at election time, harsh criticism of other political groups, persistent demands that the Nordic peoples recognize their special geopolitical location and their "duty" to establish "progressive" political regimes, and castigation of the "imperialists," especially the United States.[19] In so doing, the Soviet Union has acted on the vague but generally correct assumption that a stronger Nordic Left is likely to redound to its own benefit and enhance its broader foreign policy goals.

All in all, however, Soviet politico-ideological approaches in the region have had but limited success at best. While Finnish and Swedish neutrality seem assured, both countries (society at large and most of the political elite) remain oriented toward the West in many crucial respects, a fact that has denied the Soviet Union any major influence in the domestic and regional policies of these Nordic states. In Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, too, public opinion and most of the political elite remain firmly in the Western camp despite great Soviet pressures, especially against Norway. Finally, there is no indication that the Nordic Left as a whole is susceptible to manipulation by the Soviet Union.

Economic. Another significant aspect of Soviet policy toward Northern Europe has been the attempt to expand economic ties. Although the Soviet Union is not wont to give full explanations of its policy objectives, it is clear that a major Soviet goal in approaching Northern Europe is strongly economic in character—the need to rationalize foreign trade and gain the comparative advantages conferred by geography and other factors. Here, the technologically advanced Nordic countries have much to offer in the way of trade and technology transfer. Sweden and Finland, in particular, can play a special role, that of making available to the Soviet Union certain high-technology items that might not otherwise be obtained from the member states of COCOM, the coordinating commission whose function it is to control trade in strategic items with the Soviet Union.[20] It is also clear that the Soviets look forward to other advantages—political, ideological, even military and strategic—if their trade practices succeed in influencing the Nordic countries' domestic policies to any significant degree.

The extent to which Soviet economic policy has been successful (or unsuccessful) in the region can be ascertained from recent foreign trade statistics. As is evident in Table 2, the Nordic countries trade primarily among themselves and with other Western nations, and only secondarily with the Soviet Union. In 1978, for example, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark each obtained less than 3 percent of its imports from the Soviet Union, and Iceland, only 8.5 percent of its imports. Finland was the exception, with an import figure of 18.7 percent. The pattern of exports to the Soviet Union is similar. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark each sent no more than 1 percent of all its exports to the Soviet Union, Iceland no more than 4 percent, and Finland 17.8 percent. More recent data are expected to show little change in most respects, although in the case of Iceland overall trade has been increasing in recent years, and it now appears that this trend will accelerate in 1981.[21]

The kinds of commodities traded between the USSR and the Nordic countries are equally instructive. As for imports from the Soviet Union, oil is overwhelmingly the most important item. In recent years, it has accounted for approximately 75–80 percent of

[18] For a detailed analysis of the major developments in the Nordic Left, see ibid.

[19] These aspects of Soviet policy were clearly present during political talks between Nordic leaders and Soviet representatives—for example, during Norway's talks in Moscow in December 1979, as reported in *Arbeiderbladet*, Dec. 11, 1979.

[20] The structure of Finnish and Swedish trade with the Soviet Union in fact reflects the Soviet emphasis on the import of advanced machinery.

[21] "The Trade Between Iceland and the Soviet Union Increases with Every Year," *Morgunbladid* (Reykjavik), Sept. 17, 1980.

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Table 2: Trade of Nordic States with Selected Partners, 1978

(in millions of US dollars)

IMPORTS

Partner	Importing country: Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Denmark	—	212.1	67.5	763.5	1,446.3
Finland	514.5	—	15.2	460.9	1,265.1
Iceland	13.7	15.5	—	11.0	12.4
Norway	621.0	217.8	56.7	—	1,116.6
Sweden	1,925.2	1,131.1	64.0	2,101.8	—
United Kingdom	1,691.8	719.2	71.5	1,371.1	2,284.5
US	811.5	394.4	2.5	775.6	1,499.3
USSR	319.5	1,473.5	57.5	108.8	547.0
All countries	14,765.0	7,854.7	678.4	11,482.6	20,512.7

EXPORTS

Partner	Exporting country: Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Denmark	—	348.0	12.5	584.0	1,976.8
Finland	207.6	—	14.7	193.0	1,243.7
Iceland	83.3	12.8	—	54.9	53.1
Norway	778.4	430.2	9.9	—	2,230.3
Sweden	1,524.6	1,249.1	11.0	1,091.9	—
United Kingdom	1,703.5	1,076.4	110.0	3,813.4	2,353.2
US	663.2	336.8	2.9	545.1	1,372.0
USSR	66.7	1,524.3	25.6	88.8	211.6
All countries	11,845.3	8,551.4	650.2	10,893.9	21,726.9

SOURCE: *Yearbook of Nordic Statistics, 1979*, Stockholm, Nordic Council, 1979, pp. 172–75.

each country's imports from the USSR—79.6 percent for Norway (1978), 79.8 percent for Sweden (1979), 74.8 percent for Finland (1976), 79.8 percent for Denmark (1980), and more than 80 percent for Iceland (1980).[22] Nevertheless, most of the region's oil comes not from the Soviet Union, but from other suppliers. The exception has been Iceland, which until mid-1980 imported all its oil from the USSR. Recently, however, Iceland diversified its oil supplies by signing a long-term contract with the British National Oil Company (BNOC)—a move prompted more by price considerations, it is said, than by a fear of dependence on the Soviet Union.[23]

As for exports to the Soviet Union, manufactures and finished goods, especially machinery, predominate. In recent years, for example, paper and machinery accounted for 64.1 percent of Norway's exports to the Soviet Union (1978); machinery and finished goods, 81.1 percent of Sweden's exports to the Soviet Union (1979); and ships, paper products, and machinery, 75.5 percent of Finland's exports (1976).[24] Iceland, again an exception, has sold and still sells large quantities of fish to the Soviet Union. If its traditional markets in Western Europe and the United States continue to decline, as is expected, it may well increase its sales to the Soviet Union.[25]

In terms of individual commodities, then, there is little evidence that the Soviet Union has achieved any significant economic penetration of Denmark, Norway, or Sweden. The exceptions, albeit partial ones, are Finland and Iceland. Finland has long utilized relatively close economic relations with the Soviet Union as a counterpoise in foreign policy. Moreover, such sectors of Finnish industry as metalworking and shipbuilding have developed a steady and reliable market to the east; this relationship, originally established for reasons of economic stability, has now become one more of necessity. Even in the special case of Finland, however, trade with the West vastly exceeds trade with the Soviet Union, in terms of both volume and commodity mix. Iceland, although heavily reliant on imported oil and exports of fish to the USSR, is distant enough and seemingly flexible enough to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining major political advantage from the relationship. For no single commodity, it would appear, are the Nordic countries irrevocably dependent on the Soviet Union.

The Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are seemingly of little importance in Soviet-Nordic economic relations. Unfortunately, Soviet trade statistics are not broken down in such a way as to document this proposition.[26] Obviously, there is some trade, if only unofficial—for example, that carried on by tourists or Swedish middlemen on a very small

[22] See *Statistik Arbok 1979* (1979 Statistical Yearbook), Oslo, Central Statistical Bureau, 1979, pp. 174–75; *Statistisk Arsbok For Sverige 1979* (Statistical Yearbook for Sweden 1979), Stockholm, Central Statistical Bureau, 1979, pp. 164–69; *Suomen Tilastollinen Vuosikirja* (Finnish Statistical Yearbook), Helsinki, Central Statistical Office, 1977, pp. 142–48; *Manedsstatistik over udenrigshandelen* (Monthly Bulletin of External Trade), Copenhagen, Danmarks Statistik, 1980 (data are for the first 11 months of 1980); discussion in the Economic/Commercial Section, US Embassy, Reykjavik, June 20, 1980.

[23] Interview with leaders of the Social Democratic Party, Reykjavik, July 11, 1980.

[24] For Norway, see *Statistisk Arbok*, pp. 174–75; Sweden, *Statistisk Arsbok*, pp. 164–69; and Finland, *Suomen Tilastollinen Vuosikirja*, pp. 142–48.

[25] "The Trade Between Iceland and the Soviet Union Increases with Every Year," *Morgunbladid*, Sept. 17, 1980.

[26] The trade statistics on both sides merely show trade between countries, not between subdivisions thereof.

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

Soviet tanker "Volgoneft' 65M" loads up with petroleum products for delivery to Finland.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

scale. But even if the Soviet Union has only partially achieved its goal of full integration of the Baltic republics into the Soviet economy, it still has been able to curtail the direct flow of trade between the Nordic countries and the Baltic republics. Under other circumstances, it should be noted, the more natural prewar pattern of trade across the Baltic could perhaps be resurrected.

The specific features of Soviet-Nordic trade relations described here—the exchange of Soviet oil for Nordic machinery—may not endure for long. For example, if projections of future Soviet oil shortages prove accurate and if North Sea oilfields come on line as expected, much less oil may change hands. But the general pattern—the exchange of Soviet raw materials for sophisticated Nordic manufactures—will probably continue. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union, whose products are seen as low in quality and as having few ready applications in Western economies, can gain an unshakable economic hold over the Nordic countries. Despite considerable Soviet efforts, the Nordic economies remain firmly oriented toward the West.

Military-strategic. Soviet military influence in Northern Europe is significant and apparently growing. The Soviet approach to Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland has increasingly stressed the region's military and strategic importance to vital Soviet interests.[27]

Northern Europe, as defined here, presents both challenges and opportunities to the Soviet Union in a military-strategic sense, no matter whether it is viewed in terms of the defense of the Soviet homeland (whether "Mother Russia" or the "Socialist Bastion" is irrelevant), the maintenance of the Soviet position as a regional power, or the projection of Soviet power on a global scale. That is, so long as there is a great power whose central base lies between the Urals in the east and the Vistula in the west, that power will have vital strategic interests in Northern Europe. The movement of the capital to St. Petersburg on the Neva estuary in 1712 emphasized those interests, just as the return of the capital to Moscow in 1918 deemphasized them, but the interests remained nonetheless.

The Baltic republics and Finland are vital to the defense of the USSR. The Baltic republics (including, for our purposes here, the Soviet-occupied portions of the former German province of East Prussia) guard the land approach to Leningrad from Central Europe, and

[27] Such views have been expressed repeatedly by Soviet leaders. For a Soviet tour d'horizon of security problems in the North, see the statements made by leading Soviet political figures (including Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov) to a high Norwegian foreign ministry official during a visit to Moscow in February 1979, in *Arbeiderbladet*, Feb. 22, 1979.

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their actual or potential control by a hostile power based in Central Europe would impose a serious strategic disadvantage to the defense of the Northern European USSR—as Stalin recognized in ordering their occupation in 1940 and as the Germans "confirmed" a scant year later. Similarly, Finland guards the northern land approach to Leningrad, whose importance was again demonstrated by Soviet and German operations before and during World War II. But there are differences between the two areas. Finland is insulated to some degree by a neutral Sweden to the west. Moreover, the difficulties of supporting major operations overland through Norway, Sweden, and Finland offer a degree of protection not available on the southeastern side of the Baltic. Finally, control of the Baltic republics provides a base for operations to deny use of the eastern Baltic for a direct attack on Leningrad or for land operations through southern Finland. From the Soviet point of view, in other words, Finland's independence since World War II is tolerable in a military-strategic sense, principally because the Baltic republics are part of the USSR, and secondarily because Sweden is neutral. Changes in either of those conditions, however unlikely, would probably trigger a change in Soviet posture.

In the far north, the Murmansk-Arkhangel'sk area offers the only relatively unrestricted sea access to the European USSR from any source. To the south, the Turkish straits and the Black Sea afford comparatively little maneuvering room for large-scale naval operations. Farther north, the Baltic straits and the relatively constricted Baltic itself provide defensive opportunities to the USSR. To the far north, by contrast, the Norwegian Sea approaches to the USSR's northern coast are open, and the possibilities of land access (at least to Murmansk) from northern Norway are serious. The allied occupation of the Arkhangel'sk area (1918–19) during the revolution and civil war, though never supported adequately to challenge the new Bolshevik regime, does furnish a graphic example of the importance of the area in terms of defense. Stalin's insistence on Finnish territorial concessions in the north after World War II is also revealing of Soviet concerns. Current Soviet objections to a third-party military presence in northern Norway, and to pre-stockage of supplies for US forces in the area, surely are linked to sensitivity concerning vulnerabilities in the region.[28]

[28] The latest Soviet views on this subject were expressed to Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund in Moscow. See, for example, *Dagbladet*, Dec. 22 and 23, 1980.

United States Marines pictured in northern Norway in March 1980 during the NATO exercise "Anorak Express."

—Lehtikuva via Photoreporters.

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As a regional power, the USSR has interests of a dual nature in Northern Europe. One interest is to prevent extraregional powers from establishing a strong presence there, be it diplomatic, economic, or military. The other is to prevent the Nordic states from combining to present a common front against the preservation and expansion of Soviet influence. In both, the Baltic Sea is of primary importance. It is a reentrant to the Soviet position in eastern Europe, and while its southern flanks are covered by Poland and the GDR, the straits providing access to the Baltic are controlled by NATO members, and neutral Sweden and Finland afford less than perfect control of the northern flank. Thus, in peacetime, the USSR must attempt to use its political influence to minimize the entry of other maritime powers, and in periods of heightened tension must be prepared to control the Baltic straits and Baltic airspace. While Poland and the GDR territorially fall outside the scope of this article, it should be noted that Soviet hegemony over both renders the status quo elsewhere more acceptable.

In the north and west, too, the possibility of finding undersea mineral deposits, including oil (the region is largley unexplored in this regard), and the strategic imperative of securing shipping lanes to the Soviet Arctic and Far East give an added impetus to the extension of Soviet control offshore. Maritime air surveillance over the Norwegian Sea is also essential in order to provide early warning of any potentially hostile presence north and east of the G-I-UK gap. Here, again, Norwegian membership in NATO, unpalatable as it is to the Soviet Union under any circumstances, is slightly less odious because of Norway's refusal to permit foreign bases on its territory during peacetime. Soviet sensitivity to events in Finland, Sweden, and Norway testifies to an unrelenting sense of insecurity over that which the Soviets do not control absolutely. Soviet intransigence in its relations with Norway over Spitsbergen and subsurface mineral exploration in the Barents Sea is but one example of this general disquietude.[29]

In its attempt to project its power on a global scale, the Soviet Union seeks access to the world seas for both the Soviet merchant marine and the Soviet navy. Both fleets rely heavily on the existence of land bases in the north, on some degree of control over the Norwegian Sea, and on access to the North Atlantic through the G-I-UK gap. Even though geography and weather require long and inhospitable sailing, at least for surface vessels, until "open" seas are reached, the Soviets must see these northern bases (and their defense) as vital both to the protection of Soviet power in peace and to the denial of critical choke points to other maritime powers in war. Constricted as the northern route into the Atlantic may be, it is far less so than any others, such as those in the south (the Black Sea-Turkish straits, Suez, or Gibraltar) or in the Pacific (Vladivostok-Sea of Japan-La Perousse Strait, Sea of Okhotsk). In addition, it is ice-free the year round. To be sure, modern nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN), with their longer-range missiles, do not require transit out of the Arctic area in order to launch their weapons, but they do require the loitering space and depth northern waters afford. In the case of attack submarines, which would be crucial to any effort to deny North Atlantic shipping routes, only the northern bases provide satisfactory home ports. Alternatives within range, such as the Turkish straits-Gibraltar and the Baltic straits, are far too susceptible to interdiction, and neither the Baltic nor the Mediterranean offers the maneuvering room that the Norwegian Sea does.[30]

Sergeant Vladimir Povaren leads an antiaircraft squad in training exercises held in the Baltic Military District of the USSR in August 1979.

—TASS Sovfoto.

Northern Europe, then, constitutes an area of vital military importance to the USSR in any of its various roles. In some ways, it may appear to have a lower priority in Soviet strategy than Central Europe, where Soviet ground and air forces are heavily concentrated. Nevertheless, if one looks at Soviet naval and air de-

[29] Ibid.

[30] This judgment is based on examination of hydrographic charts and the requirements of modern navies for open water.

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fense forces positioned in the north, one has little doubt of the importance Northern Europe occupies in Soviet strategic thinking. While Soviet intentions—offensive or defensive—may not be entirely clear, the very presence of these forces must raise questions as to their ultimate purpose. In any case, Soviet concern with political events in the Nordic states provides ample evidence of the attention and priority the region receives in Moscow.

Such military and strategic concerns in Northern Europe have induced the Soviet Union to take a number of specific military steps designed to enhance its own position while weakening that of any adversary, whether potential or real.

First, it has stationed substantial conventional and nuclear forces in close proximity to Northern Europe. Some of these forces are in a high state of readiness and can be expected to move rapidly to achieve their objective. The following are identified as targeted primarily for duty in Northern Europe:

The Baltic Military District has three tank divisions, five motorized rifle divisions, and two airborne divisions. These forces are backed up by 25 submarines, at least 40 major surface combat ships, and 120 naval bombers. (In the Baltic environment, minor surface combatants are likewise important; however, exact figures are not available). An air army is assigned to the Baltic District, but its exact size is not known, primarily because of rapid movements of some units in and out of the district. There is also a regiment of naval infantry.

The Leningrad Military District, which includes the Kola Peninsula, has eight motorized rifle divisions, one airborne division, one rocket brigade armed with SCUD-B surface-to-surface missiles, one regiment of naval infantry, and the Northern Fleet at Severomorsk, which includes 130 submarines, 80 major surface combatants, and about 80 bombers. There is an air army (exact size not known) assigned to the district. Excluding artillery and aircraft capable of nuclear weapons delivery, there are more than 90 missile launchers of various types capable of medium- and short-range nuclear launches. In addition, large Air Defense Forces (PVO Strany) are present in the Leningrad and Kola areas.[31]

Second, since the Soviet Union has universal military conscription, it can mobilize large numbers of reserves in short order. Full mobilization would put millions of men in uniform, a substantial number of whom can be directed to the northern front if necessary.

The Soviet forces listed above are massive. Disproportionately large to serve any defensive purposes, such force concentrations can only have *offensive* implications as well. They thus become a salient part of the policy environment in which Nordic decisionmakers formulate foreign and defense policies.

The Baltic republics. Obviously, the Kremlin's polices toward Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are not those it conducts toward the Nordic states. Even so, the three Baltic republics constitute somewhat of a separate entity inside the USSR, because of their linguistic and cultural peculiarities, their strong (and perhaps growing) sense of political nationalism, and their enduring ties with the independent Nordic states. As noted above, they are of crucial military-strategic concern, since they sit athwart both a primary access route to Leningrad and a traditional invasion route to and from the West. Furthermore, continued Soviet control over Poland and the GDR depends on quick and easy access through the Baltic republics. In addition to these military-strategic concerns, the Soviet leadership views the Baltic republics as crucial to several of its long-standing, fundamental policy goals.

First, the Baltic republics are a key testing area for the Soviet policy of Russification, which here includes in-migration of Russians in large numbers,[32] clear discrimination against the local languages and cultures,[33] and a tight hold by Russians over the republic party apparats. (As an Estonian dissident so eloquently stated, "Estonia is the largest country in the world. It is located on the western shores of the Soviet Union, its capital is in Moscow, and its people are in Siberia.") This policy is an integral part of the drive for the forceful expansion of Russian power and Russian culture and thereby for the political penetration and control of the Soviet borderlands.

Second, the Baltic republics are being rapidly developed in certain economic sectors that can take advantage of key local features. Industries such as electronics, for example, rely heavily on the relatively large numbers of skilled manpower in the area. Similarly, agricultural sectors such as animal husbandry, dairy farming, and vegetable and fruit growing can utilize the area's traditionally high agricultural productivi-

[31] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1980–1981*, London, 1980, pp. 10–12; supplemented by conversations with Scandinavian defense officials.

[32] For details, see John L. Scherer, *USSR: Facts and Figures Annual*, Gulf Breeze, FL, Academic Internnational Press, 1978, pp. 153–55.

[33] See, for example, Parming and Jarvesoo, op. cit., Chaps. 2 and 3.

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ty—here, it seems, for the purpose of supplying the large population concentrations in Russia proper, especially Leningrad.[34] The economic importance of the three republics is therefore greater than mere considerations of size would suggest.

Third, any manifestation of political and religious dissent in the area is harshly repressed. During the 1960's and 1970's, for example, religious activities among Lithuanians caused great concern in Moscow, which sees a potential for close religious ties between Lithuanians and Poles. This concern has been especially evident since the mid-1970's, as the growing popular dissatisfaction in Poland has brought that country to what Moscow now sees as "near anarchy."[35] Moscow's nervous reaction to developments in Lithuania, and its decisive moves against any manifestations of nationalism and cultural separatism in Estonia and Latvia as well, reveal both its fears and its determination to keep the area firmly in hand.

In the final analysis, Soviet policy toward Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is a form of "area denial" strategy. Moscow aims at reducing the possibility of undue Nordic cultural and economic influence, for it is well aware that such influence, coupled with widespread ethnic and religious separatism and political nationalism, might have dangerous political implications in a brittle multinational empire. Given the relatively frequent contacts between the Nordic countries (particularly Sweden and Finland) and the three Baltic republics (particularly Estonia and Latvia), denial of the Nordic influence is no easy task.

Northern Responses

In recent years, Soviet leaders have had clear signs of a mounting concern in Northern Europe regarding their policies within the region and outside, particularly in Afghanistan. Specifically, there have been indications of an increasing perception, among both policymakers and the general public in Northern Europe, of a Soviet military threat and of the need to reconsider security and defense policies accordingly. Although the precise character of this reaction differs from country to country, those in the Kremlin must take it into consideration as a factor of some importance for Soviet policy in the years to come.

Sweden. Whether by necessity or choice, this nation of only 8.3 million people has not fought a war since the Napoleonic era. Traditionally, its foreign policy has been one of "non-alignment (or 'Freedom from alliances') between power blocs in peace, aiming at neutrality in war."[36] Such neutrality, it is emphasized, is de facto neutrality, a neutrality unsupported by international guarantees or by conventional international law, as in the Swiss or Austrian cases. It is a neutrality that would

. . .assure the nation's freedom of action in all situations by means we ourselves choose, so that within our borders we can preserve and develop our society in accordance with our own values in political, economic, social, cultural and all other respects, and at the same time work in the world for international detente and peaceful development.[37]

For most of the post–World War II era, Swedish neutrality has had several major corollaries. Neutrality presupposes credibility, and successive Swedish governments and all four major political parties have therefore concluded that in order to preserve its credibility, Sweden requires a strong, all-round (but nonnuclear) "total defense." Total defense, as conceived of in Sweden, includes not only military defense but also civil defense, economic defense, psychological defense, and "other" defense (e.g. telecommunications and medical care).[38] Furthermore, given the realities of a divided Europe, neutrality presupposes the ability to deter a "marginal attack." Swedish strategic planners assume that:

. . . a power which might threaten or even attack Sweden will always have a substantial part of its resources tied up for other purposes, for example to counter any expected or unexpected confrontation with the other superpower. Thus only a marginal part

[34] This charge is increasingly being made by recent émigrés from the Baltic republics, especially Estonia.

[35] For an excellent analysis of the Polish situation and Moscow's reaction to it, see Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Workers and Party in Poland," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December 1980, pp. 1–22.

[36] Nils Andren et al., *The Future of the Nordic Balance*, Stockholm, Ministry of Defense, Secretariat for National Security Policy and Long-range Defense Planning (SSLP), 1977, p. 85. For additional background information, see Johan Jorgen Holst, Ed., *Five Roads to Nordic Security*, Oslo, University Press, 1973, pp. 208–12.

[37] As reiterated by the Swedish Undersecretary of State for Defense in introducing the five-year defense budget for the period 1977/78–1981/82. Cited in *Swedish Security Policy and Total Defense*, Stockholm, SSLP, 1977, p. 2.

[38] Most Swedes generally see no contradiction between defense preparations and deep involvement in international work for disarmament. Moreover, they see Swedish defense as an important factor in maintaining the Nordic balance, which, if upset, might result in direct superpower confrontation in the Nordic area. See, for example, ibid., p. 3; and *The Swedish Budget 1978/79*, Stockholm, Goteborgs Printers AB, 1978, p. 86.

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of the military strength of a superpower could be used in an attack on Sweden.

* * * * *

. . . provided that the goal in Sweden is limiting and the country can defend itself, the value of controlling Sweden or part of Sweden will not be worth the cost of conquest.[39]

Acting on this assumption, they have planned to meet the marginal attack through a combination of (1) territorial defense based on rapid mobilization of a large conscript force and a home guard armed with relatively inexpensive weapons *and* (2) a peripheral defense based principally on high-technology aircraft and naval forces defending well beyond Sweden's land and sea boundaries. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, emphasis was on peripheral defense. With a period of relatively high inflation, however, has come a continuing defense debate on the cost and wisdom of attempting to carry out both strategies simultaneously and on the precise mix of weapons systems best able to sustain either strategy or both.[40] Finally, Sweden's policy of neutrality presupposes a *tous azimuts* strategy of being able to defend against an attack from any quarter, a strategy that befits Sweden's strategic location between the superpowers and their allies. In the 1940's and 1950's, in fact, Swedish forces were tasked with defense against attacks both from the Baltic and through Finland. In 1963, however, these missions were redefined to provide for either one or the other, not both simultaneously.

At the same time, certain significant factors have tended to erode these corollaries, primarily the *tous azimuts* strategy. Swedish defense planners, though they may not say so publicly, probably have long considered the chief military threat to be from the Soviet Union, and their sympathies clearly lie with the West.[41] For example, the 1962 defense report of the Swedish Supreme Commander was based on a Baltic attack from the east and showed the Soviet Union as the aggressor (of course, the Soviet ambassador protested strongly to the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs). More recently, Swedish defense planners have duly taken note of the large buildup of Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula, in which a standing force of two Category I motorized divisions, a rocket brigade, a brigade of naval infantry, some 300 aircraft, and more than 90 nuclear-missile launchers have been introduced.[42]

As a result, Swedish defense policy has in practice shifted significantly in recent decades. To be sure, Swedish policymakers cannot formally align themselves against what must be perceived as the principal military threat to Sweden. There is a clear public consensus in Sweden for a policy of neutrality, and any alignment would almost guarantee, in the event of war between the superpowers, the Soviet attack Sweden seeks to avoid. Nonetheless, it is clear that Swedish defense planners see the main threat in the east. Even though they cannot plan on direct NATO support, for example, defense planners probably do consider the extent to which NATO force commitments to the northern flank would reduce at the margin Soviet capabilities against Sweden. (It should be noted that some defense planners have explicitly denied that the United States would come to Sweden's aid in the event of a Soviet attack.[43])

The principal contingency for which Swedish defense specialists must now plan is that of a Soviet attack on Norway. Such an attack could come as an amphibious operation through the Baltic or along the western coast of Norway. Or it could come as a land invasion (across rugged off-road terrain, the defense of which would slow, but not stop, a determined Soviet attack), with large tank and motorized infantry forces, across Finland and northern Sweden "to secure the northern Norwegian coastline in order to control the ice-free approaches to the vast military complex at Murmansk."[44] Swedish thinking now is that the latter case is the more probable, largely because of the modernization of Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula.

[39] Andren et al., op. cit., p. 94.

[40] See Ingemar Dorfer, "The Nordic Balance in Perspective: Sweden," paper prepared for the Seminar on International Security Problems in the Nordic Area, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, June 15–16, 1978, pp. 7–23.

[41] See Katarina Brodin, *Surprise Attack: Problems and Issues,* Stockholm, SSLP, 1975, pp. 15–16; and Thorbjorn Falldin, *Swedish Security Policy,* Stockholm, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press and Information Department, 1978, p. 2.

[42] See John Erickson, "The Northern Theatre: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," *Strategic Review* (Washington, DC), Summer 1976, pp. 70–71; Marian K. Leighton, *The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank,* New York, NY, National Strategy Information Center, 1979, pp. 6–13; Robert G. Weinland, "The State and Future of the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic," in Christoph Bertram and Johan J. Holst, Eds., *New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1977, pp. 55–59; and R.D.M. Furlong, "The Threat to Northern Europe," *International Defense Review* (Geneva), April 1979, p. 521.

[43] See, for example, the denial at a meeting of the Swedish Institute of Foreign Affairs, reported in *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm), May 4, 1977.

[44] *Aviation Week and Space Technology* (Albany, NY), May 15, 1978, p. 16. See also Erickson, loc. cit., pp. 70–72; and Nils Orvik, "Scandinavian Military Doctrines," in Frank B. Horton, III, Anthony C. Rogerson, and Edward L. Warner, III, Eds., *Comparative Defense Policy*, Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, pp. 265–66.

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A unit of the Red Banner Northern Fleet of the Soviet navy practices a sea-borne landing in August 1977.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

In either case, however, a Soviet thrust into Norway would put Sweden in an extremely difficult position. First, the Soviets might not want to commit major naval forces to large amphibious landings in Norway, preferring to hold them in reserve initially. Second, the Soviets might consider that

The rapid transit of ground troops to the north could be facilitated by the use of Finnish territory and rail links, "doubling up" on Soviet capacity. Swedish airspace could be utilized simply by over-flying for high priority missions or some form of "pre-emptive occupation" on the pretext of NATO's making use of Swedish facilities—a number of scenarios suggest themselves, all with the background that the Soviet Union could not leave Sweden out of its military calculations.[45]

Third, the Soviets might want to use the Swedish transportation system as a means of rapidly placing conventional forces in strategically important locations simultaneously in both Norway and Denmark; Swedish air bases and airports might be viewed of additional value.[46] Fourth, a Soviet thrust through the Baltic into the Atlantic would necessarily mean the destruction of Norway's coastal defenses and the neutralization of Swedish coastal defenses.[47] Fifth, if Soviet military operations against Norway were completed successfully, it is difficult to imagine the Soviets' ignoring a "neutral," capitalist country with a mobilized, technologically sophisticated armed force of 800,000 intact in the USSR's newly acquired "front yard." Soviet leaders might see the ideological and political costs of doing so as simply too high.[48] Such calculations arise no matter whether one concludes that the position of Norway (and Denmark and Sweden) "behind the lines" of Soviet strategy makes them important strategically or that the Soviet deployment of new technology (mainly naval) on the Kola Peninsula makes them less important and thus less likely to be

[45] Erickson, loc. cit., p. 8.
[46] See Andren, *The Security and Defense of Sweden*, p. 79; and Orvik, loc. cit., p. 265–66.
[47] Erickson, loc. cit.
[48] Orvik, loc. cit.

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occupied.[49]

Other contingencies and questions must also be examined. For example, the rapid increase in deployments of Soviet SS-20 missiles against Central Europe and the NATO decision to install Pershing II and cruise missiles in response portend, to some observers, violation of Swedish neutral airspace in time of war.[50] Some Swedish defense planners have suggested that this threat calls for fewer fighter aircraft and more and better capabilities for air defense with surface-to-air missiles.[51] This could become a seriously divisive issue in interservice relations in Sweden.

In addition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a neutral nation bordering on the Soviet Union, has caused considerable concern among Swedish planners, especially because Soviet submarines have repeatedly violated Swedish territorial waters. Sweden has taken a public position firmly against the Soviet invasion.

Despite these various new considerations, however, it should be underscored that Sweden's defense planners join those in other industrialized democracies in their concern over military spending. The high and rising cost of defense manpower has led to numerous cost-cutting programs. Many military installations and units have been shut down, training of reserve forces has been seriously curtailed, and conscript training is to be all but ended for young people whose civilian skills are directly transferable to military job requirements.[52] A government commission recommended in 1980 that women be permitted officer commissions in the combat arms as well as the support arms of the armed forces.[53] And debates over military spending, led by the Social Democrats, have long delayed a government decision on the follow-on aircraft to replace the Viggen fighter in the 1990's.[54]

These changing perceptions among Swedish defense planners are reflected in changing perceptions among the Swedish public. It should be noted that the Swedish government plays an active role in shaping Swedish public opinion on defense issues. For example, attempts are being made to broaden public discussion and debate on defense policy in Sweden through a number of programs in the school system. Nevertheless, most of the information on Swedish security comes from the mass media, in which the government takes a prominent part.[55]

Swedish public opinion on various aspects of "total defense" is surveyed regularly by the Swedish Board of Psychological Defense and reported periodically in the media. Of particular interest here are two recent survey questions, one dealing with the degree to which the USSR, the United States, and China threaten world peace, the second with the extent to which the two superpowers are a threat to Sweden.

In regard to the first question, the percentage of Swedes who perceive a threat to world peace from the United States declined fairly steadily from 20 percent in 1973 to 10 percent in 1980. The percentage who perceive a threat to world peace from the Soviets increased from 15 percent to 36 percent during the same period. Significantly, those who view Soviet policy as a threat to world peace rose markedly between the fall of 1979 and the spring of 1980, from 23 percent to 35 percent, probably as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[56]

In regard to the second question, few think that the superpowers are a direct threat to Sweden, although the number who view the Soviet Union as a threat or as unfriendly to Sweden has clearly increased while the number who so view the United States has declined markedly.[57] In general, the 1980 survey by the Swedish Board of Psychological Defense showed that "71% of those surveyed are uneasy over tension in the world as compared with 51% in the fall of 1979. Fifty-three percent are of the opinion that there is a large risk of major conflict into which Europe can be drawn (only 39% the previous fall)."[58]

Despite these changes in Swedish perceptions of the Soviet threat, there will certainly be no change in the fundamental Swedish policy of "neutrality in peace aimed at nonalignment in war." However, changing perceptions may well lead to a greater will-

[49] See Arthur E. Dewey, "The Nordic Balance," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1976, pp. 7–8.

[50] See Martin Peterson, "Stockholm: Nonaligned and Nervous," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Summer 1980, p. 189; and Colonel Carl Bjoreman, "Upset in the Power Balance Can Heighten Demand for Swedish Base Areas," *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), Apr. 15, 1980.

[51] See "Alva Myrdal to Military Authorities: How Shall We Manage to Assert Our Neutrality?" *Dagens Nyheter*, Apr. 25, 1980.

[52] See Defense Minister Eric Kronmark, "Total Defense—Without Naive Expectations," *Svenska Dagbladet*, Apr. 29, 1980.

[53] See "Female Officers in Combat Forces," ibid., Oct. 31, 1980.

[54] See William J. Taylor, Jr., "Swedish Defense Policy," in Douglas Murray and Paul Viotti, Eds., *Comparative Defense Policy*, 2nd ed., Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming.

[55] See Olof Hulten, *Mass Media and State Support in Sweden*, Stockholm, The Swedish Institute, 1979, p. 1; and Steen Sauerberg and Nils Thomsen, "The Political Role of Mass Communication in Scandinavia," in Karl H. Cerny, Ed., *Scandinavia at the Polls: Recent Political Trends in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden*, Washington, DC, The American Enterprise Institute, 1977, pp. 194–95.

[56] See Kurt Tornquist, "Attitudes About International Affairs and Defense," *Psychological Defense*, Stockholm, Board of Psychological Defense, 1980, p. 9.

[57] Ibid.

[58] *Svenska Dagbladet*, June 11, 1980.

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

The Viggen fighter, the backbone of Sweden's air defense. Swedes are currently debating development of a follow-on aircraft to replace the Viggen in the 1990's.

—UPI.

ingness to spend more on military defense, so that the decline in refresher training for reserves can be reversed and the movement to close out unit installations can be counteracted. Perhaps most important, they could hasten the long-delayed decision on the next generation of Swedish fighter aircraft. Indeed, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, coupled with continued Soviet military activities off Norway in the north and off Sweden and Denmark in the Baltic, probably had some impact on the decision, taken by the Swedish government in February 1980, to fund a preliminary study of the JAS pursuit-attack-reconnaissance aircraft to replace the Viggen.[59]

From the Soviet perspective, such recent developments in Sweden are probably a matter of some concern, for Sweden's ability to defend itself against a marginal Soviet attack has been and remains an important factor in the Nordic balance, with implications for Soviet capabilities both in northern Norway and in the Baltic.

Finland. Finnish defense planning is constrained by the special relationship between Helsinki and Moscow, notably by the treaty obligations assumed by Finland after World War II and renewed periodically in the postwar era. At the same time, Finland *does* have its own defense policy, whose main points have a clear impact upon the opportunities available for Soviet policy.[60]

Finnish defense policy, like Swedish defense policy, is based upon the principle of total defense, which is in turn dependent upon universal conscription and the rapid deployment of the large Finnish reserves alongside the standing armed forces. Even though the standing Finnish forces are modest in size (approximately 70,000), total mobilization can put 700,000 men in the field in a short period of time. This fact, together with the natural defenses provided by deep forest, thousands of lakes, and a harsh winter climate, makes Finland a potentially formidable defender of its territory.[61]

Officially, Finnish defense strategy assumes that invasion can come from any corner—an assumption that is a necessity, given the delicate relationship with the Kremlin, which precludes any direct or indirect indication that the main threat is from the east. Finland is forced to spread its standing forces along its entire territory, even though the most likely threat is clearly on the eastern border. Likewise, it is assumed that any potential invader of Finnish territory will probably be fundamentally engaged elsewhere; hence, the relatively small Finnish forces should have a realistic chance to prevail in the ensuing combat, and in any case will inflict so much damage to any potential invader that limited incursions will be unprofitable.

Privately and in some publications, however, Finnish defense planners, like their counterparts in Sweden, worry about the possibility of a Soviet invasion through northern Finland and Sweden into northern Norway in the event of a major East-West confron-

[59] Ibid., Feb. 25, 1980.

[60] A thorough discussion of Finnish defense policy can be found in *Uppgifter Om Forsvaret*, (Information on Defense), Helsinki, 1978, esp. Part 1.

[61] *Finnish National Defence*, pp. 14–15.

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tation on the northern flank and in Central Europe.[62] Such an eventuality would clearly involve both of the neutral Nordic states, thus rendering nugatory one of the main premises of postwar Finnish diplomacy. But it would also bring public threat perceptions and actual defense policy into conformity with each other, thereby making it easier to bring Finnish citizens into full participation in "total defense."[63] It is generally assumed, therefore, that any invasion of Finland, or through northern Finland, would be a difficult military undertaking.[64]

Denmark and Norway. Danish and Norwegian defense planning rests on the fundamental fact that both countries are members of NATO and that both must therefore reckon with the likelihood that any major confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States would soon involve them directly in military hostilities. In the case of Denmark, Soviet military plans call for quick movement of Warsaw Pact troops into northern Germany and Jutland, thereby effectively drawing Denmark into the fighting on the Central European front.[65] In the case of Norway, Soviet plans call for gaining a secure foothold on the Atlantic coast very quickly, from which vantage point they could effectively break US supply routes to the Central European front;[66] thus, Norway, like Denmark, would quickly be drawn into the hostilities. These military-strategic facts establish certain parameters for Danish and Norwegian defense planning.

One is that both Denmark and Norway must rely on "total defense," which involves local defense forces ("Home Guard"), civil defense units, and general resistance by the civilian population (including defense against psychological warfare). As in Finland and Sweden, so in Denmark and Norway defense planners attempt to build resistance against external pressure through civic education and through physical education and sports, which presumably will enhance defense capabilities if hostilities do ensue.

A second is that since both countries have small populations, their defense effort is based both upon relatively small standing armies and upon large, readily mobilized reserves, which maintain a high level of skill through periodic training exercises and which can be brought to bear within 48–72 hours after the inception of hostilities. Denmark's standing forces number 35,000, with a total reserve force of 130,000 and considerably larger total forces in the case of mobilization. Norway's standing forces number 37,000, with reserves of 266,000 and even larger total mobilization forces.[67]

A third is that Danish and Norwegian defenses are meaningful only within the broader context of NATO and only given a US readiness to defend Western and Northern Europe. Danish and Norwegian forces must therefore be prepared to wage a defensive holding operation against superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces until US reinforcements can reach the scene or until US pressure (military or diplomatic) forces a withdrawal of enemy units from any part of NATO territory.[68]



Members of Norway's Home Guard in training.

—NTB.

[62] For a summary of the Finnish debate on this subject, see *Arbeiderbladet*, Apr. 9, 1979.

[63] There is an excellent discussion of Finnish public opinion surveys and the security debate by Markku Haranne in *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1979*, Helsinki, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1980, pp. 48–52.

[64] See *Finnish National Defence*, pp. 35–41.

[65] See, for example, A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, "The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier," Rand Working Draft, to be published as R-2417-AB/E, esp. pp. 9–21.

[66] Erickson, loc. cit.

[67] Derived from the *Military Balance 1980–1981*.

[68] See, for example, Bertram and Holst, op. cit.

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In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there have been growing fears in both countries, and particularly in Norway, concerning the vulnerability of states located on the Soviet periphery. Many in Scandinavia have interpreted Soviet statements justifying that invasion as *general* points with *general* validity; thus, it is widely assumed that Soviet leaders have in fact reserved the right to pass judgments on the nature of each state on the Soviet periphery and to take "necessary and appropriate" action if circumstances dictate. Such perceptions may be exaggerated and overstated. Nevertheless, they are real perceptions, and as such they are bound to have an effect upon the political climate in which Soviet policies must operate.[69]

In Norway, these perceptions have been instrumental in increasing public support for defense and in producing a policy designed to enhance Norwegian defense capabilities against the Soviet Union. Symptomatic is the statement of Reiulf Steen, Chairman of the Labor Party, in an interview after his visit to Moscow in December 1979:

My visit is even more important if it is seen in a somewhat broader perspective; I am referring primarily to the time when we reach possible production and deployment [of the new NATO missiles]. *I had the opportunity to discuss all the important matters which pertain to the arms race and arms reduction in relations with the leaders of the Soviet Union. In this manner I have obtained a first-hand impression of their assessments, and I have had the opportunity to see this matter from their vantage point. This is very important, since it is clear that they have arguments which are highly relevant for them.*

Asked whether he believed, on the basis of his conversations, that the Soviet Union would "accept negotiations after the decisions in NATO" to deploy new nuclear weapons, Steen replied:

That depends upon the way in which they interpret the realities of the NATO decision, and it will also depend upon whether or not the SALT-II agreement is ratified.[70]

Subsequently, during the debates in NATO concerning the deployment of new weapons systems in Europe, Norway played a crucial role in effecting a compromise between US defense planners, who emphasized the need for affirmative decisions in order to redress the imbalance vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, and the Dutch and Belgians, who expressed grave doubts about NATO policy.[71] And during the lengthy and acrimonious debates in Norway concerning prepositioning, the Labor Party leadership remained dedicated to the principle of increased defense spending and improved defense readiness. Norwegian public opinion also supported such policies. A Gallup poll in late 1979 indicated that fully 84 percent of the population were for a stronger defense.[72]

Despite such evidence of both elite and mass support for a strong defense effort, Oslo has made concerted moves to reassure the Soviet Union about the implications of this attitude. Hence, Steen's trip to Moscow to discuss foreign policy issues after the Norwegian decision on weapons deployment in the fall of 1979, and Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund's visit to Moscow just before Christmas 1980 to explain Oslo's decision on prepositioning.[73]

In Denmark, the debate over defense and security policy has coincided with a period of considerable economic difficulty, a fact that has made the choice between guns and butter much more poignant than in oil-rich Norway. There have been rather widespread demonstrations against the NATO decision to modernize its nuclear force in Europe, and a plethora of pacifist groups have made themselves increasingly visible on the Danish political landscape in the last two to three years. Even the ruling Social Democrats have had considerable doubts about Danish accession to a 3 percent increase in defense spending. All these developments have provided Moscow with certain advantages in Denmark in its current propaganda offensive against NATO's rearmament program; moreover, they have given the Danish Communists a rather popular cause on which to campaign.[74]

Iceland. Iceland is unique among the Nordic countries in terms of military-strategic issues. Though a member of NATO, it has no army, no navy, and no air force. Despite its heavy reliance on the fishing industry and foreign imports, both of which make water rights and sea lines of communication vital to its secu-

[69] For an overview of Norwegian perceptions, see *Arbeiderbladet*, Dec. 10, 1979.

[70] Ibid., Dec. 14, 1979.

[71] Ibid., Dec. 10, 1979.

[72] See *News of Norway* (Washington, DC), Dec. 7, 1979, p. 76.

[73] *Arbeiderbladet*, Dec. 22, 23, and 24, 1980.

[74] The Danish Communists were active in a variety of groups that objected to Danish membership in the EEC as well as NATO. For a discussion of the party's complicated maneuvers in such groups, see *Berlingske Sondag* (Copenhagen), Jan. 28, 1980; and *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), June 1980, pp. 32–44.

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rity, Iceland maintains only a small coast guard constabulary force of approximately 5 modern gunboats and 160 men, whose primary mission is that of policing Iceland's fishing zones. For its defense, therefore, Iceland has relied on NATO, principally the US forces stationed at the Keflavik air base. And Icelanders—perhaps as a result—have evinced a singular lack of urgency about matters of defense and national security.

This seeming unconcern among Icelanders appears to rest on a broad consensus. Part of the reason may simply be cultural. Icelanders are by temperament not predisposed to engage in wide-ranging speculative discussions of such abstract concepts as national security. Another part may stem from the daily conditions of life in Iceland. Icelanders tend to react to what they see at first hand, not to less graphic dangers they can see but from a distance.

If the question of threats to Iceland is posed in general terms, then, Icelanders see the potential range of threats to Icelandic values as a much broader one than a mere military focus would convey. For most Icelanders, the clearest threat to individuals and national security would be a threat to the economy. Because of Iceland's dependence on its fishing industry, for example, any threat to either its fisheries or its export markets is in fact as well as in perception a direct threat to the Icelandic standard of living. Furthermore, Icelanders have become accustomed to a very high standard of living, based on the ready availability of imported consumer goods and on government dedication to social welfare programs. In the 1970's, however, because Iceland must import a good portion of the inflation generated in the Western industrial nations, the country experienced a relentlessly increasing inflation rate, put officially at 65 percent in 1980 and still rising.[75] Such economic difficulties are also seen as posing threats.

Another area of concern is the preservation of Icelandic culture, particularly the customs, language, and homogeneous character of the population. All the political parties express concerns in this regard, and various intellectual groups outside the political process keep the issue constantly before the people. Even many of those who support Iceland's NATO membership are concerned about cultural erosion.[76]

In this respect, of course, the principal source of concern is the presence of foreign troops, which have been stationed on the island throughout Iceland's independence except for a brief period after World War II. Here the United States is the major source of discontent. To be sure, US forces stationed in Iceland, initially a large and highly visible presence, have decreased steadily in number, to only about 5,000 (including dependents) in 1980. Yet the litany about the cultural threat has been heard for so long that the average Icelander regards it as a clear and present danger.

Thus, a primary goal of Icelandic foreign policy since World War II has been to chart a course of independence from external domination. Ironically, since 1945 some of Iceland's NATO allies have seemed to Icelanders to pose direct challenges to the achievement of this goal. Britain has clashed with Iceland over fishing rights on three occasions, the latest in the so-called Cod War of 1974–75. Norway is seen by many Icelanders as attempting to expand its territory in the North Sea, even as negotiations over fishing rights and the control of Jan Mayen Island continue. Denmark, with its history of economic exploitation of Iceland, is still viewed with a subtle suspicion, which surfaces, for example, when Icelandic businessmen object to dealing with US companies through Danish subsidiaries.[77]

If, by contrast, the question of threats to Iceland is posed in terms of a Soviet threat, there is a marked tendency for Icelanders to take the Soviets less than seriously. There is a general awareness of the fact that the Soviet navy has expanded in recent years and that Iceland's geography makes it strategically important to both NATO and the Soviets. But there is little understanding that the Soviet navy has greatly increased its capabilities and now threatens vital sea lines of communication between North America and Europe. Moreover, Icelanders tend to separate the concept of a land war in Central Europe from the idea of a simultaneous naval war in the Atlantic, many believing it entirely possible for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to fight a land war in Central Europe without necessarily involving Iceland. Above all, in view of its role in the Icelandic economy, the USSR tends to be considered a valuable trading partner more than anything else.

However, it is true historically that specific aggressive acts imputed to the Soviet Union have generated increased interest in and awareness of a Soviet threat to Icelandic security. It has been at these points that key Icelandic defense decisions typically have been made. It is surely no accident, for example, that

[75] "The New Year Is to Begin in February," *Morgunbladid*, Dec. 23, 1980, p. 20.

[76] Interview with leaders of the Social Democratic Party, Reykjavik, July 11, 1980.

[77] Interview in the Economic/Commercial Section, US Embassy, Reykjavik, June 20, 1980.

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Iceland joined NATO in 1949 just after Eastern Europe had fallen under Soviet domination, that Iceland signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States in 1951 during the Korean war, and that Iceland dropped its demand for removal of the US base at Keflavik in 1956 just after the Soviets invaded Hungary.[78]

Moreover, there is evidence that Icelanders' concern over a Soviet threat is growing. A newspaper poll taken in October 1980 found that 54 percent of Icelanders now favor the presence of US forces in Iceland—an increase of 10 percent since the spring of 1976. The editors concluded that the overall increase in international tensions in the last few years, and specifically the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have been translated into greatly increased support for Iceland's role in NATO.[79]

Under these circumstances, Iceland presents both opportunities and difficulties for the Soviet Union. The opportunities stem from the clear presence of anti-Americanism among both the elite and the general public in Iceland, and from the widespread perception that the Soviet "bear" is merely a distant threat. The difficulties stem from the Icelander's suspicion of both global powers, which is likely to limit Soviet opportunities even among the Icelandic Left, especially if the Soviet Union continues to flex its muscles in various areas of the world, such as Afghanistan. What may be emerging in Iceland is a growing understanding of the *global* reach of Soviet power and thus of the likelihood that a war in Central Europe will spread even into the Atlantic and involve Iceland. With such changes in Icelandic perceptions, and in the policies emerging therefrom, Iceland may become less susceptible to Soviet influence in the 1980's.

Soviet Policies in the 1980's

The decade of the 1980's is likely to be a crucial era in the relations between the Soviet Union and Northern Europe. Of the Soviet Union's three roles—global power, regional power, and hegemon—that of global power, only recently assumed, is quite likely to become increasingly important, even to subsume the other two roles. As in the past, however, the interaction of roles will raise pressing issues for the Soviets.

In the Baltic republics, the record of Soviet policy is likely to remain mixed. Through manipulation of the local party structures, the central authorities in Moscow have established firmer control over the local parties, but there are indications of "nationalist deviationism" in all three republics.[80] The in-migration of Russians and the staffing of many supervisory positions by Slavs have reduced the likelihood of political separatism based upon ethnic homogeneity. But there is relatively little intermarriage, and settlement patterns typically remain separate. Little headway has been made in reducing the political role of religion as a defense mechanism against Russian influence and as a rallying point for local political nationalism.[81] The citizenries of the Baltic republics remain pro-Western, with strong cultural ties to some of the Nordic countries (e.g., Estonians with Finland) and with contacts with active émigré colonies, especially in Sweden. A sense of cultural superiority vis-à-vis the Russians continues to be pervasive; "Russification," in psychological terms, has been a clear failure.[82]

Thus, there has been success in "area denial," insofar as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain within Soviet borders and have no opportunity to escape this geopolitical fact. But there has been failure in the attempt to shield these three strategically important republics from Western, and particularly Nordic, influences. Such a failure may have broader and more serious implications elsewhere in the Soviet Union. At the least, it will make it much more difficult for the Soviet Union to play to the hilt its role as global power. At the most, the success or failure of Soviet nationality policy in the Baltic republics will have a significant impact on the very territorial and political integrity of the Soviet multinational empire.

In the Nordic states, the interplay of Soviet global and regional policy is likely to have an equally significant effect.

During the decade of the 1970's, when the Soviet Union achieved military power at least equal to that of the United States, the Soviet leadership clearly revealed its primary political goals:

(1) It wants Western acceptance of Soviet equality with the United States in military power and global

[78] See John R. Fairlamb, "Icelandic Threat Perceptions," paper presented at the International Studies Association convention in Philadelphia, PA, Mar. 18–21, 1981.

[79] "A Defense Force Without Servility," *Dagbladid* (Reykjavik), Oct. 10, 1980, p. 10.

[80] See, for example, Edward Allworth, "Flexible Defense of a Nationality," and Tonu Parming, "Roots of Nationality Differences," in Edward Allworth, Ed., *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States: Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1977, pp. 1–24 and 24–54.

[81] A major study of this problem in Lithuania is Thomas Remeikis, *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania, 1945–1980*, Chicago, IL, Institute of Lithuanian Studies Press, 1980, esp. pp. 105–14 and 152–57.

[82] Ibid.

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reach. Such acceptance would presumably mean greater US willingness to consult with Moscow in all kinds of conflicts and questions in the coming decade and beyond.

(2) It wants unqualified Western acceptance of the status quo in areas under the USSR's control, while reserving for itself the right to conduct forward policies in other areas; one such area would be Northern Europe.

(3) It wants, in consonance with the USSR's status as a global power, the right to watch political developments in neighboring states more closely and carefully; in this respect, too, the states of Northern Europe would be affected. Accordingly, one can expect greater Soviet willingness to intervene politically in the affairs of other states during this decade.

All such Soviet global objectives bode ill for the Nordic countries. Soviet policy toward Norway in the 1970's may be a harbinger of future Soviet relations with all the Nordic states. Specifically, Soviet policies are likely to be marked by:

(1) Greater Soviet willingness to force favorable policy changes in the Nordic states, in political, economic, and military-strategic terms. An area hitherto considered the "quiet corner" of Europe will therefore probably experience much greater foreign policy turbulence, caused, in considerable measure, by the Kremlin's general truculence and increased interest in the area.

(2) More forceful policies toward selected countries in the region. Norway is likely to be the major target, both because of its strategic location on NATO's northern flank and because of its economic importance. The Norwegians can expect increased (and increasingly critical) Soviet interest in their political system, their economic resources, and, above all, their foreign and security policies. In specific terms, the Kremlin is likely to attempt to reduce or eliminate the recent Norwegian decision to accept prepositioning of military matériel in central Norway, to force a more neutralist stance by Oslo in matters of general East-West relations, and to extract concessions in the exploitation of mineral resources and oil in the Barents Sea and in the area around Spitsbergen and Jan Mayen. The success or failure of these Soviet attempts will depend both upon domestic political conditions in Norway and upon the strength of the Western alliance.

Ultimately, the Nordic states are an integral part of the non-Communist world, whether they are committed to the Western alliance system or to the principle of neutrality. As such, they suffer from the general problems of Western Europe, the most crucial of which is the hostage mentality of "living with a bear in the woods," where taking risks with the USSR engenders unspoken thoughts of the physical proximity of Soviet power.[83] Some Nordic states, even though dangerously exposed geographically, now appear to be committed to a stronger defense posture. But the Nordic region as a whole is likely to become more vulnerable in the coming decade if the resolve of the West in general is lacking. Only the deep-seated problems facing the Soviets in their quest for continued hegemony in Eastern Europe and in their expansion into Afghanistan have so far prevented them from taking more forceful advantage of weaknesses they see in the overall position of the West, including Northern Europe.

[83] See Walter Laqueur, "Europe, in the Woods," *The New York Times*, Jan. 27, 1981, p. A19.

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Cataluña, Carrillo, and Eurocommunism

By Eusebio Mujal-León

Three years ago, political and academic interest in Eurocommunism was at its zenith. Most students of West European politics considered it only a matter of time before the Italian, French, and Spanish Communists assumed some form of governmental responsibility. Since then, Eurocommunism has suffered a precipitous decline in its fortunes, as the PCI, PCF, and PCE have lost influence in their respective countries. The crises of confidence and identity brought on by their failure to enter government have been brought into sharpest focus in Spain. There, the Communist Party had hoped to parlay its adoption and defense of Eurocommunism (remember that in March 1977 Madrid became the capital of Eurocommunism when the three parties met and issued a joint statement) into rapid electoral growth, leading subsequently to a hegemonic role on the left. This has not occurred. Even though the PCE assured itself of many international headlines when its April 1978 Ninth Congress dropped the term "Leninist" from the party's self-definition and declared it henceforth to be simply a "Marxist, revolutionary, and democratic" organization, the Communists failed to increase perceptibly their vote in subsequent parliamentary elections. This failure has led to much soul-searching and internal debate within the PCE, but until this year there was no frontal assault on official party positions. Then, at a January 1981 congress, the formally autonomous Unified Socialist Party of Cataluña (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya—PSUC) decided to drop all reference to Eurocommunism from its program. This move represents the most severe threat yet to the leadership and policies of the PCE and its secretary-general, Santiago Carrillo.

The Catalan challenge had been in gestation the last two years, the result of diverse and conflicting elements. These included the desire of a strong regional organization to resist domination by the central party organization, regardless of the content of PCE policies; the greater electoral success of the PSUC and its correspondingly different alliance strategy; an intensive factional struggle spurred by the absence of a single, forceful PSUC leader; the persistence of a well-defined Leninist organizational and political style among those who had worked in Comisiones Obreras (Workers' Commissions—CC.OO.); and the impact of deteriorating economic circumstances on Cataluña's workers, among whom the PSUC was strong.

This essay will explore how the Catalan challenge developed and its relationship to the leadership and policy crisis facing the PCE. Accordingly, in the first section, we shall analyze the situation of the PCE after its legalization in April 1977, examining why its Eurocommunist stance did not develop a broad electoral and political audience in Spain. The second section will assess the nature and importance of the PSUC in the context of Spanish Communism, focusing on how relations between the two parties have evolved over the last few years. The third and concluding section will discuss the Fifth PSUC Congress, and place its results in the more general context of the forthcoming (July 1981?) PCE Tenth Congress and the challenges facing the national party.

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The PCE and Post-Franco Politics

On Easter Sunday 1977, the Spanish Communists emerged from nearly four decades of clandestinity. In the 40-odd years which had elapsed since Francisco Franco defeated the Popular Front coalition, of which the PCE was a member, both Spain and the Communist Party had changed dramatically. The country had been transformed in the course of those years from an agrarian and rural to a primarily industrial and urban society, with accompanying shifts in the values and mores of Spaniards.[1] Of particular importance was the lessened (although still important) role of Catholicism, attended by a diminished religious cleavage and a less ideologized level of political discourse. The process of development and industrialization led to an important, albeit not necessarily equitable, redistribution of wealth, creating the foundations of a consumer society. This, in turn, contributed to the broad base of support that reformers within the regime found as they tried to modify the laws and institutions inherited from Franco, laying the groundwork for a parliamentary democracy in Spain.

The Communists responded to the changes taking place in Spanish society by modifying their own perceptions and policies. Isolated after 1939, under fire from a regime which aimed at the extirpation of the Communist virus from Spain, and hated by many on the left for its actions during the Civil War and its supine obedience to orders emanating from Moscow, the PCE began in the mid-1950's to change its domestic and international orientations. Elsewhere, I have examined the substance and limits of that transformation.[2] Suffice it to mention here its most salient characteristics.

With respect to Catholicism and the Church (ideological and institutional pillars of the Franco regime), the Communists adopted a more open and accommodating stance. The party promised to respect freedom of religion in the future and called on Catholics to work with the PCE for the reestablishment of political liberties. Even internally, the party opened its doors, asserting now that faith was an entirely private affair which need not impede membership in the PCE.

On the labor front, the Communists moved to exploit whatever opportunities were available by working within the regime-sponsored syndical organization, and laying the groundwork there for the CC.OO. as a new type of labor movement which would rely not on traditional union structures but rather on factory-level organizations and assemblies. Its objective would be the incorporation of all workers, regardless of party affiliation or ideological preference into a *movimiento sociopolítico* which the Communist Party would in theory not try to dominate.

Ideologically, the Spanish Communists shifted away from Leninist dogma, emphasizing instead the inviolability of civil and political liberties and renouncing the use of violence or the need for an armed takeover of the state. Party ideologues came to emphasize Communist commitment to a pluralist socialist model with a role for an opposition and possible alternation between contenders for power. Change was also evident in the organizational sphere, as the PCE abandoned the conspiratorial party of professional revolutionaries—a model advanced by Lenin in *What Is to Be Done?* and *One Step Forward*—in favor of a more open form of organization with a mass membership and less demanding forms of affiliation.

But the most notable of the shifts in orientation occurred in the area of foreign policy, where the PCE moved from unconditional allegiance to the Soviet Union to a highly critical posture. This climaxed with the publication of Santiago Carrillo's *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado* in 1977, in which the PCE secretary-general challenged the very socialist credentials of the Soviet state.

Whatever judgment one cares to make about the sincerity of these changes (and there can be no doubt that there were important elements of tactical expedience and ambiguity in them, even as there slowly and painfully evolved among some party members a deeper appreciation of Western political and cultural traditions), the thrust of these policies was to break the isolation of the PCE. These initiatives, when coupled with the role the party played in the resistance to Franco and with the PCE's organizational strength relative to other groups, suggested to many that the PCE would play a major role in the politics of the post-Franco era.

PCE Liabilities and Problems

That the PCE has not played such a role is by now self-evident. A number of factors worked against the Spanish Communists. One of the foremost was the

[1] For an analysis of the transformation in Spanish society, see José Félix Tezános, *Estructura de Clases y Conflictos de Poder en la España Postfranquista* (Class Structure and Power Conflicts in Post-Franco Spain), Madrid, Editorial Cuadernos para el Dialogo, 1978.

[2] A detailed analysis of the substance and limits of PCE evolution may be found in Eusebio Mujal-León, *Communism and Political Change in Spain*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, forthcoming.

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Citizens of Madrid examine the candidate lists of the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España — PCE) on the eve of Spain's first post-Franco parliamentary elections, in June 1977. The PCE captured 9.4 percent of the vote in the balloting.

—Magnum.

weight of the past, specifically, the experience of the Civil War. Although a majority of Spaniards alive when Franco died in November 1975 had not directly experienced the Civil War, all had been marked by it, even as they wanted to forget it. In the years after 1956, sensing as well as anticipating such a longing, Communist leaders had issued repeated calls for "National Reconciliation" and, in the process of making the policy changes indicated above, adopted many of the tenets of "democratic socialism." But these changes were not enough. What might have sufficed or even appeared bold in Italy, for example, did not have that effect in Spain, where resentment and fear on both the right and the left—transmitted however imperfectly through generations—remained alive. Moreover, it was the generation of PCE leaders spawned during the Civil War which orchestrated the changes, and these individuals could neither easily nor convincingly overcome their own identification with the earlier period. Very real ambiguities in the Communist evolution only aggravated this credibility gap.

Also important in reducing the future role of the PCE was the April 1974 military coup in Portugal. The PCE, along with many in the Spanish opposition, initially greeted the coup there with euphoria, but this quickly changed as the Portuguese revolution took a radical turn. These events, and particularly the role played by the Portuguese Communists, fanned fears of a similar scenario's being followed in Spain. Partially in response to such fears, a reformist faction within the Franco regime decided to spur the transformation of political structures and move toward democracy. Under the leadership of King Juan Carlos and Premier Adolfo Suárez, these reformists controlled the tempo of change in Spain, thus avoiding a potentially disastrous polarization. That there were disadvantages associated with a less than clear break with Francoism would later become abundantly evident, particularly from the attempted military coup of February 1981. Nevertheless, the reformist effort, a virtually unprecedented peaceful transition from authoritarianism, showed the maturity of the general public and the po-

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litical elite. The victory of the *reforma* thesis worked against the Communists, permitting the more moderate opposition groups to overcome the initial organizational and mobilizational advantage the PCE had over them in 1975. This was particularly important for the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español—PSOE), a party with a lengthy tradition in Spanish politics but one which had atrophied during the Franco era. The victory of the *reforma* gave the PSOE the opportunity to catch up with the PCE, to present itself as a credible alternative to the Communists on the left.[3]

These factors contributed to a poor Communist performance (9.4 percent of the vote and 20 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as compared to 29.9 percent and 122 deputies for the PSOE) in the June 1977 parliamentary elections. It was a showing from which the Communists could only hope to improve, even as they took comfort from the influence the PCE exercised among workers through the Comisiones Obreras.

The unexceptional PCE showing in June 1977 aggravated several problems which the party would have had to address in any case. The Communists had had the most effective clandestine organization during the Franco years, but they now had to transform that structure into one capable of operating in a relatively open environment and of engaging successfully in electoral competition.[4]

Simultaneously, PCE leaders had to consolidate the various groups operating under the Communist standard. One group had been in exile. Most of the party had been inside Spain, particularly in the major industrial centers. The exile leadership had maintained loose ties with these groups. Upon its return to Spain, it had to reestablish preeminence over the other groups, molding these at times fissiparous units into an effective organization, capable of assimilating and transmitting party policies in the ideological and political spheres.

A generational cleavage affected this consolidation. Several generations exist in the Spanish party. The oldest and least powerful are the septuagenarians and octagenarians who joined the party in its early years and attained positions of importance prior to the Civil War. They retained these positions until the late 1950's and early 1960's. While these individuals have not been particularly active in setting the course of recent party policy, they (particularly Dolores Ibárruri, the matriarch of the PCE and its living link with the past) have exercised a restraining function. In exchange for lending legitimacy to the changes in party policies made by Carrillo, they demanded and expected that adaptation would have its limits.



Felipe González, leader of the Socialist Workers' Party of Spain, the Spanish Communist Party's principal electoral rival on the left.

—Katherine Young.

A second generation of party members joined the PCE just before and during the Civil War. Communist fortunes were on the rise at that time, and many of these people joined the party as the politically opportune thing to do. Few of the rank and file who joined in that era remained active in the PCE in the decades following the Civil War, however. The most resolute handful lapsed into the vague status of sympathizer or sometime collaborator. But these people, and others who dropped out of active party life, were not irretrievably lost to the PCE. Many of them reentered the party in the post-Franco era and, by then eager to prove they remained *real* Communists, often supported those who tried to slow the "Eurocommunization" of the PCE. There was, however, a countervailing sentiment of obedience (or *seguidismo*, which roughly translates as "followerism") among them, which those

[3] On the PSOE, see an excellent chapter by José Maria Maravall, "The Socialist Alternative: Politics and the Electorate," in Howard Penniman, Ed., *Spain at the Polls*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming. Also of interest may be the interview with Felipe González in *Leviatán* (Madrid), No. 1, 1978, pp. 9–44.

[4] The argument is fleshed out in a chapter by the author for a book edited by Ronald Tiersky, *Democratic Centralism*, London, Allen & Unwin, forthcoming.

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in positions of power within the PCE did not hesitate to draw on.

Yet another political generation active in the PCE entered the party after the consolidation of the Franco regime and in the context of the new round of demonstrations and strikes that surfaced in Spain in the late 1950's. These people, who were generally either workers or students and professionals, joined the PCE in those years because it represented the principal force in the anti-Franco opposition. Those from the working class entered the party after participation in the semiclandestine Comisiones. The others, sometimes scions of the wealthy or socially relevant, but in any case privileged to have had the opportunity for a university education, became active during their student years and retained their party links as they entered professional life. There was little sign of any conflict between these two groups prior to the death of Franco. Student activists led strikes and riots in support of working-class demands at moments when the labor movement was reeling under the harshest repression, and professionals either signed public manifestos demanding political and syndical liberties or, if they were lawyers, were conspicuous in defending arrested labor activists. Although many who remained in the PCE after their university days did so as much because the party was the most effective instrument for opposition to the regime as out of loyalty to the PCE per se, party leaders nevertheless gave these people special status, delegating important duties to them and allowing them to be members without requiring formal participation in cell activities.

Perhaps the high point in the influence of the professional sector (popularly known as the *fuerzas de la cultura*) came in late 1975 and early 1976. During these months, the PCE committed all its forces to press for a peaceful and orderly but nevertheless definitive *ruptura* with the Francoist past, and emerged from the shadows of clandestinity. Intellectuals and professionals were in the forefront of this battle, which lasted until mid-1976: their status rendered them less vulnerable to the police and to the risk of losing their jobs. By mid-year, however, the PCE had failed in its efforts to seize the initiative from the reformist faction led by the King and Suárez, and the influence of this element within the party waned.[5] The party now had to worry about ensuring its existence as a national movement, and to this end it relied not on the *fuerzas de la cultura* but on those activists the PCE had developed in the labor movement. The organizational expression of this reorientation was the displacement of many professionals from positions of influence, an event which coincided with the return of an exiled Communist hierarchy eager to reestablish its control over the party in Spain.

To the organizational and generational problems just mentioned, we might also add the issue of Spanish Communist identity. There was a time, before the death of Stalin, when Communist parties knew all too well their identity and the model of society toward which they were moving. This situation changed in the wake of his death, with the fragmentation of the international Communist movement and the demonstration—at least in Western Europe—that Leninism was an unviable strategy for the seizure of power. These developments led to important changes in the policies of the major West European Communist parties (although naturally the substance and pace differed with the country and the party), changes which by the late 1970's led to the coining of the term "Eurocommunism."

The term, numerous analysts have now noted, was analytically imprecise, reflecting much more of a process or tendency than of a finished evolutionary stage. Inaccurate in suggesting a common doctrinal and policy base among several West European parties, the term belied a complicated reality of parties which, although sharing certain views or at least reacting to broadly similar phenomena, did so in unique, distinctive, contradictory, and ambiguous ways. A Eurocommunist ideal type might include a desire for autonomy from the Soviet Union, support for parliamentary democratic methods, an abandonment or muting of claims to Communist party omniscience, a commitment to respect the rights of an opposition now and in the socialist society, and support for the emergence of Western Europe as an independent actor on the international scene. But there was no concrete point of reference to which the PCI or PCE might refer as an example. Because of this absence of a model, much of what passed for theorizing in these parties was primarily an effort to dissociate a given Communist party from the unattractive Soviet model.

The Spanish Communists had been among the most vociferous advocates of Eurocommunism, but even here the principal thrust of PCE efforts prior to 1977 had been the marking of distance from the Sovi-

[5] Thus, the Madrid provincial leadership associated with Executive Committee member Victor Diaz Cardiel defended the dissolution of the lawyers' *agrupación*, blasting the undue influence that professionals and intellectuals had in the *dirección política* of the PCE and warning of the risks this entailed for the party's "denaturalization." The phrase is taken from a speech by Cardiel at the opening of a March 1978 Madrid provincial conference at which the author was present. See also the *Informe sobre Politica Organizativa* (Report on Organizational Policy), n.p., n.d., distributed at the Conference, pp. 7–8.

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et Union. With the onset of the post-Franco era, and particularly if it hoped to overcome its minority status on the left, the party had to move toward the elaboration of a positive model. Disagreements and debate were to be expected as the party tried to develop a corpus of doctrine, but this intrinsically difficult undertaking became more complicated as a result of the Spanish Communists' failure to develop a mass electoral audience. The party wanted to occupy the political space of democratic socialism (for that was in many ways what Eurocommunism was all about), but in Spain it faced a resurgent PSOE—a party which had been part of the anti-Franco opposition, and whose long history and tradition had been unstained by previous associations with Moscow.

PCE Strategy

The Spanish Communists thus entered the post-Franco era needing to resolve a complex set of problems and cleavages, all in the context of their failure to do well in the first parliamentary elections. In the months after June 1977, the PCE moved on a broad front to reverse the unfavorable correlation of forces on the left and in the country more generally.[6] In a step reminiscent of the Italian Communists' "historic compromise" proposal, the Spanish Communists issued a call for a "government of national concentration"—to include all parties with parliamentary representation. Convinced (or at least publicly asserting) that it was still possible to force through a *ruptura* with the Francoist past and institutions and to realign the party system, the PCE pursued a dual strategy of forcing the Socialists into a coalition government with Suárez and the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD)—perhaps to include the Communists as well—and of compelling Suárez to join forces with the Left during the drafting of the new constitution. The effort had initial success, with the signing of the political and economic agreements known as the *Pactos de la Moncloa* in October 1977. The UCD and PCE also cooperated in the labor arena to slow the growth of the Socialist trade union. In the longer run, however, it was Suárez who played the Communists off against the Socialists, but this outcome was not immediately apparent.

In the months after the Moncloa pacts, the PCE also launched several public relations initiatives in an attempt to increase its electoral and political audience. One occurred during the events marking the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1977, when—after what appears to have been a deliberate ploy to taunt the Soviets—the latter forbade the PCE secretary-general from speaking in Moscow. Shortly thereafter, basking in the limelight of the snub, Carrillo came to the United States, where he hoped to persuade American policymakers that it was in their interest (vis-à-vis the Soviet Union) to encourage Suárez to accept the PCE into the Spanish government. Later, Carrillo announced that at its upcoming Ninth Congress the PCE would drop the reference to Leninism from the Communist program.

Although the motion dropping Leninism did carry at the April 1978 Congress, the vote represented a pyrrhic victory for Eurocommunism in the PCE. Not only did Carrillo have to strike a tacit deal with rather orthodox labor activists throughout Spain in order to pass the motion, but the decision brought no significant electoral return over the next two years. After a December 1978 referendum on the new constitution, Suárez announced early parliamentary elections for March 1979. In that polling, the Communists did only slightly better than in 1977, with 10.8 percent of the vote. If the Communists could look upon that showing as something of a moral victory, it was only because the Socialists, who had confidently predicted they would defeat Suárez, wound up once again in second place, albeit with just about the same percentage of the vote as in 1977. The municipal elections held a month later brought the PSOE and PCE a much-needed boost, and in their wake, the two parties signed an agreement which led to the installation of Socialist or Communist mayors in many cities and towns. Despite the agreement, however, the Socialists showed no desire in the ensuing months to tie their fortunes to the PCE, pinning their hopes instead on new elections, after which they might be able to form a government without relying on the Communists. And the latter found themselves increasingly cast into the role of marginal spectators to the national struggle for power.

By early 1980, then, it had become apparent that the Communists had failed in their efforts to outmaneuver the PSOE, and, however reluctantly, many in the party began to realize that a long and drawn-out battle would be necessary before the PCE could catch up with or pass the Socialists. This changed perception of the future had an important effect on ideological and political debate within the party. The failures in Communist strategy, moreover, coincided with important changes abroad. In France, the PCF deliberately

[6] For more detailed analysis, see Eusebio Mujal-León, "The PCE in Spanish Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1978, pp. 15–37.

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sabotaged a possible Left majority in the March 1978 National Assembly elections. In Italy, the assassination of Aldo Moro in early 1978 and the resulting political cross fire under which the PCI found itself from Socialists and Christian Democrats, as well as from extraparliamentary and terrorist groups, bespoke the unviability of the historic compromise. Détente appeared to be on its last legs, and a new cold war loomed, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan undermining an already tenuous superpower accommodation.

These circumstances had an impact on the PCE. With the seemingly inevitable success of Eurocommunism Spanish-style no longer assured, resistance to party policies reemerged. As we shall see in the next section, it was in Cataluña where the challenge to the policies of PCE Secretary-General Carrillo was the most direct and comprehensive.

The PSUC and Spanish Communism

Cataluña and the PSUC have an important place in contemporary Spanish Communism. Spain, the by now classic definition goes, is a unitary state but a divided nation. Peripheral nationalist demands are important elements in the Spanish political equation, the belligerent nationalism of the Right in many ways belying the unstable foundation of the nation. Four decades of Franco rule, with its harsh treatment of areas like the Basque country and Cataluña, exacerbated this tension. Regional claims and sentiment were almost by definition anti-Franco, with most national opposition groups supporting demands for regional self-government. For them, it was easy enough to criticize the "centralist" character of the regime and to call for a devolution of tax, administrative, and



Santiago Carrillo, Secretary-General of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), at the organization's Ninth Congress in April 1978, where the party dropped its "Leninist" label.

—Christine Spengler/SYGMA.

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other powers to the regions. But, after this had been done in a general way, there remained the task of finding the appropriate vehicles for articulating those demands in the regions. As the various political groups tried to develop a presence throughout Spain, they were in effect laying the foundation for regional cleavages as well, which would affect the incipient party organizations. For the Spanish Communists, this tension has posed a challenge uniquely different from that which other West European parties have had to address.

During the Franco era, the PCE dealt with the issue of peripheral nationalism by upholding the right of historic nationalities to self-determination but emphasizing Communist support for a federal solution to the problem. Organizationally, the Spanish party sought to integrate some "nationalist" sectors into its ranks, particularly in the Basque country and Cataluña. In the former region, the effort generally failed. Despite the entry of some dissident members of the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA) into the PCE in 1970, most Basque radicals considered the party too tame and Madrid-oriented for their tastes. Cataluña provided a more favorable arena, and the PSUC a more effective instrument, for the Communists.

Some guidelines for understanding the PCE-PSUC relationship may be found in their respective statutes.[7] Article 1 of the PCE Statutes defines the Partido Communista de España as "the vanguard political organization of the working class and of the progressive forces of the peoples of Spain." Article 42 then specifies the formal relationship between the PCE and the PSUC:

The Spanish Communist Party and the Unified Socialist Party of Cataluña maintain relations of complete compenetration and jointly adopt agreements through which the same Marxist principles, the same general political line, and the same methods of organization are maintained. Members of the PSUC [who are] elected by the PCE Congress participate with full rights in the leadership of the PCE. Those members of the Spanish Communist Party who take up residence in Cataluña should join the Unified Socialist Party of Cataluña, and, reciprocally, those members of the PSUC who reside in other parts of Spanish territory shall be members of the respective organizations of the Spanish Communist Party.

For their part, the PSUC Statutes deal with the relationship as follows: Article 1 describes the PSUC as a "national Catalan party, the political organization which . . . constitutes the voluntary and combative union of advanced men and women from the working class, from the peasantry, from professional and intellectual sectors, from the forces of labor and culture of Cataluña." Later, Article 20 notes:

The PSUC, which maintains relations of complete compenetration with the PCE, adopts together with that party agreements through which the same Marxist principles, the same general political line, and the same methods of organization are maintained. . . . Moreover, and with the objective of contributing to the elaboration of the political line at the level of the State, the PSUC participates in the Congresses of the PCE, to which it sends representatives chosen according to norms established by the PCE. Those delegates have identical rights and assume the same duties as the rest of the delegates to the Congress.

The relationship thus spelled out is highly unusual within and among Communist parties, reflecting an equivalence between the PCE and PSUC which the national party denies for its other organizations in regions such as the Basque country and Galicia (see Article 41 of the PCE Statutes). The roots of this relationship go back to the period immediately preceding the Civil War, when the topic of organic fusion between Socialists and Communists was the order of the day. The formation of a single national party never came off, although their respective youth movements did coalesce into the Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas. Otherwise, the only other merger occured in Cataluña. There, four small parties—the Union Socialista de Cataluña, the Partit Català Proletari, the Partit Comunista Català, and the Catalan federation of the PSOE—joined to create the PSUC, with Joan Comorera as secretary-general.[8]

During the Civil War, the PSUC became the organizational and political expression of the PCE (and the Soviet Union) in Cataluña. As such, it benefited from its role as distributor of arms and matériel sent by Moscow as well as from the moderate, broad-front policies advocated by the Comintern. This latter aspect of the PSUC appeal was particularly important, as the more radical anarchosyndicalist and Trotskyite movements had an important base in the Catalan

[7] For the texts of the respective statutes, see *9° Congreso del PCE: Actas, Debates y Resoluciones* (The Ninth PCE Congress: Proceedings, Debates, and Resolutions), Bucharest, Ediciones PCE, 1978, pp. 432 and 441, and *PSUC IV Congrès* (The Fourth PSUC Congress), Barcelona, Editorial Laia, 1978, pp. 113 and 116.

[8] Josep Lluís Martín i Ramos, *Els Orígins del Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (1930–1936)* (The Origins of the Unified Socialist Party of Cataluña), Barcelona, Editorial Curial, 1977.

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working class. By 1939, drawing many members from a middle class which was fearful of such radicalism, the PSUC had more than 90,000 members.

With the defeat of the Popular Front, the PSUC went underground and into exile.[9] Comorera traveled to Moscow and convinced the Comintern that the PSUC should join the International alongside the PCE. This venture by no means endeared him to the Spanish Communist leadership. However, the latter—scattered throughout the world, divided over who would succeed José Diaz as PCE secretary-general, and trying first to reestablish their authority with respect to challengers from within Spain such as Heriberto Quiñones and Jésus Monzón—did not confront Comorera until later. Finally in November 1949, when these issues had been resolved, the leadership was in a position to move against Comorera (and his supporters), expelling him on charges of being a Titoist and a spy.

The elimination of Comorera—and the way the PCE and PSUC treated him is one of the more lamentable episodes in Spanish Communist history—represented a major step toward the imposition of PCE control. The PSUC held its first and second congresses in 1956 and 1965 respectively, but by this time, it was little more than the Catalan filial of the PCE. Gregorio López Raimundo, an Aragonese who never learned Catalan even as he became secretary-general and later (1977) president of the PSUC, played a key role in this transformation.[10]

Sources of PSUC Success

In the two decades following the Civil War, the PSUC successfully expanded its role and influence in Catalan politics. It followed suit when the PCE promulgated its "National Reconciliation" line in 1956, and when the latter instructed its militants to use every opportunity to infiltrate the regime-sponsored syndical organization. Although both initiatives would eventually redound to the PSUC's benefit, the latter decision was of singular importance in the late 1950's and early 1960's. It was during those years that Spain began rapidly to industrialize, a process which particularly affected Cataluña. Hundreds of thousands of workers migrated there, and this influx gave the PSUC an opportunity to develop a new working-class audience. Although the Catalan Communists undoubtedly overestimate their role in the Barcelona strike movements during the 1950's, the Communist decision to participate in syndical elections after 1948 helped the PSUC develop its present strength in the Comisiones Obreras.[11] Thus, the PSUC forged the Barcelona Workers' Commission Central (Comissiò Obrera Central de Barcelona) in 1963–64 and consolidated a regional organization. Despite having to fight off various ultraleftist groups within the CC.OO., the PSUC by the early 1970's had become the hegemonic force within the Comisiones, and these in turn had become (and remain) the dominant force in the Catalan labor movement.

The key to the PSUC success in the 1970's did not lie simply in the Catalan Communists' ability to develop a working-class audience, however. The party was also successful in presenting itself at once as an authentically regional force and as part of a national one. It was in the forefront of efforts to reclaim Catalan rights,[12] participating in the so-called Taula Rodona in 1966, and forging regional opposition coalitions such as the Assemblea de Catalunya (1971) and the Consell de Forçes Politiques (1975). Its defense of *catalanismo* enabled the party to attract numerous intellectuals and professionals, something which strengthened its image in the June 1977 and March 1979 parliamentary elections.

A third factor favoring the Catalan Communists during the transition to the post-Franco era was the modification of party structures begun in early 1976. Taking advantage of the more tolerant political climate in Cataluña, the PSUC abandoned the cell structure, creating workplace and neighborhood *agrupaciones* about half a year before the PCE Central Committee approved a similar shift for the PCE. The transformation, which in other regions of Spain had not been completed by 1978, had been virtually completed in the PSUC by June 1977. As a result, the Catalan Communists had a much broader infrastructure through which to influence the electorate.

In the first post-Franco elections, the Catalan Com-

[9] On PSUC internal developments, see Victor Alba, *El Partido Comunista en España* (The Communist Party in Spain), Barcelona, Editorial Planeta, 1979, pp. 291–95; and Angel Ruiz Ayúcar, *El Partido Comunista: 37 Años de Clandestinidad* (The Communist Party: 37 Years of Clandestinity), Madrid, Editorial San Martín, 1976, pp. 377–86.

[10] On López Raimundo, see a book-length interview entitled *La Soledad del Corredor de Fondo* (The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Runner), with Xavier Viñader et al., Barcelona, Editorial Laia, 1976.

[11] The March-April 1977 issue of *Taula de Canvi* (Barcelona) is devoted to the development of the labor movement in Cataluña. See, in particular, the articles by Ignasi Riera and Manuel Ludevid.

[12] See Gregorio López Raimundo, *Qué es i que vol el PSUC?* (What Is the PSUC and What Does It Want?), a pamphlet published in May 1976. A more general overview may be found in Josep M. Colomer et al., *Els Anys del Franquisme* (The Franco Years), Barcelona, Editorial DOPESA, 1977. The reader is also referred to an unpublished manuscript by one of the author's students, Mark Bohannon, entitled "The Spanish Communists and the National Question," May 1980.

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

A campaign poster of the Unified Socialist Party of Cataluña (PSUC) from the March 1979 Spanish parliamentary elections.

—ACI via Pictorial Parade.

munists received over 550,000 votes—representing 18.2 percent of the total cast in the region (19.9 percent in Barcelona province)—and elected 8 deputies to the national parliament. This performance contrasted to the 9.4 percent share of the national vote garnered by the PCE. Indeed, the PSUC accounted for 47 percent of all Communist votes in the country. And, although this percentage dropped to 35 in March 1979, the results of both elections underscored the importance of the PSUC for the Spanish Communist cause.

If we can say that Eurocommunism—at least in part a strategy aimed at attracting more moderate voters to the Communist standard—generally failed in Spain, the same was not true in Cataluña. Data from a 1978 survey show the PSUC voter to have had a profile somewhat different from that of his counterpart PCE voter.[13] Of PSUC voters asked to place themselves on a 10-point left-right scale, only 17 percent (as opposed to 43 percent of PCE voters) chose the two leftmost positions. Only 46 percent of the PSUC voter sample accepted the label "Marxist," in contrast to 64 percent among PCE voters. On a third question—asking voters how close they felt toward the Socialist Party—20 percent of the sample from the PSUC electorate said "Very," while only 8 percent of the PCE voters polled gave that answer.

Another index of the PSUC's importance for Spanish Communism may be seen in its size. Already during the last years of the Franco regime, the Catalan Communists had developed a rather impressive organization, and by early 1977 the Barcelona city federation boasted some 5,500 members. By April 1978, the PSUC had 40,000 members, nearly one fifth of the Communist membership in Spain—which entitled the Catalans to the largest delegation at the Ninth PCE Congress that month. What is more, the results of the 1978 syndical elections indicate that the margin of victory scored by the Comisiones over the Socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) in Cataluña was the largest in Spain, with between 42 and 56 percent of the delegates elected belonging to the CC.OO.[14]

Factional Struggle Within the PSUC

As it sought to adapt to the political environment in post-Franco Spain, the PSUC faced many of the same organizational and ideological problems which the PCE had to address. Not surprisingly, the changed circumstances triggered a power struggle within the PSUC. Various factions or groups were visible already in early 1977, and the competition between them grew more acrimonious as time passed.[15] The struggle was compounded by the efforts Carrillo and the PCE made to influence the situation, with their meddling generating tensions between the two parties.

[13] The figures may be found in the in-depth analysis of the Communist voter and his attitudes prepared by Juan J. Linz, entitled "A Sociological Look at Spanish Communism," manuscript, 1979. An abbreviated version may be found in George Schwab, Ed., *Eurocommunism: The Ideological and Political-Theoretical Foundations*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1981, pp. 217–68.

[14] *Mundo Obrero* (Madrid), Dec. 19–25, 1980, published the comparative figures.

[15] In emphasizing below the categories of *banderas blancas, historicos*, Eurocommunists, and Leninists, I am by and large following the usage of the *El País* correspondent in Cataluña, Alfons Qiuntá, whose articles on the PSUC have been excellent. Much of the analysis that follows is also the result of conversations in Barcelona in May 1980 and of a careful reading of the PSUC daily *Treball* and its theoretical journal *Nous Horitzons*.

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One group within the PSUC included many individuals who had been in the ultraleftist Bandera Roja (Red Flag) group. Although this group had been radical in the late 1960's and early 1970's, most of its members who joined the PSUC became quite moderate in their politics, with wags referring to them derisively as "*banderas blancas*" (white flags). The most prominent representatives of this current were intellectuals like Jordi Borja, Alfonso Carlos Comín (now deceased), and Jordi Solé Tura, and labor leaders from the Baix Llobregat area like Carlos Navales and Agustí Prats. One might characterize their views as "right Eurocommunist": they did not put much stress on the class struggle or on polarization politics. Borja, for example, wrote an article in the journal *Taula de Canvi* in which he virtually said that the working class has no greater right to demand socialism than many other sectors of society. "Today," he argued in late 1976,

the ideals of socialism can be renewed, in the context of a democratic State, through joint action by the great traditions which have had a progressive impact in the Western world: Christianity, liberal Socialism, and Communism.[16]

Many in the PSUC distrusted the *banderas blancas* and for several reasons. For one, they had left and then rejoined the party, many being co-opted in 1973 directly into leadership positions.[17] For another, they were in the forefront of efforts to adapt Communist policies. Thus, not only did they favor rather open-ended political alliances, but individuals like Comín played a special role in having the PCE and PSUC issue a virtually unconditional welcome to those Catholics who wished to join Communist ranks. Finally, the most prominent members of the group had close relations with Carrillo. Their identification with him—he unsuccessfully lobbied for the selection of Solé Tura as secretary-general at the Fourth PSUC Congress in November 1977—in many ways minimized their effectiveness, injecting an anti-Carrillo element into their defeats.[18]

A second PSUC group, rallying around Organizational Secretary Josep Serradell and Margarida Abril, both in the Catalan Executive Committee, received the nickname of *historícos*. As the name suggests, its most distinguished exponents had been in the PSUC for some time and had a vision marked to some extent by their lengthy membership and clandestine experience. The *historícos* were what might be termed recalcitrant or partial Eurocommunists, accepting what had become PCE and PSUC policy more out of a sense of discipline than as a matter of conviction. They did their best to retain as much of the Leninist ideological baggage and *Weltanschauung* as possible, even while the party developed a mass membership and electoral base. The *historícos* saw the PSUC (and PCE) relationship with the labor movement, neighborhood associations, and other mass organizations from an undiluted Leninist perspective, viewing these groups as inferior and subject to control by the party. As later became apparent, moreover, their foreign policy reflex was to justify Soviet actions and to emphasize solidarity with the so-called socialist bloc. A counterpart to this group existed in the PCE leadership and, like its Catalan cohorts, began in 1978 to criticize what it perceived to be the overly conciliatory domestic and excessively anti-Soviet international orientation of the PCE. By then, the failure of Eurocommunism to catch on in Spain had become apparent, and residual pro-Soviet base elements looked to the *historícos* for support and encouragement.

Between the *banderas blancas* and the *historícos* stood a third group, dubbed the "Eurocommunist" faction. The bulk of the Catalan leadership—Antonio Gutiérrez Díaz, José López Bulla, José Rodríguez Rovira, Joaquim Sempere, Rafael Ribó, and Antoni Lucchetti—belonged to this group. By 1980, it would divide into "Leninist" and "Eurocommunist" components, but initially this group represented a centrist or synthetic position. By and large, these individuals supported the renovation Carrillo had impelled beginning in 1956, and they wished to purge the party of "Stalinist" political and organizational residues and to introduce democratic norms to the PCE/PSUC. Yet their support for Eurocommunism had a different tone from that of the *banderas blancas*. They insisted on the continued vitality of the revolutionary tradition of the Third International (its constitution marked, they believe, a definite and necessary rupture with the reformism of international social democracy), and they warned against losing identity through an excessive tactical flexibility. They thought more in terms of Left alternatives (even when in the context of broader alliances with middle-class parties) and saw no nec-

[16] "Socialists and Communists Before Democracy," in *Taula de Canvi*, No. 2, November-December 1976, p. 51. See also the article by Luis Crespo and Maximo Loizu in the September 1978, January 1979, and March 1979 issues of *Argumentos* (Madrid).

[17] In December 1973, Carrillo and a PCE Executive Committee delegation decided the conditions under which some dissident members of Bandera Roja could join the PSUC and how many seats they would be given in that party's Executive and Central committees. From private conversations the author had with PCE members in 1977–78.

[18] Ibid.

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essary contradiction between Eurocommunism properly understood and "real" Leninism.[19]

The divergences which later developed among the "Eurocommunists" were reflective less of differing ideological perspectives than of generational and personal conflicts, which intensified in the PSUC (and the PCE) after 1977. As the Communists relied more and more on their influence in the labor movement, it became only logical for Comisiones activists to demand a greater share of power within the party. People like Francisco Frutos, López Bulla, Lucchetti, and Rodríguez Rovira (who were for the most part members of a younger generation) chafed at the bit when the PCE signed the *Pactos de la Moncloa*. They insisted that mass mobilizations were an irreplaceable tool.

The dynamic unleashed by a growing democratization of the Catalan party organization exacerbated the tensions between these contending groups. Beginning in the mid-1970's, the PSUC had developed a tradition of open debate which contrasted even then with the closed nature of other regional Communist organizations. The flexible leadership style and the absence of a single strong personality capable of dominating the rather heterogeneous elements in the PSUC leadership encouraged this tradition. Already in 1977, intraparty differences had forced postponement of a Barcelona provincial conference and then of the Fourth PSUC Congress. When the Congress finally convened in November, the overwhelming majority (92 percent) of the delegates approved the report that Secretary-General Gregorio López Raimundo presented in the name of the Central Committee, but the delegates spoke openly about difficulties facing the party. Divergent interpretations were visible with respect to the significance of the *Pactos de la Moncloa*, the alliance strategy of the PSUC, and the appropriate relationship between the PSUC and the Comisiones.[20]

The Fourth Congress also modified the self-description of the Catalan party in a way which would have future relevance for PSUC relations with the PCE. Although the PSUC dropped a previous reference to its "Marxist-Leninist" character, it did so equivocally, describing itself in any case as a "political organization basing itself on the principles of Marxism, Leninism, and other contributions to revolutionary theory and practice."[21]

It was at precisely this time that Carrillo launched his effort to drop all reference to Leninism from the PCE program. Most members of the Spanish Communist Party and its constituent organizations learned of Carrillo's intentions from press reports of his statements in the United States. A formal proposal on this score did not come until January 1978, at which time the PCE Central Committee approved the Draft Theses for the April 1978 Ninth Congress. The proposal created quite a stir, with sharp exchanges taking place in various PCE organizations (e.g., in Asturias, Andalucia, and Madrid), but the sharpest in Cataluña.

Discussion of Thesis 15 (which conspicuously omitted mention of "Leninism") and the rest of the Central Committee document lasted several weeks in Cataluña, coinciding with the selection of delegates to the First PSUC National Conference, called for early April. Those who argued for the retention of the reference to Leninism in the Theses wrapped themselves in the mantle of Catalan nationalism, exploiting as well the concern of a growing number of militants about the loss of definition and identity the party might be suffering. Those who from the beginning sided with the PCE Central Committee on the deletion belonged almost exclusively to the *bandera blanca* faction.

The debate over Thesis 15 split the Catalan Communist leadership, as became evident at a session of the PSUC Executive Committee several days before a regional conference.[22] A majority (including Secretary-General Gutiérrez) argued, albeit in less than enthusiastic or coherent fashion, that there was no real contradiction between the PCE proposal and the phrasing approved earlier at the PSUC Congress. A minority of the Executive wanted the PSUC to defend its version at the upcoming PCE Congress, but found itself obliged by the rules of democratic centralism to go along with the majority group at the Conference. Following the Executive Committee's recommendation, the Conference approved the text presented by the PCE, but by a margin of only 97 to 87. In the wake of that vote, however, 10 members of the Executive, most of whom would emerge as "Leninists," threatened to resign if obliged once again to vote with the majority. Faced with this challenge, the majority prudently relaxed the rules of internal discipline. As a re-

[19] See the argument made by former PSUC Executive Committee member Joaquim Sempere in *El Pais*, Apr. 21, 1978; also his "The Communist Tradition and Its Continued Force," *Nous Horitzons* (Barcelona), No. 36, October 1977, pp. 7–18.

[20] See the speeches contained in the aforementioned *PSUC IV Congrès*—for example, the remarks by Leopold Espuny and Antoni Lucchetti. In addition, see the coverage by *El Pais* and *Informaciones* (Madrid).

[21] *PSUC IV Congrès*, p. 113.

[22] A remarkably candid statement may be found in the pamphlet edited by the PSUC entitled *La Conferencia Nacional del PSUC y la Reunión del Comité Central (April 8 and 9): Explicación del los Hechos* (The PSUC National Conference and the Central Committee Meeting of April 8 and 9: A Factual Explanation), n.p., n.d.

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sult, a somewhat contradictory motion to have Leninism mentioned in the Statutes won by the same margin as had Thesis 15!

The episode provoked a debate in Cataluña whose openness was unprecedented among Communist parties in the post-Stalin era. Spokesmen for divergent positions made statements to the press, the PSUC newspaper *Treball* carried detailed accounts of the debates, top party leaders held a press conference where they publicly discussed how the PSUC Central Committee had become divided, and the votes that individual Central Committee members had received in their reelection to the PSUC Executive Committee were even published.

PCE-PSUC Relations

As the Ninth PCE Congress approached, then, the PSUC found itself sharply divided over an issue of major significance for the national party. Up to this point, relations between the two parties had been by and large harmonious, due mostly to the dominant position the PCE had achieved with the 1949 ouster of Comorera. Some ultraleftist groups had split from the PSUC in the 1960's in reaction to the moderate policies put forward by Carrillo, but this was the case everywhere in Spain. The first signs of what might later occur were visible just before the death of Franco. Isidor Boix (a member of the PCE and PSUC Executive Committees) proposed that labor opposition to the regime be led not by the Comisiones but by those individuals who filled elected posts in the syndical hierarchy. He argued this was possible because labor activists affiliated with the Comisiones had taken over government-sponsored provincial and branch unions, and therefore that the syndical equivalent of the *ruptura* demanded by the PCE had begun. The significance of the Boix proposal, unacceptable to Spanish Communist leaders, who rejected his analysis at the Second National Conference of the PCE, in September 1975,[23] lay in its argument that a *national* policy should be based on the experience in Cataluña.

By early 1977, there were further signs of tension between the PSUC and the PCE. Some Catalan Communists objected to the April 1977 decision by the PCE Central Committee to abandon the traditional Communist support for a republic in favor of a monarchy and to drop allegiance to the tricolor Republican flag and accept instead the one Franco had chosen after the Civil War. The mild treatment Suárez and the UCD received from the PCE during the campaign preceding the first parliamentary elections provoked more grumbling. So, too, did PCE efforts in the wake of June 1977 to join with Suárez against the Socialists.

What critical Catalan perspective now existed found itself reinforced by the PSUC's electoral success. Not surprisingly, the disparity with the PCE's showing led to a certain self-satisfaction and to calls for greater autonomy vis-à-vis the national party. Events preceding the Ninth PCE Congress fueled this fire.

Ironically, by the time of the Congress, the issue of whether or not Leninism would be dropped from the PCE program had by and large been settled. Carrillo and his supporters had rallied support for the motion in most regions. The debate at the Congress was thus anticlimactic, its importance for us lying in the defense that Frutos, today secretary-general of the PSUC and then organizational secretary of the Catalan Comisiones, made of Leninism at the gathering. He stressed the compatibility of Leninism and Eurocommunism, warned against "laxity" in party organization and militance, and insisted there should not be so much hurry in "changing formulations, conceptions, and terminology."[24]

Although by most accounts the Ninth Congress represented a major victory for Santiago Carrillo, a less favorable dimension was also evident. In order to achieve his victory, Carrillo had had to rely on traditional Communist organizational methods, using them to ensure a quick and bold initiative rather than engaging in a more lengthy (but potentially more explosive) process through which a more thoroughgoing change might have been possible. Moreover, to win he had allied himself with labor activists throughout Spain (with the important exception of those in Cataluña, who by and large opposed dropping the references to Leninism). Their Eurocommunist convictions were less than deeply held, and they sided with Carrillo only to prevent the Leninism issue from provoking a more substantive debate.

The Congress events generated a profound resentment among many Catalan Communists, not only (or even mainly) over policy, but over the leadership style of Carrillo and his efforts to bring the PSUC back into line. In the ensuing months, these resentments deepened, and supporters of the PCE secretary-general—e.g., the *banderas blancas*—came under more fire, losing positions within the PSUC to factions with a more hard-line orientation.

Catalan Communist criticism of Carrillo and the PCE focused on several issues. One was the lack of ideo-

[23] See Chapter 2 of *Communism and Political Change in Spain*.

[24] *9° Congreso PCE*, pp. 170–75.

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logical substance in the Eurocommunism that Carrillo preached. It was perhaps all right to talk of eliminating Leninism, but only if you had something to put in its place. What Carrillo offered—consensus politics, a Spanish version of the "historic compromise" which included alliance with the UCD and an effort to force the PSOE into the government—seemed to reflect more a tactical instinct than anything else. Moreover, while the policy the PCE had fashioned for dealing with the PSOE nationally might make sense, in light of the latter's three-to-one electoral edge over the Communists, in Cataluña the margin separating the two parties was much smaller. To the PSUC, then, the Catalan Socialists were a potential partner. Gutiérrez expressed the PSUC's position clearly: "Our *política de concentración* cannot be implemented against the PSOE." And again: "The struggle in Cataluña is not directed against the Socialists."[25]

Related to this criticism of the consensual policies Carrillo articulated was unhappiness over the *Pactos de la Moncloa*. The national Communist leadership had confidently predicted that those agreements would prove to be the first step toward the *gobierno de concentración nacional*, and prominent labor leaders (like Marcelino Camacho and Nicolás Sartorius) had said the party would be able to force the government to live up to its end of the bargain. Things did not turn out that way, of course, and by late 1978 and early 1979, many labor activists in Cataluña and elsewhere had concluded that the government had effectively used the PCE and the Comisiones to hold down wages. Such a situation would have been acceptable had the Moncloa agreements led to tangible political gains, such as entry of the PCE into the government. But this did not occur. Instead, it was the UCD and Suárez who adroitly used the Communists as a weapon against the Socialists.

This failure in strategy was compounded, in the view of many Catalan Communist labor activists, by the fact that calls for moderation came in the face of the growing economic crisis affecting Spanish industry. The deepening crisis led to a further groundswell of discontent with the PCE's consensus politics. Although the national party tried to adjust by arguing for a combination of consensus and mobilization politics, such an approach smacked, to many, of the tactical sleight of hand for which Carrillo was so well known. Thus, many Catalan labor leaders were less than enthusiastic and clearly uncomfortable in September 1978 when national Comisiones leaders urged the signing of new economic agreements.[26] PSUC labor activists took a much more aggressive line on what the Communists should demand in exchange, furthermore insisting that any agreement be signed only for a year (as against the three proposed by the PCE leadership), and rejecting the argument that an "exceptional" political situation required a toning down of confrontation.

As if these matters were not enough to create problems between the PSUC and PCE, Carrillo and others in the national Communist leadership criticized the Catalans for a drop-off in PSUC votes in the March 1979 parliamentary elections.[27] In fact, the PSUC had lost support in all four provinces, receiving a total vote of only 510,000 (17.1 percent) as compared with 550,000 (18.2 percent) in 1977. Voters also handed the PSUC a setback in the senatorial races, with only the independent Josep Benet of the candidates put forward by the PSUC making his way against a Socialist tide. Even he, who had received the most votes of any Senator in June 1977, now trailed Socialist Josep Andreu i Abelló by over 170,000. Generally, the PSUC had been hurt by abstentions in the industrial belt around Barcelona and, specifically, in Vallès Occidental (where the cities of Sabadell and Terrassa are located) and in Baix Llobregat, where it had done rather well two years earlier.[28]

The drop in the Catalan Communist vote in the industrial belt reflected more than growing working-class disenchantment and alienation. It also was a consequence of the spectacle created by the bitter internecine struggle between the *banderas blancas* and Leninists in the labor movement prior to the Second PSUC National Conference in December 1978. Determined to weaken their antagonists, the Leninists embarked on an offensive during this period, seizing control of the PSUC organizations in Baix Llobregat and Mataró as well as of the Communist *agrupación* in the 30,000-man SEAT factory in Barcelona.[29] This offensive elicited a statement from PSUC Secretary-General Gutiérrez at an October 1978 PSUC Central Committee session where, quoting the words employed by one labor cadre, he warned of the dangers created when Comisiones activists saw their role as "the cor-

[25] For the first quote, see his report to the Central Committee, *Informe del Secretario General* (Report of the Secretary-General), Oct. 7–8, 1978, p. 25; for the second, an article/interview in *Mundo Obrero*, Mar. 15–21, 1979.

[26] *El País*, Oct. 28, 1978.

[27] Carrillo's remarks appear in *Mundo Obrero*, Mar. 15–21, 1979.

[28] See the analysis in Josep M. Maymó, "Appraisal of the Results of the Legislative and Municipal Elections in Cataluña," *Nous Horitzons*, No. 54, May 1979, pp. 3–19.

[29] *El País*, Oct. 31, Nov. 10, Dec. 10 and 12, 1978.

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rector of the rightist and consensualist exaggerations" within the party.[30]

Despite this evidence of growing conflict within the PSUC, many in the Catalan party felt that Carrillo had simply seized on the March 1979 PSUC performance as an excuse for attacking the PSUC, especially if one considered the weak PCE showing. In any case, even though the national party improved its performance in the municipal elections a month later (especially in the provinces of Madrid, Andalucia, and Asturias) and through an agreement with the PSOE placed Communist or Socialist mayors in cities with 75 percent of the population, the PSUC did even better. There were Communist mayors in several medium-size Catalan cities (Badalona, Santa Coloma, Gramenet, Sabadell, and Cornellà), and the party had fared very well in Mataró (with 27 percent of the vote), Terrassa (30.4 percent), and L'Hospitalet (35 percent). More important, the Left had emerged strengthened from the municipal elections in Cataluña, and the joint Socialist/Communist vote in Barcelona Province rose to 56 percent. This showing and the increase in the other three provinces led Catalan Communist leaders to think more and more of a possible coalition with the Socialists after regional elections, to be held in 1980 after approval of an autonomy statute for the region. Although Córdoba had replaced Barcelona as the province with the highest proportion of Communist votes, nowhere was the Communists' potential for influence in Spain stronger than in Cataluña.

Up to mid-1979, the rising expectations and performance of the Catalan Communists created what we might term "structural" conditions for conflict between the PCE and PSUC. By late that year a new element—diminished prospects for the PSUC—had been injected into the problem, and this heightened tensions within that party. The PSUC had premised its strategy on the possibility and probability of alliance with the Socialists. While it did not seek an outright Popular Front, the party did hold to the idea that with a popular majority in tow, the Catalan Left could compel the moderate nationalists of Convergencia to form a regional coalition government. The results of the municipal elections suggested the conditions were being laid for such a process.

Over the next six months, however, Socialist leaders moved the PSOE away from the Communists. In May 1979, the PSOE Executive Committee recommended dropping the reference to Marxism from the party program, so as to broaden the party's electoral appeal and enable it to compete more effectively with the centrists. The decision reflected the Socialists' desire not to become tied irrevocably to the Communists. Although the PSOE had signed the municipal agreement with the PCE in April 1979, Felipe González wanted to avoid closer ties. Thus, the battle within the PSOE over the dropping of the term "Marxism"—the Executive proposed it, the PSOE Congress in May 1979 rejected it, and then González refused reelection to the post of First Secretary, resulting in an Extraordinary Congress, where a compromise solution led to the adoption of his position—was not just over Marxism but over the issue of potential partners. And the victory of González weakened the position of those within the Catalan Socialist Party who favored alliance with the PCE-PSUC.[31]

Despite these developments, PSUC leaders per-

[30] *Informe del Secretario General*, p. 16.

During Spain's 1979 municipal election campaign, Spanish Communist Party leader Santiago Carrillo, center, chats with Communist poet Rafael Alberti. At the right is Gregorio López Raimundo, then President of the Unified Socialist Party of Cataluña (he refused reelection in January 1981).

—ACI via Pictorial Parade.

[31] On developments within the PSOE, see Josep Dolmau, *La Crisis del PSOE Vista des del Conflicti Pallack-Reventós* (The PSOE Crisis Seen Through the Pallach-Reventós Conflict), Barcelona, Editorial Portic, 1979; and Alfonso S. Palomares, *El Socialismo y la Polemica Marxista* (Socialism and the Marxist Polemic), Barcelona, Editorial Bruguera, 1979.

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sisted in believing that if the Left were to gain an absolute majority in the regional elections, their party could force the Socialists into a deal. This was an uncertain prospect at best, and resolution of the issue did not depend simply on the Communists or the Socialists. Other actors—the various centrist parties in Cataluña—were relevant. The centrists, running separately in June 1977, had not done well. Since then, however, there had been a winnowing-down of those competing for the centrist political space. Indeed, even as the municipal elections had represented a victory for the Left, they had also represented a major step forward for the Jordi Pujol–led Convergencia, which had overtaken what by now was its only rival, the UCD, as the principal centrist party and established itself as a force to be reckoned with. In the wake of those elections, Convergencia maneuvered skillfully, taking advantage of Socialist flirtations with the Communists to attract voters to its own ranks. A final element complicating the situation for the PSUC was the presence of the Socialist Party of Andalucia (PSA), which in late 1978 announced it would field candidates in the Catalan regional elections.

It was against this background that the March 1980 elections to the Catalan parliament took place.[32] The results were a clear-cut defeat for the Left. Although the PSUC more or less held its vote (its percentage increased relative to 1979, but its total number of votes declined), the Socialists lost over 200,000 votes, dropping into second place with 22.3 percent. Meanwhile, Convergencia became the leading vote-getter in the region, increasing its vote by nearly 250,000 over March 1979. With a 28-percent share, it now was in a position to elect its own candidate as president of the Catalan regional government, the Generalitat.

As a result of the setback suffered in the regional elections, the internal struggle within the PSUC stepped up, with moderates blaming the vote loss on the strikes which the Comisiones had called in late 1979 and early 1980 and on the mobilization strategy of the party and the CC.OO.

Carrillo Under Fire

Coincident with the exacerbation of tensions within the PSUC we have just described, a crisis affecting the authority of Santiago Carrillo and the content of Communist policies had developed in the PCE. Earlier, we mentioned the tacit alliance Carrillo had effected with labor elements during the debates leading up to the Ninth Congress so as to carry the day on the Leninism issue. Subsequently, his reliance on the



Jordi Pujol, President of the Catalan government and leader of the centrist Convergencia party.

—ACI via Pictorial Parade.

labor wing of the party deepened because these activists were ever more important from a numerical point of view (especially since the party had been losing members at a steady clip since 1978), and their influence in labor represented the only real weapon the PCE had in its arsenal to do political battle with the UCD and Socialists. As the PCE fought to avoid being relegated to a marginal role, it had to rely more on labor activists, and these, in turn, gained more influence within the party. As labor cadres flexed their muscle at party meetings, others charged them with trying to "syndicalize" (*sindicalizar*) the party. Eventually, a majority in the PCE leadership moved to reimpose party authority, demanding that the labor activists tone down their emphasis on mass mobilizations. Thus, in late May 1980, it convened a special meeting of labor cadres, where bitter exchanges took place between Carrillo and such Comisiones leaders as Fidel Alonso from Madrid and López Bulla and Frutos from Cataluña.[33]

That meeting did not resolve any basic questions,

[32] For an analysis, see Eusebio Mujal-León, "*Catalanismo*, the Left and the Consolidation of Centrism in Spain," to be published later this year by *World Affairs* (Princeton, NJ).

[33] The description and analysis in this paragraph and the next draw primarily on conversations with Spanish Communist cadres in May-June 1980.

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however. Indeed, a number of other questions fanned the discord. Lines were being drawn for the battle over the Carrillo succession. Some prominent party leaders like Pilar Brabo (who had been close to Carrillo and owed her initial remarkable rise in the party to her relationship with him) and Ramón Tamames had begun to call for greater internal democracy and a loosening of the central leadership's control. More traditional elements called for a reevaluation of PCE international positions. In the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan, and with the deteriorating international climate, more and more voices (at the base and in the leadership) rallied to the Soviet side, calling for a more favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union. While the party continued in its official statements to defend Eurocommunism and condemn the Afghan invasion, criticism of the Soviet Union became tempered. No more polemical tracts like *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado* issued from the PCE. Perhaps more significant, for the first time since the late 1960's, when the Soviets had encouraged several splinter groups, it became fashionable to laud the Soviet Union. *Openly* now, party members spoke of the pro-Soviet orientation of such Executive Committee members as Armando López Salinas, Antonio Palomares, and Francisco Romero Marín.

The depth of the malaise afflecting the PCE—and the staggering deficit run up by the Communist daily *Mundo Obrero* just before it ceased publishing in July 1980 was a clear symptom—showed through at a Central Committee session in November 1980. There, several members of the Executive, fearful that a report Carrillo presented to lead off discussion prior to the Tenth Congress (scheduled for mid-1981) would unduly affect the pre-Congress debates, voted against making it the approved basis for those debates or abstained on the issue.[34] The nine (three voted against, and six abstained) then were allowed to express their views to the full Central Committee, and this opened up a veritable pandora's box of problems. Opposition surfaced particularly to the Carrillo proposal for the creation of a vice secretary-general and to his insistence that the PCE remain "a party and not [become] a federation of parties." The first notion alarmed those who saw an effort by Carrillo to control his succession; the second, those (like the Catalans, but also the Basques) who wanted greater autonomy from the central party organization.

Events in Cataluña had also been moving in ways unfavorable to Carrillo's leadership and outlook. For one, the battle between "Leninists" and more moderate sectors of the PSUC for control over the Comisiones Obreras, which had been in full swing since

Two who have argued for a more collective style of leadership in the Spanish Communist Party: at left, Pilar Brabo; at right, Ramón Tamames.

—ACI via Pictorial Parade.

1978, ended with a victory for the Leninists, at the Second Congress of the National Workers' Commission of Cataluña (Commissió Obrera Nacional de Catalunya—CONC) in June 1980. The more moderate sectors led by Navales and Prats had argued against a strategy emphasizing strikes and work stoppages, insisting that industrial workers were more interested in maintaining their jobs than in demanding (and, in any case, not achieving) higher wage increases. This position found public expression in the so-called "Document of the 53," which urged a less confrontational attitude. This view—more in tune with official PCE policy—received the support of no more than 20 percent of the delegates at the CONC Congress, and its defenders gained only 6 of 55 seats on CONC's new Executive Committee. The general program and statutes approved by the majority contained strong criticisms of the *Pactos de la Moncloa* and the policy of consensus. The strength of the more hard-line elements was particularly visible on international questions, with 285 delegates openly indicating they wished "preferential relations" with the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Although they lost on a motion to have the CONC affiliate only with the WFTU, this group managed to gain approval of a resolution condemning the US bases in Spain and supporting entry of French (the CGT) and Portuguese (the CGTP-IN) Communist unions into the European Syndical Confederation.[35]

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[34] The text of the Carrillo report is in *Mundo Obrero*, Nov. 7–13, 1980. Partial but substantial texts of speeches by Executive and Central Committee members are in ibid., Nov. 14–20 and 21–27, 1980. For further reporting, see *El País*, Nov. 5, 1980.

[35] The analysis in this paragraph draws primarily from reporting in the PSUC weekly *Treball*. See, for example, its June 26, 1980, issue and the articles by Txiki Laorden and Manuel Ludevid.

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

Marcelino Camacho, right, Secretary-General of the Spanish Workers' Commissions (CC.OO), at a press conference on October 9, during the 1980 syndical election campaign in Spain.

—ACI via Pictorial Parade.

Along with this reinforcement of the influence of hard-line elements in the labor movement went increasingly vocal Catalan criticism of PCE foreign policy positions. A move in this direction had already been evident in early 1980, when the PSUC organization in Baix Llobregat approved a resolution supporting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The official PSUC posture (like that of the PCE) was to condemn the Soviet action, but more moderate (and the term is relative) members of the party leadership sought to derail the growing internal dissent by stepping up their attacks on the United States and NATO.[36] At the same time, PSUC leaders called for greater Catalan input into PCE decisions on international questions. Indeed, in what could only be interpreted as a direct slap at Carrillo, during a meeting of the PSUC Central Committee devoted to international issues, Secretary-General Gutiérrez quoted approvingly the remarks made by a prominent "Leninist," José Rodríguez Rovira:

We are not neutral. . . . That is the first fundamental question. It is necessary that we leave quite clear the fact we are not neutral in relation to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the socialist countries. . . . [There are] interimperialist contradictions which we should know how to stimulate and take advantage of in favor of a policy of peace, disarmament, détente and the overcoming—in any case simultaneous—of the blocs. This policy is not only best for us but for the socialist countries as well.[37]

That statement represented quite a step back from the foreign policy positions articulated since 1968 by Carrillo, and it brought into question the commitment to political democracy (as the Western world understands it) of Rodríguez Rovira and others in the PSUC. To make matters worse—particularly for those in the PSUC who had argued that the PCE needed to defend the consubstantiality of democracy and socialism—numerous voices at the meeting called on the PSUC to push for its own international relations. The object was to ensure a PCE foreign policy less "critical" of the USSR by encouraging the national party to broaden its links in the international Communist movement beyond the PCI, to temper its acerbic criticism of Georges Marchais and the PCF, to attend events like the May 1980 Paris Conference sponsored by the French and Polish Communists, and to tone down support for the European Economic Community.[38]

The publication in June 1980 of the Draft Theses for the Fifth PSUC Congress represented a further slap in the face for Carrillo. The document repeated well-known Catalan criticisms of Spanish Communist failures during the transition to the post-Franco era, and of the *política de concentración* that the PCE had followed since June 1977. It blamed the latter policy for "creat[ing] confusion among workers and the popular classes."[39] There were also calls for unity between Socialists and Communists in the context of a Catalan *bloque de progreso*, and (in a further, not too veiled reference to internal affairs) for greater democratization of party structures.

As if to reinforce its right to speak on such matters, and in a notable departure from traditional Communist practice, the PSUC Central Committee sent the

[36] See the speeches by López Raimundo and Gutiérrez Díaz in *Réunion del Comité Central* (Central Committee Meeting), Apr. 26–27, 1980, and their replies to questions and criticisms.

[37] Ibid., pp. 35–37.

[38] Ibid.

[39] See the partial transcript in *Mundo Obrero*, June 3, 1980.

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proposed rules for the Congress to base organizations before the Congress, modifying the system whereby selection of the Central Committee would be made.[40] Delegates would be presented with a list of names ordered alphabetically (with only asterisks to indicate those proposed by the official *comisión de candidatura*). The Central Committee also proposed that election of the secretary-general and president come 10 days after the Congress and after a mandatory two-round vote, the first essentially a nominating exercise. These moves indicated the degree to which the PSUC had itself begun to act on the call for internal democratization (and in this, many Catalan Communists thought they were teaching the PCE a lesson), but they also suggested that the Catalan leaders might be unleashing a process over which they would have much less control than was "normal" in Communist parties.

Concern over where this "democratitis" (a pejorative expression commonly used in Spanish Communist ranks) might be leading the PSUC grew in the weeks after the publication of the Draft Theses. Not only was their anti-PCE thrust evident, but within the PSUC itself unreconstructed pro-Soviet (not just "Leninist") elements became increasingly visible. In many party organizations, spirited defense of Soviet accomplishments could be heard, and in that climate even someone identified so closely with Carrillo as Jordi Borja felt compelled to argue how, "despite Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the USSR [is] a force which struggles for peace and supports the important popular movements."[41] A rising chorus within the PSUC was also critical of the term "Eurocommunism" (both for its theoretical inadequacy—in this they were on the mark—and because of what it symbolized), wishing to have it dropped from the party program altogether.[42]

In October 1980, a PCE Executive Committee delegation (made up of Carrillo, his principal deputy Simon Sánchez Montero, and the Comisiones Obreras leader and possible Carrillo successor Nicolás Sartorius) went to Barcelona for a face-off with the PSUC Executive. Reports of the meeting (and a subsequent one held a few weeks later) indicate that Carrillo and the others, particularly Sánchez Montero, pulled no punches, lambasting Gutiérrez for failures in leadership, demanding a revision of the Draft Theses (something, the PSUC Executive Committee replied, it could not do as these had already been distributed), and criticizing the alliance policies of the PSUC as being out of step with the national PCE policy.[43]

The sessions did not resolve the substantive issues, however. A brief communique issued after the conversations referred to the continued applicability of Articles 20 and 42 of the PCE Statutes. Further, it called for "an effort which permits the bettering of joint work by the PCE and PSUC as should be the case between parties which, although independent, draw inspiration from the same principles, adopt the same general policies and methods of organization, and which struggle in united fashion in the same process of social transformation."[44] More important, the meetings deepened Catalan Communist resentment—one of them wrote in a national newspaper that "the PCE has gone to Cataluña to create a problem which did not exist in order to overcome another problem which was not present in Cataluña but which did exist [elsewhere] "[45]—and contributed to the subsequent anti-PCE tone of the Fifth PSUC Congress. The unyielding posture of the PCE leadership also weakened the *banderas blancas,* betrayed a complete deterioration in personal relations between Carrillo and Gutiérrez, and caused most of the factions in the PSUC to rally together in the face of the Carrillo criticism. Indeed, it was somewhat paradoxical—although at the same time understandable, since the cleavage which had developed was not only between rival interpretations of Eurocommunism or between Madrid and Barcelona, but between different conceptions of authority—that only several *historicos* (Josep Serradell, Margarida Abril, Josep Salas, and Manuel Linares) sided with Carrillo.[46]

The Fifth PSUC Congress

In the weeks preceding the Fifth PSUC Congress, there was mounting evidence that it would not be a routine affair. The temper of the debates in base organizations and the tone of letters sent to *Treball* reinforced that impression, as did the revelation that the PSUC organization in the Vallès Occidental (which would have the largest single bloc of delegates to the Congress) had been circulating amendments to the Draft Theses among other local organizations. Some

[40] See the interview with Gutiérrez in ibid., July 11–17, 1980, for the changes in rules.

[41] *Mundo Diario* (Barcelona), Sept. 2, 1980.

[42] See the letters in the "Tribuna" section of *Treball* during the fall of 1980.

[43] For analysis of the meetings, see the magazine *La Calle* (Madrid), Oct. 14–20 and 21–27, 1980. The magazine is close to the PCE.

[44] The PCE-PSUC statement may be found in *Treball*, Oct. 23, 1980.

[45] *El Periódico* (Madrid), Oct. 8, 1980.

[46] *El Pais*, Oct. 18, 1980.

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PCE Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo (center) with the new leaders of the Unified Socialist Party of Cataluña (PSUC) elected in January 1981. On the left, Francisco Frutos, the secretary-general; on the right, Pere Ardiaca, the president.

—ACI via Pictorial Parade.

Central Committee members, e.g., Alfred Clemente and José Valdivieso, who were the visible heads of the pro-Soviet fraction in the PSUC, were responsible for this effort. It is likely (given concerted Soviet efforts since early 1978 to woo Spanish Communist labor leaders and potential dissidents, as well as a more general Soviet offensive against Eurocommunism under way in the last year and a half) that Soviet diplomats in Madrid were aware of and encouraged the move. And well they should have, for the document defended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as having been requested by the government in Kabul, and also called on the PSUC to oppose European integration. The document was in flagrant violation of the rules of democratic centralism, which prohibit horizontal communication between organizations, but even the mild reprimand issued by the PSUC Central Committee was not approved unanimously—two members voted against it, and 13 abstained.[47]

By late December, the delegate selection process had been completed, and the incumbent PSUC leadership knew it was in for a tough time—a judgment, it might be noted, which Carrillo and the PCE Executive shared. Aware of a likely effort to eliminate the term "Eurocommunism" from the PSUC program, Gutiérrez tried to defuse the situation by declaring a few days before the Congress that "the errors of the USSR [came] from its desire to help in the revolutionary transformation of society."[48] Moreover, in his own speech to the Congress, he criticized Eurocommunism but argued against dropping the term, on the grounds that this would be "to abandon [the concepts of] revolution of the majority and socialism in liberty" to which he subscribed. The report he presented in the name of the Central Committee (and with the reference to Eurocommunism) received the approval of only 53 percent of the delegates voting (some 100

[47] Ibid., Oct. 30 and Nov. 7, 1980. See also *Mundo Obrero*, Dec. 5–11, 1980, for the PSUC statement on the issue. The effort had been reported by two "Leninists," Andreu Claret Serra and Rodriguez Rovira, who had been asked to join in.

[48] *Hoja del Lunes* (Barcelona), Dec. 29, 1980.

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votes were not accounted for). That was a close call, and suggested things would get worse. The following day, an amendment to remove "Eurocommunism" from the Theses proposed by the Central Committee received the approval of the delegates by a margin of 424 to 359, with 21 abstentions. Interestingly, many in the PSUC leadership—including the "Leninists," among whom was the future PSUC secretary-general, Frutos—voted against the amendment. Despite this, the critics, among whom pro-Soviets like Clemente and Leopold Espuny were prominent, carried the day.[49]

The vote was unquestionably a victory for the pro-Soviet faction, which acted decisively at a time when the other groups in the PSUC did not. And yet, many of the 424 delegates voting to strike the term could not be described simply as pro-Soviet. More accurately, most voted against the term because it was a symbol, a symbol of Carrillo and the PCE, a symbol of failure. What the out-and-out pro-Soviets did was to take advantage of this sentiment.

The weight of the pro-Soviet elements and their allies was felt on several other issues, particularly with respect to international questions. Thus, the Congress approved a resolution indicating (in line with the views of people like CPSU Secretary Boris Ponomarëv) that the decisive contemporary international confrontation was "between the socialist bloc and the imperialist one." Other efforts—to adopt a more restrictive definition of membership and to include a reference in the Statutes to the PSUC as a "lay" party—were less successful, but they did not lose by much.

The PSUC Congress represented the first serious organizational challenge to the leadership of Santiago Carrillo since various pro-Soviet splinter groups had been formed in the late 1960's and early 1970's. As such, it coincided with a Soviet strategy which aimed at weakening Carrillo within the PCE and reducing the influence of his ideas in other European Communist parties. Yet the results cannot be described as simply, or primarily, a victory for the Soviet Union. The latter did not control events in Cataluña; rather, those who sympathized with Moscow used deep-seated frustrations and resentments to advantage.

Although hard-line and pro-Soviet elements were on the offensive throughout the Congress, they represented only a minority in the Catalan party, having between 25 and 34 representatives in the 101-member Central Committee.[50] In any case, only some 15 percent of PSUC militants participated in the pre-Congress debates, and many of the "Leninists" from local organizations who followed the pro-Soviets' lead during the Congress did so primarily to send a message to Madrid. Furthermore, even though the major "Leninist" and "Eurocommunist" figures in the PSUC could hardly be described as fundamentally anti-Soviet, neither were they ready or willing to return to the era of unconditional and self-abasing obedience to the Soviet Union.

In any case, the Fifth Congress threw the PSUC into the most profound crisis it had ever experienced, creating, in the words of one Leninist member of the Executive Committee, "an exceptional situation as well as a great opportunity."[51] The previous secretary-general and president (Gutiérrez and López Raimundo) refused reelection, and in their place the Central Committee elected Frutos and Pere Ardiaca respectively. The latter, viewed with sympathy by "traditionalists," was nevertheless an unlikely president of a *catalanista* PSUC, having helped consolidate PCE control over the Catalan party in the late 1940's.[52] Despite an effort to fashion an "integrated" leadership, Frutos in the end formed an Executive Committee list whose overwhelming majority was "Leninist." Representatives of the *banderas blancas* declined to join, as did many pro-Soviets and "Eurocommunists."

In the wake of the congress, the various factions, arguing that the documents approved were amenable to different interpretations, continued their open maneuvering. Those who had lost, particularly the *banderas blancas,* called for a new congress. Those who had won insisted there was no need for one. The pro-Soviet group favored the latter position, but called for an expansion of the Executive Committee to include *historicos* like Josep Serradell, warning of the dangers that confrontation with the PCE would have.

The Spanish Communist leadership, for its part, reacted harshly to the Fifth Congress, calling immediately for an extraordinary PSUC Congress. Sánchez Montero, accusing the Soviets of meddling in internal PCE affairs, said that the party faced a choice between those who wanted a return to the Stalinist era

[49] For information on the Congress, see *Treball,* Dec. 24, 1980–Jan. 9, 1981; *La Calle,* Jan. 13–19, 1981; *Mundo Obrero,* Jan. 9–15, 1981, and *El País,* Jan. 6, 1981. The vote on the Eurocommunism issue came on the heels of a speech by the PCE representative at the Catalan congress, Executive Committee member Ignacio Gallego, who has a reputation as being sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Some thought his speech, in which he declared, "They say I am pro-Soviet: I have been, am, and will [continue to] be a Communist," cinched matters for those who wished to delete "Eurocommunism." One wonders why Carrillo sent him to the PSUC gathering.

[50] See, for example, *La Calle,* Jan. 13–19, 1981.

[51] Andreu Claret Serra in *Treball,* Jan. 22, 1981.

[52] Alba, op. cit., pp. 291–93.

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Figures to be watched at the Tenth Congress of the Spanish Communist Party this summer: at left, Jaime Ballesteros; at right, Nicolás Sartorius.

—Christian Vioujard/Gamma, and ACI via Pictorial Parade.

and the Eurocommunists.[53] Reducing the problem to those terms was advantageous to Carrillo, especially in light of the challenge to his authority and of his desire to stage a "manageable" Tenth PCE Congress.

Things were not quite so simple or neat, however. The results of the Fifth PSUC Congress reflected the force of several cleavages among the Catalans. There were cleavages between those who wanted greater autonomy (indeed, even independence) vis-à-vis Madrid and those who did not; between those who wanted a return to a more closed, traditional party and those who did not; between those whose "Eurocommunism" emphasized consensual policies and participation in parliament, and those who stressed mass mobilizations and a grass-roots experiment with democracy; and finally, among those who were willing to justify virtually any action taken by the Soviet Union, others who—while critical—nevertheless ultimately saw the PSUC and PCE on the side of the socialist bloc, and a minority which insisted on a radical critique of Soviet and Eastern European reality along with a further distancing from the parties in power there. On almost all of these issues, the "Leninist" majority in the Executive Committee took a "synthetic" and therefore most ambiguous position.

The PCE and Its Crisis

Events at the Fifth PSUC Congress were symptomatic of a deep-seated crisis affecting the Spanish Communists today. This crisis operates at various levels, all of which overlap and tend to exacerbate one another. At one level, there exists nothing more than an ordinary struggle for power and for positioning with a view to the Carrillo succession. As the PCE moves toward its Tenth Congress, Carrillo finds himself under challenge from more sectarian elements and others in the leadership who want a diminution of his power. Yet, ironically, his position may have been strengthened by the Catalan Congress. Many in the party apparatus interpreted the results in Cataluña as a warning (one reinforced by the attempted military coup in February 1981) of what might happen were things to get out of control. This should enable Carrillo to thwart those like Tamames[54] (whose role in the PCE is much less important than some observers think) and Brabo[55]—who, in arguing for a more collective leadership style, are taking direct aim at him. Others, like

[53] For the official PCE reaction, see *Mundo Obrero*, Jan. 16–22, 1981. Writing in *El País*, Jan. 6, 1980, Ignasi Riera, who was a former editor with the PSUC weekly *Treball*, noted that "in the 'pro-Sovietization' of the PSUC it was possible to see very direct and (why not?) financed influences."

[54] Tamames has called for "rejuvenation" of the PCE, but his willingness to speak out in "bourgeois" newspapers and magazines may cost him support within the party. *El País*, Nov. 8, 1980.

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Gutiérrez and leaders of the Basque party, who called for a *federalización* of the PCE, are also likely to find their arguments undermined, even if a lessened role for the party center in Madrid may be in the cards. Carrillo remains the dominant figure in the PCE, and his removal at the Tenth PCE Congress is unlikely. Yet the battle over his succession has clearly begun. In this respect, the roles of Sánchez Montero, Jaime Ballesteros, and Sartorius at the upcoming conclave should provide an indication of how that battle is shaping up.

Aside from having to temper and resolve the power struggle presently under way, the Spanish Communist Party must also address another set of problems. One of these is to complete the transformation of the party from a clandestine and restricted to a legal and mass-based organization. The changeover in personnel policies, methods, and styles aggravates internal tensions. Moreover, there is the crisis of identity through which the PCE is passing. The tentative articulation of a PCE Eurocommunist model has been slowed, if not stopped, by the Communists' failure to expand their electoral and political audience. This, in turn, has encouraged the Soviet Union to move aggressively against the man who in *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado* challenged them most directly, Santiago Carrillo. (The PCE is not unique in being thus targeted by Moscow, but the Soviet effort in France, Italy, and Japan has been less forthright). The uncertain and deteriorating economic climate has also contributed to the Spanish Communists' problems. It was no coincidence that many of the hard-liners at the PSUC Congress came from Vallès Occidental and Baix Llobregat, areas with unemployment rates among the highest in Spain.

To a certain extent, then, the present crisis of the Spanish Communist Party bears a resemblance to those which have occurred in other West European Communist parties, especially the PCI. For example, the present PCE situation might be compared with that of the Italian party during the late 1940's and early 1950's with the onset of the cold war. Then, a debate pitted the more flexible formulations of Palmiro Togliatti against the more restrictive, Stalinist conceptions of PCI Organizational Secretary Pietro Secchia. A more recent parallel may be found in the problems that PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer has had in persuading an increasingly restive party base to bear with his historic compromise strategy.

Yet there is also a unique and complicating element in the Spanish situation. This is the absence of a *ruptura* with the past, the lack of a decisive victory over the Franco regime comparable, let us say, to the defeat of fascism in Italy or France. This meant not only that the PCE came out of clandestinity without the boost of having participated in a victorious resistance, but that the Communists have been compelled to accept the legacy of the decades of Franco rule. A similar challenge has faced the other Spanish parties, but no other must feel the anguish of this exercise quite like the PCE. It had always called for and predicted a *ruptura*, yet it must deal with a messy situation requiring more than a good bit of willingness to compromise. The victory of the *reforma* thesis allowed Spain to complete a peaceful transition from authoritarianism. That same victory implied the persistence of institutions and laws from the Franco era, and this has made difficult the consolidation of democracy in the country. The legitimacy of the new democratic order has yet to be consolidated, as the attempted military coup in February demonstrated. And the crisis of authority affecting the Spanish state is both cause and effect of a similar crisis affecting all institutions and parties in the society. The PCE has not been able to escape that crisis, and this gives the party's recent problems with the Catalans a unique dimension.

[55]Her relationship with Carrillo has deteriorated since 1979. They clashed, for example, over which faction to support in the Valencian branch of the PCE. Her assessment of the PSUC Congress (along with a pointed remark that the PCE "has today lost its central nervous and vital system") may be found in ibid., Jan. 21, 1981.

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Cuba in the 1980's

By Jorge I. Domínguez

As the Cuban revolutionary government begins its 23rd year in power, its leadership faces a complex combination of achievements and problems. The former make it likely that the regime will remain in power, meeting the bulk of the needs and aspirations of many Cuban citizens. The latter make it likely that the revolutionary government will need to choose among plausible objectives far more carefully in the years ahead than it has in the decade just ended. These choices may require the sacrifice of some goals for the sake of enhancing others.

Accomplishments

The principal achievement of the Cuban revolutionary government has been sheer survival. In January 1959, few would have imagined that a regime of this type—a Marxist-Leninist government tightly allied with the Soviet Union—could have lasted off the continental shores of the United States.

Not only has the revolutionary government survived, however, but it also has brought about a major restructuring of Cuban internal life and has projected political and military power throughout the so-called Third World. As titular head of the nonaligned movement, the Cuban government addresses a wide array of issues of international significance and makes its weight felt in many different settings and issue areas. Its government-to-government foreign assistance programs have operated in no less than two dozen countries during recent years. These range from Vietnam to Nicaragua, from Mozambique to South Yemen, and from Equatorial Guinea to Grenada.[1] The level of Cuba's commitments as an international aid "donor" is comparable only to the level of the major powers. In late 1980, the Cuban government officially admitted to having about 15,000 Cubans posted overseas performing civilian tasks.[2]

The best-known feature of Cuba's overseas presence in recent years has been, of course, its massive commitment of combat troops to Angola and, later, to Ethiopia. President Fidel Castro has noted that the Cuban military forces in Angola at the peak of the 1975–76 war reached 36,000;[3] that is probably the level of Cuba's overseas military presence in all countries as of the early 1980's.[4] This level of commitment is extraordinarily high for a country whose population is about 10 million people.

Cuba's overseas military presence now even includes formal military missions in Grenada and Nicaragua. These missions, sent after revolutions in

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[1] Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political and Military Limitations and Consequences of Cuban Policies in Africa," *Cuban Studies* (Pittsburgh, PA), July 1980, pp. 7–15.

[2] *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), Nov. 30, 1980, Supplement, p. 3.

[3] *Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz. Primer Secretario del CC del Partido Comunista de Cuba y Presidente de los Consejos de Estado y de Ministros, en la clausura del II periodo de sesiones de 1979 de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, Palacio de las Convenciones, 27 de diciembre de 1979* (Speech by Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Councils of State and Ministers at the End of the Second Session in 1979 of the National Assembly of Popular Power, Palace of Conventions, December 27, 1979). This is the unpublished but printed document of the Departamento de Versiones Taquigráficas. The page numbers vary depending on the version available, but the citation is from about the middle of the speech.

[4] President Castro noted in July 1980 that "more than 50,000 . . . do exemplary work abroad." Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (in charge of foreign relations) stated later in 1980 that there were about 15,000 civilians overseas. See *Granma Weekly Review*, Aug. 3, 1980, p. 3; and the citation in fn. 2.

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An apartment in old Havana.

—O. Franken/Sygma.

those two countries in 1979, represent the first undertakings of such a kind by the Cuban government in the Western Hemisphere. (The formal character of these missions, it should be underscored, distinguishes them from the kind of covert paramilitary and political action activities in which the Cubans have sometimes been involved in Latin America—e.g., Che Guevara's undertakings in Bolivia in the late 1960's and the more recent ventures in El Salvador.)

Economic Problems

When one turns to problems, the most obvious is the long-run failure of the Cuban government to generate real, sustained economic growth. Cuba has the dubious distinction of being one of the few Communist states that has not experienced high sustained rates of real economic growth over an extended period. Indeed, with the exception of the first half of the 1970's, the record of overall growth of the Cuban economy has been dismal. It is virtually impossible to make precise statements about Cuban economic growth over time because the Cuban national accounts system tends to count some activities twice and, more serious, because prices are not properly deflated. Nevertheless, if one uses the government's own statistics and makes modest adjustments for ignored inflation and for population growth, it would appear that with the exception of 1978, the Cuban economy has registered zero real growth of aggregate product per capita in every year since 1976. According to official figures, "gross social product" in current prices rose by about 4 percent a year in 1977, 1979, and 1980, 1 percent in 1976, and 11 percent in 1978; the projected figure for 1981 was 3.9 percent.[5] Thus, even the most modest adjustments for inflation imported from the international economic system would drastically reduce the real growth rate in four of the last five years, and

[5]Computed from the *Anuario estadistico de Cuba 1978* (Statistical Yearbook of Cuba 1978), Havana, Comité Estatical de Estadísticas, 1979; as well as from *Granma Weekly Review*, Jan. 6, 1980, p. 3, and *Granma* (Havana), Dec. 27, 1980, p. 3.

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there still remains the necessity for further deductions for population growth (which averaged about 1 percent a year).[6]

While Cuba is somewhat insulated from sharp upswings in international prices because a majority of its imports come from Communist countries with which it has long-term price and supply agreements, these prices, too, rise over the long run (after some time lag). Therefore, the relatively high rates of inflation in the world economy during the late 1970's do not augur well for Cuba in the early 1980's, when the prices of its long-run contracts will catch up to immediately past world levels. The hope for the Cuban economy is that production increases will outweigh the predictable increases in the cost of imports.

Possibilities for such production increases are somewhat cloudy. It is true that several natural disasters hit the Cuban economy recently and negatively affected its performance, especially in late 1979 and 1980. The plagues that attacked the sugar cane and tobacco crops are the better known, but other sectors of agriculture suffered major calamities as well. However, poor performance of the economy cannot be explained entirely by these natural disasters. For example, while the levels of sugar production declined somewhat in 1980 in comparison with 1979, the world price of sugar approximately quadrupled during that same period.[7] Cuba could not take full advantage of this price bonanza not only because its production declined but also because the bulk of its production is committed to the Soviet Union and East European countries under long-term contracts. Nevertheless, if one assumes that at least a quarter of Cuba's 1980 sugar harvest might have been sold at prevailing (quadrupled) prices in the world market—a very conservative assumption given the historical record—then Cuba's foreign exchange earnings should not have fallen in 1980 as compared with 1979. Indeed, they should have risen quite substantially. Notwithstanding this, there was a drop in overall economic growth.[8]

Many who write about Cuba emphasize that the US trade embargo has made it difficult for Cuba to register higher rates of economic growth. Although there is little doubt that this US policy has affected Cuban economic performance negatively over time and still does so today, the major impact occurred in the early 1960's. Since that time, the marginal importance of the US economic embargo has declined considerably.[9] Its main current consequences relate to the costs that Cuba incurs, or must pay, as a result of higher freight charges; limitations on access to spare parts for old equipment; the difficulty in communication, transportation, and warehousing that comes from trading with geographically distant partners; and the opportunities lost when some potential partners choose not to trade with Cuba to avoid political or economic retaliation from the United States. Such costs to Cuba of the US policy, which in any event have decreased, cannot explain why the performance of the Cuban economy worsened in the late 1970's as compared with the early 1970's.

There appear to be three other reasons for much of Cuba's economic difficulties in the late 1970's and thus far in the 1980's. The first has been the fluctuations in the world price of sugar. Recovery of the Cuban economy in the first half of the 1970's was greatly facilitated by a spectacular rise in the world price of sugar, which was eventually reflected in the long-term contracts with Communist countries. But the world price of sugar peaked in late 1974 and declined sharply through 1975. While the prevailing world sugar prices of the late 1970's were still about three times higher on the average than what they had been 10 years earlier, and while the sugar prices paid to Cuba by the USSR remained some five times higher than prevailing world sugar prices in these years, the price drop in mid-decade clearly ended the Cuban economic recovery.[10]

The timing of the price drop had an additional perverse effect. When Cuban government officials were drafting the first five-year plan, for 1976–80, the world price of sugar was very high. Central planners took into account the likelihood that the sugar price would drop from these lofty heights, but, in the words of Gilberto Díaz, Vice-President of the Central Planning Board, "when it came, the price drop exceeded all expectations."[11] Consequently, that first

[6] *Anuario estadístico de Cuba 1978.*

[7] In 1979, it averaged under 8 cents a pound; in 1980, it was well above 30 cents. See daily quotations for the commodity market.

[8] *Anuario estadístico de Cuba 1978.* See also Cole Blasier, "COMECON in Cuban Development," in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Eds., *Cuba in the World*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979. The advantage to Cuba of the nonsocialist world market is that its earnings are in convertible currency. Cuba's contractual obligations to Communist states, however , limit its flexibility in foreign economic policy.

[9] In an interview with a Cuban journalist in the fall of 1980, Gilberto Díaz, Vice-President of the Central Planning Board, forgot, in presenting an extensive, detailed analysis of Cuba's economic performance, to mention the impact of the US embargo, until reminded of it by the interviewer. Díaz eventually admitted: "It is a fact but . . . it cannot be used to cover up our shortcomings." See *Granma Weekly Review*, Nov. 9, 1980, Supplement, p. 1.

[10] Ibid., p. 1; *Anuario estadístico de Cuba 1978*, p. 202; *Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz . . .*

[11] *Granma Weekly Review*, Nov. 9, 1980, Supplement, p. 2.

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

Trucks bound for Cuba being loaded aboard the Soviet ship Valerian Kuybyshev.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

plan was severely disrupted, and the benefits that might have accrued to Cuba from it were reduced.

Because prices rose in 1980, however, the economic troubles of that year cannot be explained in terms of the behavior of world sugar prices. A second factor underlying Cuba's economic problems, then, has been Cuba's Soviet connection. Although Cuban-Soviet relations had cooled considerably in 1967–68, they improved gradually in the closing years of the 1960's, and in the early 1970's, Cuba and the USSR moved to a much tighter political, military, and economic alliance. Among the results of this development was a massive increase in Soviet economic subsidies to Cuba. Although Soviet deliveries of military equipment to Cuba—which have amounted to several billion dollars over the past two decades—rose proportionately in the 1970's, Moscow continued to supply such items free of charge. In addition, Cuban and Soviet officials in December 1972 signed agreements—still in force—that made their countries' economic relationship more advantageous to Cuba. Repayment of Soviet credits extended to Cuba previously (as well as interest on those loans) was to be postponed until 1986. Some interest-free credits for the years ahead were authorized. Additional credits of an interest-bearing nature were provided for project development, especially industrial modernization. The Soviet Union also consented to subsidize the price that Cuba paid for petroleum products and to buy Cuban sugar at a price well above world market prices. Moreover, the prices of petroleum and sugar were linked to prevent a deterioration of Cuban terms of trade.[12] These agreements, then, promoted the recovery of the early 1970's and helped to cushion the Cuban economy from disruptions for at least a while in the late 1970's.

There is little doubt that the survival of the revolutionary government required such massive Soviet support. In the late 1970's, however, the Soviet economy itself faced some major economic problems, and its own growth rate slowed down markedly. Just as the bonds of economic dependence helped to bring about Cuban prosperity in the first half of the 1970's, so too the Soviet recession has disrupted the Cuban econ-

[12] Jorge I. Dominguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 149–59.

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omy in the more recent period—as Cuba's own top leadership has acknowledged.[13]

A third factor behind Cuba's economic difficulties has been low labor productivity. The mismanagement of the Cuban economy in the late 1960's was so colossal—as Cuban leaders, again, admit[14]—that there were many relatively easy ways of improving efficiency in the early 1970's, and adoption of such measures contributed to the economic recovery. Heavy borrowing of Soviet techniques of central planning and management also imposed some order on the economy. But by the late 1970's, improvements in efficiency became more difficult to achieve. Moreover, further steps to produce such improvements required substantial reorganization of labor incentives and managerial roles.[15] Although these are likely to yield benefits in the 1980's, they caused some headaches, disorganization, and costs while they were being introduced in the late 1970's.

An additional factor complicating Cuba's productivity problems has been the opportunity costs entailed in conducting war overseas. Cuba's regular standing armed forces are not very large in comparison with the country's overseas military commitments—probably not more than five times the size of the current total overseas troop contingent. To meet its overseas commitments, in short, Cuba has relied on the mobilization of military reserves. Since the mid-1970's, reservists have constituted a majority of Cuban troops overseas, the proportion of reservists at times reaching as high as 80 percent.[16] As a consequence, the more able personnel have been removed from the performance of their normal tasks in the civilian sector, and lower-skilled personnel have been asked to take up the slack. Such a situation contributed to the further decline of efficiency in some sectors.

Not only are Cuba's economic problems severe today, but the immediate prospects for resolving them are fairly dim. In the first half of the 1980's, world sugar prices are likely to fall from the heights reached in 1980 and early 1981. It is imprudent to assume that Soviet subsidies would increase much beyond the already very high levels of the late 1970's, even if the Soviet economy experiences a recovery. The improvements in efficency anticipated from the economic reforms of the late 1970's may be limited by the opportunity costs of war overseas. Recovery of Cuban agriculture from the natural disasters of the 1979–80 period would do little more than bring the economy to the still unsatisfactory level of performance of the late 1970's. And because the impact of the US trade embargo is now relatively modest, even the unlikely removal of the embargo might not make a dramatic difference.

A fair, if optimistic, bet under these circumstances is that the Cuban economy will at best register modest real growth in the early 1980's. Such growth, moreover, will require a relatively swift Soviet economic recovery, a world sugar price of 15 cents a pound (about half prevailing levels in early 1981 but twice the average of the late 1970's), an underlying rate of world inflation no higher than 10 percent, recovery

Cuban soldiers in the Ogaden, near Jijiga, Ethiopia, in the fall of 1978.

—Bernard Couret/Gamma.

[13] This was the main theme of Fidel Castro's December 1979 speech, and the probable reason why it was not published in Cuba. President Castro even offered to send thousands of Cubans to Siberia to assist the Soviets in solving their problems.

[14] There are many examples. See, for instance, *Verde olivo* (Havana), July 15, 1979, p. 15, and *Granma Weekly Review*, Dec. 9, 1979, pp. 2–3, for speeches by Fidel and Raúl Castro respectively. For thoughtful discussion by the President of the Central Planning Board, see *Granma Weekly Review*, Jan. 6, 1980, pp. 2–3, and *Bohemia* (Havana), Feb. 25, 1979, pp. 9–11.

[15] See the interviews with the President of the Central Planning Board cited in fn. 14.

[16] Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution*, Chap. 9.

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from natural disasters, and the realization of some efficiency gains from managerial and labor incentive reforms.

Political Difficulties

The decline of the Cuban economy was a key factor behind Cuba's severe political problems in 1980. The most dramatic manifestation of these problems was the departure of some 125,000 Cubans to the United States in small boats in the spring of 1980 (the Cuban government finally closed the outflow in September 1980). A few thousand others left Cuba by plane for such countries as Peru, Venezuela, and Costa Rica.[17] To be sure, a fair proportion of this outflow was somewhat involuntary. In negotiating with the Cuban-Americans who came to pick up their relatives or friends, the Cuban government reserved a percentage of the capacity of each boat for people whom the government wished to expel from the country. Although the government asserts that all who left the country did so voluntarily, that is only technically correct. Someone in prison had the choice of remaining there or leaving the country,[18] and it was difficult not to choose exile. This situation accounts for the substantial minority of recent arrivals from Cuba to the US who have prior criminal records. Nevertheless, most Cubans who left did so for the classic combination of reasons that earlier outflows of exiles had: a desire to get out of a country whose government they deemed both politically authoritarian and economically incompetent. Even many of those with criminal records had been arrested for illegal efforts to improve their family's economic activities through "black market" or other transactions that would not necessarily have been illegal in a market economy.

This is the third major wave of emigration from Cuba since the revolution came to power. The first, which arrived in the United States between 1960 and 1962, was unrepresentative of the Cuban population, for it was composed primarily of white, urban, upper-middle-class and upper-class professional and managerial families. The second wave began late in 1965 and lasted into the early 1970's. Its social composition differed markedly from that of the first, in resembling the overall occupational structure of white urban Cuba. The modal emigrant was now a skilled industrial worker. In the most recent wave, the emigrants remain occupationally representative of urban Cuba, but for the first time they include blacks as well as whites in proportions comparable to their representation in urban Cuba.[19]

The gradual universalization of the patterns of emigration suggests that support of and opposition to the Cuban government are much less related to social and economic divisions now than they were 20 years ago. Except for the rural-urban cleavage, support of or opposition to the government appears to depend more on political beliefs, ideologies, and attitudes than on one's position in the social structure.

Although the massive outflow reflects poorly on the regime's abilities to maintain the allegiances of a substantial portion of the citizenry, the government will probably benefit politically from it. Once again, the revolutionary government has exported its political opposition. Indeed, this time it even exported some of those it considered socially undesirable. Moreover, those who left vacated housing units—which are very scarce, especially in parts of urban Cuba[20]—and these have been reallocated at government discretion. Similarly, jobs have become available at a time the government had been worried about its ability to employ all veterans returning from African wars. Indicative of this worry was the institution of a system of veteran's preference for job allocation.[21]

Political dissatisfaction, however, is not confined to those who have departed from Cuba. Not only the condition of the economy but also less spectacular irritants weigh heavily upon a significant number who remain. For example, Cuban legislation and practice call for the discussion of the annual plan with the workers of each enterprise to enhance political participation and support for the government and its policies, and to correct mistakes that may have crept into the plan.[22] According to the country's leading news magazine, *Bohemia,* 34 percent of the enterprises in 1978 neglected to discuss their plans with their work-

[17] For a factual review of events as well as a statement of US policy, see Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, *Current Policy,* No. 193, June 20, 1980. For a discussion much closer to the Cuban government's perspective, see Lourdes Casal, "Cuba, April–May 1980: The History and the Hysteria," *Areito* (New York, NY), Vol. 6, No. 23 (1980), pp. 15–25.

[18] Discussion by the author with Cuban government officials. See also *Granma Weekly Review,* June 15, 1980, pp. 1 and 3, and June 22, 1980, p. 3.

[19] A survey conducted by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency based on April–May 1980 arrivals showed that about one fifth were blacks and mulattoes—a figure consistent with the makeup of the population in western Cuba, from which most came and where Mariel harbor (the point of departure) is located. *Boston Globe,* June 4, 1980, p. 73. See also Dominguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution,* pp. 139–41.

[20] For a grim discussion of the housing shortage, see *Verde olivo,* Feb. 25, 1979, pp. 74–75.

[21] *Granma Weekly Review,* June 22, 1980, p. 3.

[22] Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution,* pp. 417–20.

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ers. An additional 58 percent of the enterprises did talk over their plans with their workers, but then they failed to take into account any of the suggestions made. Consequently, only 8 percent of the enterprises were fulfilling the regulations as written and intended. Even *Bohemia* noted that this state of affairs was a "flagrant violation" of policy and underlined the failure of the labor union leadership to defend the collective rights of workers.[23]

A somewhat related circumstance is that membership (as a percent of the population) in the officially sponsored mass organizations appeared to peak in the mid-1970's. For example, although the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution already encompassed about 80 percent of the adult population in the mid-1970's,[24] the figure was unchanged in September 1980.[25] President Fidel Castro explained that "the only reason for the membership not being larger is that, in the past few years, the organization has been especially careful in choosing new members."[26] Similarly, while membership in the Cuban Women's Federation had reached 80 percent of adult women by the mid-1970's, that figure, too, remained unchanged in the summer of 1980.[27] Absolute membership in both organizations had, to be sure, continued to rise, but the increase merely reflected population growth.

These data suggest that approximately one fifth of Cuba's adults are entirely on the margins of political life. They and their offspring constitute the available pool for future emigration, should the gates reopen. That means that the pool may amount to up to 2 million people. Although not all of these individuals may wish to leave the country of their birth, it is also true

[23] "How Goes the Implementation of the System of Direction and Planning of the Economy?" *Bohemia*, July 6, 1979, pp. 36–37.
[24] Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution*, p. 264.
[25] *Granma Weekly Review*, Oct. 5, 1980, p. 2.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Dominguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution*, p. 267; *Granma Weekly Review*, Aug. 31, 1980, p. 3.

A group of 10,000 Cubans demand political asylum elsewhere in the Americas after invading the Peruvian embassy compound in Havana in April 1980.

—SIPA Press via Black Star.

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that many who have already left did belong to some of the mass organizations. Consequently, the available pool for future emigration probably is of such an order of magnitude.

Personnel Changes

In response to the growing evidence of economic and political problems, there were major personnel changes at the top of the Cuban government and to a lesser extent within the Communist Party in late 1979 and in 1980. Three ministers were replaced in December 1979. A month later, 11 ministers, presidents of state committees (also of ministerial rank), or presidents of institutes responding directly to the Council of Ministers were dismissed. Nine others were dropped from the Council of Ministers, or from direct access to it, because their agencies were dismantled or subordinated to others, thereby losing their independence. Never in the history of revolutionary rule in Cuba had such a massive political shakeup occurred in the upper reaches of the government. Nine of the 23 had been Central Committee members or alternates as well; six of these nine were dropped from the Central Committee at the Second Party Congress (December 1980).

The changes were clearly designed to enhance the capabilities of the top leadership to manage the economy. Economic ministries and other central agencies were heavily affected. In particular, sectors that had performed rather poorly—such as transportation and construction—or that were highly sensitive to the political winds—such as labor, agriculture, and the sugar industry—experienced shifts in managers. But there was not much evidence of the sort of "factional" fights that some Western analysts at times have perceived in the past. Indeed, the only two systematic outcomes of the reshuffle were the dismissal of women ministers from the Council of Ministers and possibly the elimination of blacks as well. These were probably entirely accidental outcomes, although they did not exactly enhance the demographic representativeness of the governmental leadership.

Three other aspects of the changes, however, are equally important. The first is that power has been recentralized in the hands of a relatively few people. Instead of appointing many new ministers to replace those dismissed, the top leadership decided to assign new responsibilities to itself. The Council of Ministers in late 1979 had an executive committee of 13 vice-presidents, and none has been dropped. Moreover, beginning in January 1980, all but three have been serving as ministers in addition to continuing as government vice-presidents, whereas only two of them had such direct ministerial responsibilities before December 1979. Thus, Cuba has not witnessed a "circulation of elites," the replacement of former leaders with new ones. Instead, there has been a reconcentration of power, from the second-echelon elite to the top elite. This shift reverses the modest trend of the late 1970's toward some decentralization.

The pattern of continuity among the top elite and of concentration of power in their hands was evident during the Second Party Congress. None of the members of the 1975 Political Bureau was removed (although three new members were added). Even though

The office of the "Karl Marx" Committee for the Defense of the Revolution in old Havana in May 1980. The signboard entitled "CDR Karl Marx" carries two notices. The first reads: "Your workers, your glorious syndical movement will share with you all the battles and together with you will go on forever toward new victories." The second reads: "All Cuba Tomorrow [Should Go] to the March of a Fighting People."

—O. Franken/Sygma.

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four of the nine Secretariat posts had new incumbents by the 1980 Congress, only one of the four individuals replaced appears to have been truly dropped from the top leadership (the other three have high posts, and two are elderly). There was more flux within the Central Committee, but its membership, too, shows extraordinarily high stability. Of the living full members of the 1975 Central Committee, 78.7 percent were reelected in 1980. However, the Committee's full membership expanded from 112 to 148, and the number of alternates grew from 12 to 77, as compared with the First Congress in 1975.

A second significant aspect of the changes is the highly centralized manner in which they were made. According to the Constitution approved in 1976, the Cuban national legislature—the National Assembly—is supposed to play a major role in the selection of the government's top personnel. Yet the top leadership did not even present the new slate of personnel to this body when it met in December 1979. Instead, the leadership waited until a month later to announce the most important shifts. At that time, the much smaller Council of State (dominated by members of the party Political Bureau and Secretariat) authorized the changes formally.[28] While the National Assembly has become a moderately important forum for the discussion of some parts of the legislative agenda (dealing especially with social issues),[29] it is clear that basic decisions concerning top personnel as well as military, foreign, and budgetary policies remain effectively beyond its real control.

A third key feature of the reshuffle is that the only identifiable sector of the leadership replaced in full was that concerned with internal security, law, and the courts. The Ministers of Interior and Justice, the Attorney General, and the President of the Supreme Court were all removed within weeks of each other (the last through retirement).

This last characteristic may be related to important policy changes. In the mid- and late 1970's, the revolutionary government took several important steps to implement "socialist legality." A new constitution, new legal codes, and other measures helped to set a climate in which laws would be observed and arbitrariness reduced.[30] Such measures worked well—apparently too well. Beginning in 1979, there were criticisms of the courts for their willingness to enforce procedural safeguards provided by the laws but whose consequence was to set free many people accused of crimes. The police and the courts even dismissed cases for lack of evidence. Courts of appeal had also become more willing to reverse lower court decisions on procedural grounds.

At a meeting of the National Assembly in July 1979, the courts and the police were accused of being "soft" on crime. President Fidel Castro noted that the rights of society had to prevail over the rights of criminals.[31] This criticism set the stage for the dramatic personnel changes already mentioned. Since these were effected, the criminal code has been enforced more strictly, and penalties on crime have been toughened. The University of Havana was also the target of a campaign of "ideological deepening" such as had not been witnessed in some time. A number of students and faculty were demoted, placed on probation, or dismissed for insufficient ideological zeal.[32]

One of the crudest manifestations of the new internal security policies was the temporary unleashing of mob rule on the streets of Havana in the spring of 1980. The top leadership encouraged the local neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution to hold meetings at which neighbors would—nonviolently—express their disapproval and disgust at the "scum" that were leaving the country. These were, however, intense confrontations, at times face-to-face. It is not surprising that many of them erupted into physical violence against those who had indicated their wish to depart from the country. Some local committees even held contests to select the most insulting caricatures of those about to leave Cuba. A portion of the ones I saw would not ordinarily have been published in the Cuban press under official strictures against obscenity.[33]

One incident occurred around the old US embassy building, which now houses the small US Interest Section (established by joint US-Cuban agreement in the late summer of 1977) that looks after US consular and diplomatic interests in Cuba. The official Cuban version is that the few hundred people waiting in line to leave Cuba—mostly former political prisoners—attacked people in the local neighborhood, who defended themselves. This version also suggests that the head of the Interest Section, Wayne Smith, encouraged the physical assault. Most other observers,

[28] *Granma Weekly Review*, Jan 20, 1980, *p. 5.*

[29] See, for example, *Granma*, July 3, 1980, pp. 1–3.

[30] For good discussion of these issues, see three articles by Max Azicri in the *Review of Socialist Law* (Leyden), Vol. 6, No. 2 (1980): "An Introduction to Cuban Socialist Law," pp. 153–63; "Change and Institutionalization in the Revolutionary Process: The Cuban Legal System in the 1970's," pp. 164–82; and "The Cuban Family Code: Some Observations on Its Innovations and Continuities," pp. 183–91.

[31] *Verde olivo*, July 15, 1979, pp. 11 and 14; *Granma Weekly Review*, July 15, 1979, p. 2; *Granma*, July 3, 1980, p. 3.

[32] Author's interviews during a visit to Cuba in August 1980.

[33] Ibid. See also Casal, loc. cit., pp. 17–20.

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including international journalists at the scene, contend that the former political prisoners waiting in line were attacked by a pro-government mob. The logic of the situation, in my judgment, favors the latter interpretation. It is consistent with the general political climate at the time. Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that the former political prisoners, and even less US Interest Section personnel, would have encouraged such senseless acts.

This kind of direct violence had virtually disappeared from Cuban national life during the 1970's. It was a throwback to the earlier 1960's, when Ramiro Valdés had been Minister of the Interior. In December 1979, it should be noted, Valdés had been appointed Interior Minister for a second opportunity to serve the revolution in that post.

The Regime's Strengths

In light of the failures and problems set forth in the preceding pages, one might well ask why this regime does not fall. The simplest answer is that it has been, and remains, an extraordinarily strong regime, with considerable political support. It would be a grave error to interpret the undoubted difficulties of the Cuban revolutionary government as an indication that it is about to tumble. The evidence cited earlier underscores the fact that approximately four fifths of the population belong to mass organizations. While many choose to do so only opportunistically, as a necessary step to a more or less normal life in Cuba, many others are clearly in agreement with the government.



Fidel Castro addressing the Sixth Nonaligned Summit Conference in Havana in September 1979.

—Alian Nogues/SYGMA.

Cuba, after all, is one of the few Communist states that has had an indigenous revolution. President Fidel Castro has been a genuine national leader, and a great many Cubans have backed him and the revolutionary government as a part of a national epic in which they themselves have participated. While such broad commitments are a depletable resource—the government cannot continue to rely on this kind of support indefinitely if its performance fails to improve—they remain an essential ingredient of maintenance of revolutionary rule in Cuba.

The reverse side of the coin is that Cuba lacks strong, independent alternative organizations, with autonomous world views, that can facilitate communication among people free of the regime's political control, as the Roman Catholic Church does in Poland. Historically, the Cuban Roman Catholic Church has been quite weak, and it remains so today. Other churches and sects command the support of a very small number of people.

Furthermore, contrary to East Germany, which built a wall and established other mechanisms to stop the flow of emigration, Cuba learned early (and Vietnam eventually learned as well) that the economic costs of emigration were well worth paying for the sake of political order. The three major waves of emigration from Cuba coincide with the three periods of severe economic malfunctioning in Cuba. By luck, and most recently by design, the Cuban government has exported its opposition to the United States.

On the positive side again, the performance of the regime in certain social areas critical to the lives of ordinary people has for some time been very good. Improvement of basic public health measures continued throughout the 1970's. Consequently, the rate of infant mortality per 1,000 live births dropped below 20 as the decade closed—half its level 10 years earlier. Moreover, life expectancy passed 70 years. The stock of medical doctors has increased so much that health personnel have become a standard component of the foreign aid that Cuba extends to many countries. As the 1970's ended, the median educational level of adults had risen to the sixth grade from first/second grade in 1964—a spectacular leap in a 16-year period. Even some indicators of the quality of education, which had been deficient in earlier years, had shown

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Future secondary-school teachers undergoing training at the Rene Fraga Moreno school in Matanzas in December 1977.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

remarkable improvement. For instance, the once high dropout rate for the elementary grades had become negligible, and virtually all elementary school teachers had received their teaching certificates, as compared with only a little over half of the group in the mid-1970's.[34] Although a quarter to a third of all products—primarily foodstuffs, clothing, and medicine—remain rationed, the rationing itself attests to the government's continuing commitment to equitable sharing of the scarcities of Cuban life. The rationing card is thus a twin symbol: failure in growth, commitment to equality.

The regime's political innovations at the local level in the mid-1970's likewise appear to have served it well.[35] People are now encouraged to bring their grievances to local government officials, who must satisfy these or explain why they cannot. Many small changes have taken place as a result of these procedures, and such changes have increased the sense of political efficacy and improved the quality of life of individual Cubans. While formal political institutions above the municipal level remain organized, and operate, on rather authoritarian principles, these local organs have provided an important and enduring mechanism for political participation. One danger is that they might work too well, thereby suffering the fate of the courts that sought to observe zealously the procedures enshrined in "socialist legality." But even in the case of the courts and the laws, the clock has not been turned back to the arbitrariness of an earlier decade. The rate of political imprisonment continued to decline even in the late 1970's.[36]

In addition, at least some of the measures adopted in recent months may persuade many that reforms are in the works. The dismissal of ministers did get rid

[34] For general data on public health, see *Granma Weekly Review*, June 22, 1980, pp. 1–2. On the health component of the foreign aid program, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1980, p. 2, and the Supplement to ibid., Nov. 30, 1980, pp. 4–5. For an up-to-date presentation of information on education, see the special Supplement to ibid., Nov. 16, 1980. See also ibid., Nov. 9, 1980, which indicated that the workers in the sugar sector, historically the least well educated sector, had on the average reached the sixth-grade level.

[35] In 1974, the Cuban government began to experiment with elected local government bodies that had authority to solve a number of very specific local problems on their own without consultation with the central government—e.g., grocery store service, garbage collection practices, hospital visiting hours, etc. This experiment was extended to the entire country in 1976.

[36] For US government acknowledgment of this trend, see Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, *Current Policy*, No. 167, Apr. 17, 1980, pp. 3–4.

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of some incompetents (although, to be sure, many of the departing ministers were very able). Moreover, new policies to modify the wage scale and to allow peasants to sell in the open market (at whatever prices prevail) the excess production beyond their state quotas seek to improve the balance between the supply and demand of goods and services.[37]

Finally, the regime's internal security apparatus is very powerful. No less important, the regime remains willing to apply as much force as necessary to crush the opposition.

The Future

Despite these strengths, however, the Cuban revolutionary government is not in a position to ignore its failures and problems. In the half decade ahead, it will have to evaluate more clearly the costs of its international activities for its own society. It will also have to show that the regime's economic performance can improve on a more sustained basis. It will need to reassess, too, the extent and meaning of political participation, not only in local neighborhoods but also in work centers and in institutions that govern above the local level. There are no easy answers to any of these issues.

In years past, the Cuban revolutionary leadership gave the impression at times that all problems could be addressed simultaneously, that there could be development at home as well as revolution abroad. Now, perhaps for the first time since they came to power, an older and possibly wiser set of leaders may have to choose among plausible alternatives.

[37] *Granma Weekly Review*, Nov. 9, 1980, Supplement, pp. 3–5. Also author's interviews in Cuba, August 1980.

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Books

The Rise of Soviet Naval Power

By Hedley Bull

KEN BOOTH. *Navies and Foreign Policy*. London, Croom Helm, and New York, NY, Crane, Russak, 1977.

PAUL J. MURPHY, Ed. *Naval Power in Soviet Policy*. Vol. 2, Studies in Communist Affairs, published under the auspices of the US Air Force. Washington, DC, 1978.

BRADFORD DISMUKES and JAMES M. McCONNELL, Eds. *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*. New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1979.

SIEGFRIED BREYER and NORMAN POLMAR. *Guide to the Soviet Navy*, 2nd ed. Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1977.

US SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE. *Soviet Oceans Development*. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976.

IT IS TEMPTING to compare the rise of Soviet naval power, in its effect upon America's world position, with the challenge delivered by Wilhelmine Germany to Britain's naval supremacy in the two decades following the enactment of the German Navy Law of 1898. In both cases, the dominant land power discards its traditional naval strategies of coastal defense and *guerre de course* and, by embarking upon the construction of an oceangoing "great navy," creates a threat to the dominant sea power. In both cases, the land power is led to present this challenge only after a protracted internal debate, in which the expansion of naval power is championed by an outstanding and dedicated naval leader, who is fascinated by the history of Anglo-Saxon sea power, determined to awake his country to a sense of its naval destiny, and fired with the doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan—in the earlier case, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz; in the more recent one, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, the analysis of whose writings, as these books show, has become a minor industry in the West today.

In both cases, the challenger is gravely handicapped by the burden of maintaining its position of dominance in land power, and especially by the fact that it faces potential enemies on two fronts. The challenger is also handicapped by its inexperience, by its lack of a strong naval tradition, by the inferiority of its navy to its army in terms of political and bureaucratic influence, and by the facts of geography, which give it only limited access to the open sea. In both cases, however, these handicaps, while they rule out the possibility that the challenger will ever achieve naval dominance of the kind the Anglo-Saxon opponent possesses, are not so great that they cannot bring the opponent's dominance to an end. For von Tirpitz, whose "risk strategy" was intended not to ensure that Germany would rule the waves in place of Britain but only to limit Britain's freedom of maneuver, and perhaps also for Gorshkov, this is as much as naval expansion is meant to accomplish.

In both cases, too, the dominant sea power reacts to the challenge in a spirit of righteous indignation. For Britain, it was said then as it is said of America now, sea power is a necessity because of its dependence on trade and its position as the center of an imperial system or coalition of states divided by sea. For a continental land power, it was said then as it is now, sea power is a luxury.

But why should anyone regard the existing distribution of naval power as sacrosanct? Why should Germany then or the Soviet Union now concede to the Anglo-Saxon opponent a permanent position of dominance at sea, a dominance

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used to confine or contain the challenger within its continental perimeters and to exclude or combat its influence in the world at large? Why, indeed, should third parties, and especially those states and peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America that have lived so long in the shadow first of British, then of American naval power, prefer the continuation of a single power's dominance of the oceans to a situation of balance or equilibrium, such as the challenge of an ascendant naval power tends to bring about? Was not the decline of British sea power one of the conditions that made possible the political independence of the numerous ex-colonies and ex-dependencies in the world today? Are there not many in the Third World who regard it as a welcome development that the United States is no longer so assured of its command of the sea that it can concentrate its efforts, as it did between the defeat of Japan and the rise of Soviet naval power, on "the projection of power ashore"? It is a measure of the intellectual conformism of strategic studies in the Western world today that in none of the five books under review are these questions even asked, let alone explored.

There are, of course, vital differences between the two cases. First, naval power is not as decisive an instrument of foreign policy as it was at the time of the Anglo-German naval rivalry. Sea-based, land-based, and air-based forms of power are today difficult to disentangle from one another. "Command of the sea," as Mahan used to call it, or "sea control," to use the term now fashionable in Western naval jargon, is not secured by naval forces alone; and when it is secured, it does not have the geopolitical significance it had when air communications did not exist and land communications were what they were three quarters of a century ago. Nor does control of "the great highway" of the sea lay coastal states and peoples open to domination as readily as it did in the era of imperial expansion.

Second, whereas Wilhelmine Germany was a dynamic industrial power that had already overtaken Britain in economic strength, or was in the course of doing so, the Soviet Union faces the United States in a position of decisive economic and technological inferiority. From this point of view, the better analogy is not the Anglo-German naval rivalry of 1898–1918, but the Anglo-American naval competition of the 1920's. It is a competition which the United States has the capacity (even if it does not necessarily have the will) to win.

Above all, as Alva M. Bowen, Jr., points out in a perceptive discussion of the analogy, the Soviet-American naval competition is disciplined by the fear of escalation to nuclear war:

The German fleet was designed to fight the British fleet and vice versa. The Soviet and U.S. fleets may have to fight one another, but they will more likely engage lesser navies.[1]

These and other differences notwithstanding, however, we may agree with Bowen's conclusion that Germany's challenge did in fact succeed in forcing Britain to surrender influence in large regions of the world, important to Britain's status as a world power, and that the Soviet naval challenge to the United States may be directed to-

[1] In the Murphy volume reviewed here, *Naval Power in Soviet Policy*, p. 76.

Reviewers in This Issue

HEDLEY BULL—Professor of International Relations, Balliol College, Oxford University (Oxford, England); author of many works on strategic problems and the theory of international politics, including *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 1977.

COLIN S. GRAY—Director of National Security Studies, Hudson Institute (Croton-on-Hudson, NY); author of numerous studies of contemporary strategic questions, including *The MX ICBM and National Security*, 1981, and *Strategic Studies: A Critical Asessment*, 1981; currently working on a study of comparative strategic culture.

F. STEPHEN LARRABEE—Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University (Washington, DC); member of the US National Security Council staff working on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1978–81; author of articles on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in journals such as *International Security, The World Today, Orbis*, and *Osteuropa*.

TANIA A. JACQUES—Graduate Student in the Uralic-Altaic Department, Indiana University (Bloomington, IN); President, Inner Asia Institute (Arlington, VA); and author of several articles on the Turkic minority nationalities of the Sino-Soviet border area.

STEPHEN B. YOUNG—Research Fellow in East Asian Legal Studies at the Law School and Research Associate at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA); an official of the US Agency for International Development in the Republic of Vietnam, 1968–71; author of studies of political culture in Vietnam and Thailand in journals such as *Asian Survey, Journal of Asian History*, and *Orbis*.

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ward a similar objective.

IT IS SOMETIMES ARGUED that the Soviet Union's investment in naval power has been made at just that point in history when naval power is ceasing to matter. Is it not an obsolete doctrine of the last century that the destinies of nations depend on "command of the seas"? Can we not conclude from the West's experience of the last 30 years that the coercion of weak countries by naval and amphibious power has become counterproductive? Is it not a consequence of the growing enclosure of the world's seas and oceans by national claims to territorial waters and exclusive zones, claims sanctioned by the emerging new law of the sea, that states with oceangoing navies will be circumscribed in using them as never before? Do even port visits and other exercises in "showing the flag" any longer confer prestige and win friends for great powers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, or do they not simply engender alarm and antagonism?

These are fair questions, but as Ken Booth's study of *Navies and Foreign Policy* makes clear, naval power still matters a great deal. Booth sets out systematically the military functions of navies in contributing to strategic nuclear deterrence and conventional defense and deterrence, their policing functions in coast-guarding and contributing to internal security, and their diplomatic functions in strengthening negotiating positions, conveying reassurance to friends and warnings to foes, and building prestige. This is not a penetrating or original work, but one which welds together contributions made by such other recent exponents of sea power as L.W. Martin, James Cable, Edward Luttwak, D.P. O'Connell, and Michael MccGwire.[2] It tends to echo rather than to examine critically the official and quasi-official naval thinking of the Western powers. And in its tabulated lists of naval functions, set out after the fashion of Pentagon briefers, it is sometimes tedious. But Booth succeeds in making his main point, which is that naval power, like military power generally, has not lost its utility as an instrument of foreign policy merely because its use is now more circumscribed than before.

The dramatic rise of Soviet naval power is described and analyzed in the other books under review. *Naval Power in Soviet Policy*, edited by Paul J. Murphy, concentrates on the doctrines of Admiral Gorshkov, the war-fighting capabilities of the Soviet navy, the Soviet approach to naval arms limitation, and case studies of Soviet "forward deployment" in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, edited by Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, provides a thorough and impressive study of the peacetime, diplomatic uses of the Soviet navy, including chapters on "showing the flag," coercive diplomacy, superpower naval confrontations, intervention ashore, and the "rules of the game" in naval crises. *Guide to the Soviet Navy*, by Siegfried Breyer and Norman Polmar, is an expanded and updated edition of the original English-language edition of 1970, and is profusely illustrated with drawings and photographs. *Soviet Oceans Development*, presented by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress to the US Senate's Committee on Commerce, is a comprehensive compendium of facts and opinions not only about the Soviet navy but also about the merchant marine, the distant-water fishing fleet, oceanographic research capabilities, and overall ocean policymaking of the Soviet Union.

THE SOVIET UNION, which in Iosif Stalin's time possessed only a coastal navy directed chiefly toward the defense of the Soviet Union against amphibious attack, now has, as a consequence of building programs begun in the mid-1950's and continued in the 1960's, more surface warships (including more major as well as minor surface combatants) and more submarines (including more ballistic-missile-firing submarines) than the United States. The deployment of Soviet surface warships, once confined to local waters, was extended in 1961 to embrace the Norwegian Sea, in 1964 the Mediterranean, in 1968 the Indian Ocean, and in 1969 the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of West Africa. The Soviet Union appears to have a lead in at least some branches of naval technology, such as antiship missiles and perhaps reconnaissance technology; in 1975 it came to equal the United States in the tonnage of its merchant marine; and it has narrowed the gap in oceanographic research. Its coming-of-age as a great naval and maritime power has been apparent at the Law of the Sea Conference, where despite its ideological support for Third World positions, it has been aligned with the United States, Britain, and France in defending the traditional rights of oceangoing states to the use of

[2] L.W. Martin, *The Sea in Modern Strategy*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1967; James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*, London, Cassell, 1965; Edward Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974; D.P. O'Connell, *The Influence of Law on Sea Power*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1975; and Michael MccGwire, Ed., *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1975.

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international waters. Indeed, because the Soviet Union is more reliant than any other state on access to the open sea through enclosed straits, it has surpassed these other great maritime states in its conservatism.

All these developments do not mean that the Soviet Union is, or is about to become, the leading naval power, still less that it has any prospect of achieving the naval dominance enjoyed by Britain for so long, and by America so briefly. The United States is still vastly superior in "the projection of offshore power," at least in those areas where it is able to maintain enough sea control to make seaborne intervention possible. Most authorities appear to believe that the United States would be victorious in a "classic fleet encounter," supposing that such an encounter were ever to take place. The United States, unlike the Soviet Union, has major naval allies in the West European countries and Japan. It still possesses the inestimable advantages which geography and history have conferred upon it over a rival whose first priorities must remain continental. It has the economic and technological capacity, and is apparently now recovering the will, to restore something of its former margin of superiority.

Nevertheless, the rise of Soviet naval power has forced the United States to share the control of the sea. The very substitution of the more modest term "sea control" for the more imperious term "command of the sea" is in part a recognition of this fact, although it is also a response to a more fundamental change in the inherent possibilities of naval dominance. The Soviet Union has used its "forward deployments" to deny the United States the freedom to move and act at will on the sea that it enjoyed before the 1960's. It has also achieved "sea control" in a more positive sense: it has had control of the sea sufficient not only to deploy part of its strategic nuclear forces and to engage in "naval suasion" (Edward Luttwak's horrible term) on its own behalf in Third World areas, but also to facilitate military intervention—as it did in installing a Soviet military presence in Egypt in 1970, in reinforcing Egypt in the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, or in providing support to the Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975–76, to mention only a few of the cases examined in detail in the book edited by Dismukes and McConnell.

Much of the controversy raging among specialists on Soviet naval affairs concerns the question whether the Soviet Union achieved this measure of sea control as the object of deliberate policy or as the by-product of defensive measures to neutralize the naval threat it saw directed against it by the West. Was the Soviet naval building program of the mid-1950's linked with Nikita Khrushchev's policy of seeking greater influence in Africa and Asia, or was it essentially a reaction to the threat posed by US nuclear-weapons-carrying aircraft carriers? Was the Soviet policy of "forward deployment" of the 1960's the unfolding of an expansionist policy of intervention on behalf of "wars of national liberation," or was it—in the celebrated thesis of Michael MccGwire—a response to America's "forward deployment" of Polaris submarines?[3] Admiral Gorshkov's articles of 1972–73 in *Morskoy sbornik* (Naval Digest) clearly expressed a belief in the navy as an instrument of power politics and not merely of defense,[4] but were they a statement of Soviet policy or only a plea for a policy which the Soviet Union had not then and has not since adopted?

These are important issues, but they should not distract us from recognizing that the Soviet Union now has a great measure of sea control, whether it has sought this as an object of policy or not. The distribution of naval power is better described today in terms of equilibrium rather than in terms of the preponderance of a single state. Although much of the world may be grateful that this is so, it is an exceptional, not a normal, situation in ocean affairs, and its implications for world politics are not yet fully apparent.

[3] See, for example, Michael MccGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," in *Soviet Oceans Development*.

[4] Eleven articles published in *Morskoy sbornik* (Moscow) from February 1972 through February 1973 (excluding the July and December issues), which, together with Gorshkov's *Sea Power of the State*, are summarized and analyzed in *Naval Power in Soviet Policy*.

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Understanding Soviet Military Power

By Colin S. Gray

JOHN M. COLLINS and ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN. *Imbalance of Power: An Analysis of Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strengths.* San Rafael, CA, Presidio Press, 1978.

JOHN M. COLLINS. *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960–1980.* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1980.

FRANCIS P. HOEBER et al. *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1981.* New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1980.

DAVID R. JONES, Ed. *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Vol. 2, 1978.* Gulf Breeze, FL, Academic International Press, 1978.

DAVID R. JONES, Ed. *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Vol. 3, 1979.* Gulf Breeze, FL, Academic International Press, 1979.

HARRIET FAST SCOTT and WILLIAM F. SCOTT. *The Armed Forces of the USSR.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979.

ON JANUARY 9, 1981, in his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig noted "the transformation of Soviet military power from a continental and largely land army to a global offensive army, navy and air force, fully capable of supporting an imperial foreign policy." "Today," he said, "the threat of Soviet military intervention colors attempts to achieve international civility. Unchecked, the growth of Soviet military power must eventually paralyze Western policy altogether."[1]

Haig, who has been a forceful and effective player in several administrations in the implementation of US foreign policy, has stressed on numerous occasions that the first among several fundamental tasks for the United States in the 1980's will have to be "the management of Soviet [military] power." In somewhat different ways, the six books reviewed here all contribute to an impressively detailed portrait of that power. Unfortunately, each volume is much stronger in providing answers to questions of "what" and "how" than to questions of "why" and "so what."

Clearly, it is important to understand what the Soviet Union has achieved by way of military modernization. But it is no less important to understand why the Soviet Union devotes probably close to 15 percent of its annual GNP to defense functions, and what foreign (and domestic-imperial) policy benefits Soviet leaders deem likely, or properly, to flow from this sustained military effort. None of the books advances understanding in these critically important areas—save insofar as they provide a richer data base from which informed speculation may proceed.

There is a rough consensus in the West that the Soviet Union (1) does not appear to share many crucial Western strategic conceptual desiderata (regarding *stability*, for example) and (2) is relatively far more powerful today than ever before in all dimensions of military endeavor. The real problem is to determine the meaning of the Soviet military buildup and the prudent implications of it for US and, more broadly, Western defense policy.

It is somewhat churlish, and perhaps unfair, for this reviewer to berate highly competent authors disposing of a wealth of scholarship for "failing" to write books, or a book, which they clearly did not intend to write. These books do provide, in their several ways, the essential background for debating and improving our understanding of the most important security question of the 1980's, i.e., how to manage the threat posed by Soviet military power. They remove the alibi of ignorance. Paradoxically, however, despite the fact that the books give the reader a multitude of facts (and probable facts) concerning Soviet military organization and the evolution of Soviet military

[1] *The New York Times*, Jan. 10, 1981.

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posture, they do not afford him the means to make sense of the material presented. The average reader, had he plodded diligently through all 2,322 pages of these volumes, would know the details of Soviet military power and organization. Unfortunately, he would not be well equipped to address clearly relevant questions such as: (1) How dangerous are the 1980's likely to be? (2) While it is generally agreed that "a window of Western (military) vulnerability" is opening in the early 1980's, how likely is the Soviet Union to try to jump through it? (3) Although Soviet military science has an unambiguous "war-fighting" (*for victory*) focus, under what circumstances would a Soviet leadership be likely to choose to go to war?

THE TWO BOOKS by John Collins, *Imbalance of Power* and *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance*, are monuments of diligence. The title of the first betrays the concluding punch line that

quantitative changes in U.S. and Soviet armed forces since 1970 favor the Soviet Union, with scattered exceptions. U.S. qualitative leads, less pronounced than in the past, cannot completely compensate. (p. 307)

Yet this is a curious book in that it contains a very substantial, and generally fairly skeptical, running commentary on Collins's text by Anthony Cordesman. By and large, the commentary is more interesting and informative than the main text, and this reviewer is bound to conclude that John Collins did not, *ab initio*, appreciate just what he was inviting when Cordesman became involved in this project. Following a Collins presentation on "defense manpower" (pp. 18–30), Cordesman concludes his "net assessment appraisal" in the following inimitable style:

Much more will have to be learned about the Soviet Union before a comparison of U.S. and Soviet manpower can be more than informed guesswork. (p. 30)

Sic transit Collins's own presentation!

Collins's second work under consideration here, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance*, is a veritable mine of almost extravagantly referenced information. Despite its generous dimensions, however, this book is marred by overorganization (too many subtitles) and a breathless, almost note-form, style. In attempting to cover everything, Collins is compelled to say too little about most things, and as a result the volume gives the impression of being unduly "thin" even at 645 pages. Any defense professional is likely to know as much, or more, than Collins has space to present, while the "general reader" is likely to be deterred from venturing into so forbidding a volume in the first place.

NOTWITHSTANDING its much more modest size, *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1981*, at 186 pages, is intellectually more satisfying than the Collins volume published the same year (1980). This is the fourth annual book in a series, and what it may lack in comprehensiveness is more than made up for in focus and depth. The authors and the sponsoring organization, the National Strategy Information Center, have a well-known pro-defense orientation, so the policy themes that are pressed contain few surprises. This is honest but quite heatedly engaged analysis. The principal authors declare themselves at the outset:

There can no longer be any doubt that with the continuation of current trends, the Soviet Union will have usable—diplomatically or militarily—superiority over the United States in the early 1980's, that it already has massive and growing superiority in capabilities for ground warfare, equal or superior tactical air capabilities, and a Navy more numerous in ships, catching up in tonnage, and superior in some important fighting capabilities. (p. 7)

On the same page we are told that "the Soviet Union will enjoy a decisive measure of strategic superiority in the early 1980's." The reviewer happens to agree with the authors, but he does feel that evidence should precede conclusions.

Unlike the other books reviewed here, *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets* has a US defense program orientation. This gives the volume, and the annual series of which it is a part, great value, whether or not the reader shares the generically strong-defense orientation of the contributors.

THE TWO VOLUMES of the *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual* (SAFRA) of interest here are very difficult to review. Each is a smorgasbord—though a smorgasbord of generally very high quality. Readers of these volumes are taken through detailed discussions ("reviews") of developments in major Soviet military—and quasi- or occasionally-military—organizations and are offered, in addition, special surveys, topical analyses, and specialized bibliographies. Here, indeed, is the raw material for understanding Soviet military power. These are "annuals" in the best and the worst senses. Each annual volume does strive earnestly to update for its readership de-

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velopments in the major functional areas covered; but neither volume has a particular point, or rationale, save for the fact that the calendar dictates the need to produce yet another volume. This is not to damn with faint praise. These two works contain exceptionally fine scholarship on subjects of undeniable intrinsic importance. In the hands of already skilled readers, they should enhance understanding of Soviet military power. But in the hands of less skilled readers, they are simply rather loose collections of well-researched essays. The whole is considerably less than the sum of the parts.

While worthy for their scholarship, the essays in these two volumes tend not to have unusual merit in the inspired prescience area. For example, Richard T. Ackley, writing on "Strategic Rocket Forces" (SRF) in the 1978 SAFRA, commented that

if current trends in the /Soviet/ SRF continue, some estimate that the Soviet force would be capable of destroying all but a small portion of the U.S. Minuteman silos by 1985. (p. 52)

As a generalist's judgment, that would have been a reasonable enough evaluation, but a supposed expert on the Soviet SRF should have known better and shown more awareness of the imminence of the problem. Harold Brown, then US Secretary of Defense, publicly acknowledged the *immediacy* of the vulnerable silo problem in August 1980.[2]

Similarly, David Jones, the editor of these volumes, concludes his "special survey" of Soviet civil defense in the 1979 SAFRA with the following judgment:

Taken with developments in other sectors of their military arsenal, CD measures might fractionally raise Soviet power. Nevertheless, real strategic supremacy remains beyond their grasp in the foreseeable future and CD, although it deserves continuing careful scrutiny, is only a minor and undependable factor in the USSR's overall military strength. (p. 343)

It is just possible that Jones is correct, but this author, on the basis of recent and continuing studies of US strategic nuclear targeting problems, has to affirm his belief that Jones's judgment is close to eccentric. Given the broad framework of US targeting design, the likely circumstances of central war initiation, and the character of the US nuclear arsenal, Soviet civil defense is potentially a "war-winning" factor.

THE LAST BOOK under scrutiny here, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* by Harriet Fast Scott and William Scott, is a masterpiece of organization and information. This is preeminently a work of reference. It fills a very obvious gap, should deter imitators, and needs only to be updated and refined in the future.[3] All readers, regardless of their supposed level of prior expertise, will profit from the Scotts' very careful Chapter 3 on Soviet "Military Science." While the details of Soviet military organization are important, our understanding of how Soviet officials analyze military phenomena is even more important, and this chapter promotes understanding in this area. Of the six books considered in this essay, only *The Armed Forces of the USSR* can be rated an essential part of the library of any person seriously concerned with the study of Soviet military affairs.

IF THESE BOOKS fail to offer a conceptual framework for understanding the meaning of the Soviet military modernization and buildup, what might such a framework be? What is the Soviet Union actually about?

This reviewer, while taking anything but a benign view of the evolution of net Soviet military prowess over the past 15 years, cannot entirely endorse the judgment of Francis Hoeber, expressed in *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets,* that

we can only assume that the risks of being coerced by the Soviets in the 1980s are already nearly 100 percent and the time to counter the Soviet drive toward a usable strategic superiority is now. (p. 65)

It is not at all obvious that the Soviet Union has purposefully driven toward strategic superiority. What has happened is that relative inactivity on the American side has resulted in a (temporary) condition of "strategic parity plus" for the Soviet Union. Moscow does not need strategic nuclear superiority over the United States; all it needs is a robust strategic nuclear counterdeterrent to hold the ring square for Soviet forward diplomacy in the Third World. A strategic counterdeterrent checkmates the erstwhile Western strategic advantage and allows the Soviets to use nonstrategic military and diplomatic tools effectively in the international arena.

Western commentators, officials, and politicians who are genuinely perplexed about the motivating forces behind Soviet military programs are, of course, potentially easy converts to any simple "faith" that offers plausible explanation.

[2] Harold Brown, speech presented at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, Aug. 20, 1980.

[3] One welcome refinement, in the opinion of this reviewer, would be an expansion of the existing section on the General Staff (pp. 102–13).

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This reviewer, however, eschews monocausal explanation and would cite six motivating drives which underpin contemporary Soviet defense programs.

(1) Tradition—very large armed forces have always been "the Russian/Soviet way." A very large army is the natural response of a geopolitically vulnerable, continental great power.

(2) Soviet leaders do not believe that they can command "too much" military power. In Soviet perspective, *more* military power is always likely to be useful. Russian/Soviet history teaches that military power is accorded respect and that war is an ever-present possibility.

(3) Fairly intense military preparation is an integral part of the very "warp and woof" of Soviet society. The Soviet Union is perpetually semimobilized for war. A high level of defense preparation is integral to the basic organization of Soviet society. Domestic stability—social, economic, and political—could be threatened were the Soviet state to attempt substantially to diminish the level of peacetime military preparation.

(4) The military power commanded by Moscow is *the* critical element responsible for the awe in which the power of the state is held. Soviet military power symbolizes (and helps create) national unity; represents the unquestionable authority of Moscow; overawes the East European members of the Soviet empire;[4] ensures political respect abroad; and, if need be, could defend Mother Russia.

(5) Whatever its manifold limitations as an instrument of policy, military power has been the one element in interstate competition with respect to which the USSR has been more than able to hold its own. The Soviet Union is a first-class superpower in the early 1980's because of its military capability—not because of the attractiveness of its ideology or the performance of its economy. The Soviet Union has competed successfully with the West in just one dimension of capability—the military.

(6) The Soviet drive for more and more military power is, in good part, a drive for influence for its own sake. Quite aside from the "rational" considerations of enhanced security, Soviet leaders enjoy the exercise of power. In their view, one cannot be too powerful, and on the evidence available there are no limits to the amount of power that the Soviet state may be willing to purchase. To ask "how much is enough" is an absurdity in the context of Soviet strategic culture.

This raises one final point which needs to be made. A part of the Western analytical community is hovering on the brink of appreciating that the USSR has a very different strategic culture from that of the West. Unfortunately, the rarity of historical perspective among Western policymakers means that there tends to be little resistance among them to forcefully expressed, apparently historically based, theories, be they good *or* bad. Theories are often accepted or rejected in light of how they are presented rather than of how accurate they are in depicting reality. To understand Soviet military power we must first understand the Soviet Union, not vice versa. The Western defense community should scrutinize every theory in minutest detail, not simply await seduction or conquest by an author who can explain Soviet defense behavior in a plausible—but not necessarily accurate—way.

[4] See Colin S. Gray, *Reflections on Empire: The Soviet Connection*, HI-3279-DP, Croton-on-Hudson, NY, Hudson Institute, December 1980.

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Moscow and the German Question: Continuities and Changes

By F. Stephen Larrabee

BORIS MEISSNER, Ed. *Moskau-Bonn: Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1955–1973* (Moscow-Bonn: Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1955–1973). Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975.

ERNST NOLTE. *Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg* (Germany and the Cold War). Munich, R. Piper and Co., 1974.

HANS WASSMUND. *Kontinuität im Wandel, Bestimmungsfaktoren sowjetischer Deutschlandpolitik in der Nach-Stalin-Zeit* (Continuity and Change: Determinants of Soviet Policy Toward Germany in the Post-Stalin Era). Cologne, Böhlau Verlag, 1974.

HANS-PETER SCHWARTZ and BORIS MEISSNER, Eds. *Entspannungspolitik in Ost und* West (Détente Policy in East and West). Cologne/Berlin/Bonn/Munich, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1979.

HISTORICALLY, Germany has occupied a special place in Russian policy toward Europe, particularly in the post–World War II period. For the Soviet Union, more than for any other power, Germany long stood as—to use Pierre Hassner's apt phrase—"the prize, the pivot, the problem of European politics."[1] To no other issue in European politics did Soviet leaders devote greater concern or more diplomatic attention. Furthermore, in one way or another the German problem was intertwined with or linked to practically every aspect of the Soviet Union's post–World War II foreign policy: disarmament, regional security, relations with the USSR's East European allies, and, most important, efforts to reduce tension with its major international adversary, the United States.

Yet while Soviet security ultimately has been enhanced by Germany's division, Moscow did not initially consciously seek that division. The available evidence suggests that Iosif Stalin had no specific plan for Germany's future. Rather, he appears to have pursued a policy of "watchful waiting," which would allow him to keep his options open and exploit various opportunities that arose in the course of the occupation. His policy evolved incrementally, sometimes inconsistently, in response to events themselves.[2]

Exactly when the Soviet Union abandoned the idea of reunification as a realistic goal of policy is difficult to say. Clearly, however, the June 1953 uprising in East Berlin was an important watershed, for it significantly increased the Soviet stake in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Having decided to pay the price of intervention, the Soviet leadership was forced to batten down and ride out the storm. Thereafter, the Soviet commitment to the GDR —and to Walter Ulbricht personally—increased, and its interest in reunification declined accordingly.

With the entrance of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into NATO in May 1955, the idea of reunification was for all practical purposes dead, if not buried. From that point on, Moscow openly shifted to a two-state policy, and its diplomacy followed a two-track course aimed at (1) stabilizing the GDR and integrating it more tightly into the bloc and (2) securing Western, particularly West German, recognition of the postwar status quo.

Indeed, the continuity of Soviet objectives in Europe after 1955 is striking. From Nikita Khrushchev to Leonid Brezhnev, the main goal of the USSR's policy vis-à-vis the Federal Republic remained con-

[1] Pierre Hassner, "Europe West of the Elbe," in Robert S. Jordon, Ed., *Europe and the Superpowers*, Boston, MA, Allyn and Bacon, 1971, p. 103.

[2] See the authoritative study by Hans-Peter Schwartz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik* (From Reich to Federal Republic), Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1966. Also Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Union and Germany 1941–1967," *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), No. 14, 1967, p. 517.

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stant: to obtain Bonn's acceptance of the postwar borders and the permanent division of Germany. What changed after Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 was not the goals but the style and methods of Soviet policy, and above all the *context* in which the new Soviet leadership sought to achieve a relatively constant set of objectives. Whereas Khrushchev had tried—and failed—to obtain Bonn's acceptance of the postwar territorial status quo by threats and missile diplomacy, his successors sought to exploit the desire for change and the breakdown of the rigid boundaries of the cold war in the mid-1960's in Western Europe, in order to solve the German problem within the wider framework of a campaign for European security.

At the time the campaign was launched, in Bucharest in July 1966, its main aims were largely offensive: to mobilize West European public opinion against Bonn in order to force it to revise its policy and accept the territorial status quo. By the time of the Karlovy Vary conference in April 1967, however, the main goals of Soviet policy, and its campaign for European security in particular, had clearly become defensive: to blunt the impact of Bonn's new *Ostpolitik* and halt the erosion of Moscow's own authority in Eastern Europe.

There was, in fact, an important symbiotic relationship between the development of crisis in Eastern Europe in the late 1960's and the evolution of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*. While the *Ostpolitik* did not cause the ferment in Eastern Europe, which reached a climax in 1968, the changes in Bonn's policy tended to reduce the fear of West Germany on the part of its East European neighbors—a fear which had traditionally been one of the major sources of cohesion in Eastern Europe—and thus accelerated polycentrist tendencies in the area. The Prague Spring in particular reduced Moscow's room for maneuver and caused a hardening of Soviet policy toward Bonn. In the face of the growing instability in Eastern Europe, the German "threat" remained one of the few cards which Moscow could play to bolster its crumbling position there. After January 1968, therefore, whatever hopes Moscow may have had of inducing Bonn to change the basic tenets of its policy were largely subordinated to an all-out campaign to discredit the *Ostpolitik* and isolate the Federal Republic.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia marked an important turning point in Soviet policy in Europe and toward the FRG in particular. Paradoxically, while the invasion was a reflection of the weakness of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and a response to forces which Bonn's *Ostpolitik* had encouraged, it helped to create the very conditions of stability that allowed Moscow to gradually abandon the German bogey and move toward a rapprochement with Bonn. The invasion not only halted efforts to implement change in Czechoslovakia but reversed the whole trend toward dissolution of Soviet control which had been gathering momentum during the previous two years.

At the same time, the invasion underscored for Moscow the importance of achieving a settlement with the West which would recognize the legitimacy of Soviet interests in Eastern Europe, and thus reduce the prospect of new Czechoslovakias. As long as the West had not accepted the postwar status quo, a threat to Soviet hegemony existed, however latent. This consideration pointed, above all, to the need for intensified efforts to achieve some sort of a settlement with Bonn, for it had become increasingly clear that the Federal Republic held the keys to the solution of the outstanding issues of European politics—the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and the acceptance of the GDR. Moreover, once the Federal Republic had begun to undertake détente initiatives of its own, Moscow had difficulty in portraying Bonn as the seat of "revanchism" and "militarism."

In the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet policy toward Bonn underwent a gradual shift, which culminated in the signing of the Bonn-Moscow treaty in August 1970 and its ratification in May 1972. This shift began to manifest itself much earlier than is generally thought[3]—well *before* the assumption of power by the coalition of Social Democrats and Free Democrats in the autumn of 1969—and was influenced by a number of factors. These included: (1) De Gaulle's fall in early 1969 and the gradual shift in French policy back toward Atlanticism thereafter, which removed the main raison d'être for making Franco-Soviet rapprochement the center of Soviet détente efforts; (2) the emergence of China from its isolation, which threatened to isolate the USSR and significantly reduced its room for maneuver; (3) growing Soviet economic problems, which gave Moscow a new sense of urgency about expanding ties with the industrially advanced countries of the West; (4) a desire to improve relations with the United States, and particularly to

[3]It is impossible to date the change precisely. However, preparations for it seem to have been undertaken sometime between mid-October 1968 and the beginning of 1969. For a detailed discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "The Politics of Reconciliation: Soviet Policy Toward West Germany 1964–1972," unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1978, pp. 180–218.

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stabilize the arms race; and (5) the election of the Brandt/Scheel "small coalition" in October 1969 and the new government's willingness to sign the nonproliferation treaty and abandon its claim to speak for all Germans (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*).[4]

The alteration in Soviet policy toward the FRG was part of a larger Soviet reassessment of policy toward the West as a whole, particularly the United States. Moscow's interest in an improvement in relations with the US—particularly its desire to proceed with negotiations on a strategic arms limitation (SALT) agreement—forced Moscow to view its actions elsewhere with an eye to the impact they would have on relations with the United States, and thereby played a crucial role in influencing the shift in Soviet policy toward the Federal Republic. There was, in effect, an *implicit* linkage between European détente and superpower détente, especially SALT, and this linkage accentuated the Soviet leadership's desire to see the resolution of the German problem, the main source of East-West tension.

The signing of the Renunciation of Force Agreement between Bonn and Moscow in August 1970 and its ratification by the West German Bundestag in May 1972 laid the basis for normalization of relations between the FRG and the USSR. From the Soviet point of view, its significance lay in the fact that it signaled Bonn's official acceptance of the postwar territorial status quo.[5] This had been the main goal of Soviet diplomacy in Europe for most of the postwar era and one Moscow regarded as a sine qua non for the stabilization of the situation in Eastern Europe.

The importance of the Bonn-Moscow treaty extended beyond its bilateral framework, however. Ratification of the treaty acted as a "can opener"—to use Theo Sommer's apt characterization[6]—with respect to the whole process of East-West détente. In essence, it cleared the way for the implementation of the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, convocation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the signing of the Basic Treaty between the GDR and the FRG.

WITH THESE considerations in mind—and with the added advantage of hindsight—let us now turn to the books under review here. All are by West German authors, and all reflect the growing interest in the Federal Republic in the dimensions and ramifications of East-West détente since the emergence of the *Ostpolitik*.

Of the group, the two-volume compendium *Bonn-Moskau*, edited by Boris Meissner, a former West German diplomat and one of the Federal Republic's leading specialists on the Soviet Union, is among the most valuable and important works to appear in the past few years. It contains a careful selection of the most important documents relating to Soviet–West German relations from the time of the establishment of relations between the two countries in September 1955, to Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in May 1973. The documentation relating to the Brandt-Scheel phase of the *Ostpolitik* and the Soviet response to it is particularly extensive and makes these two volumes indispensable for scholars interested in a better understanding of this crucial period in Soviet–West German relations.

In addition, each volume contains a long introductory essay by Meissner which traces the changing course of Soviet–West German relations, using the documents in the volume to amplify and buttress the analysis. These essays provide extremely useful overviews and lend an important sense of continuity and perspective to the collections of disparate documents.

However, Meissner's treatment of the Brandt/Scheel *Ostpolitik* is rather one-sided, and some of his criticisms are open to question, particularly in light of developments in Eastern Europe over the last several years. In Meissner's view, the Brandt/Scheel government was in too much of a hurry to obtain a treaty with Moscow—for reasons which he suggests were essentially related to domestic political considerations. This overeagerness, he contends, resulted in too many concessions by the West Germans and a treaty that was more favorable to the Soviet Union than to the Federal Republic.

Yet Meissner's central thesis—that the Bonn-Moscow treaty was one-sided and represented a virtual acceptance of the Soviet position without receiving anything in return—seems highly oversimplified.[7] True, the treaty represented

[4] This was signaled by Willy Brandt in his inaugural address (*Regierungserklärung*), when he acknowledged the existence of "two German states in one German nation." Brandt insisted, however, that the Federal Republic could not recognize the GDR under international law—one of the major preconditions postulated by the East German leadership for the normalization of relations—because the GDR was "not a foreign country." For the text of Brandt's address, see *Europa Archiv*, No. 21, 1969, D. 499–506.

[5] In the treaty, both parties agreed to regard the borders in Europe as "inviolable" and to settle all disputes by peaceful means. For the provisions of the treaty, see *Der Vertrag vom 12.August 1970 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union Sozialistischer Sowjetrepubliken* (The Treaty of August 12, 1970, Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Bonn, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1970, pp. 7–9. The Russian text is in *Pravda* (Moscow), May 16, 1972.

[6] *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Oct. 25, 1974.

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the achievement of one of Moscow's most important postwar goals, formal West German acceptance of the postwar borders. But as Chancellor Willy Brandt emphasized at the time, Bonn did not give up anything that had not been gambled away at the end of the war. It simply agreed that the postwar borders were "inviolable" and that it would not seek to change them by force (Article III)—something it had no intention of trying to do anyway.

Moreover, the Soviet Union did make certain compromises, and it by no means achieved all that it wanted. For instance, Article III of the Renunciation of Force Agreement commits the two countries to solve their differences "exclusively by peaceful means." This foresaw no exceptions and implied that the Soviet Union had given up its claim to the right to intervene in West Germany under Articles 103 and 57 of the UN Charter. Such an intepretation of Article III was strengthened by oral assurances given to FRG Foreign Minister Walter Scheel by USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko during the negotiations in July-August 1970, and these assurances were attached to the ratification bills which the Brandt government sent to the Bundestag in December 1971.[8]

The most important concession, however, was in Article III. This, as already noted, specified that both countries would regard the existing borders as "inviolable." In the opening rounds of the negotiations, the Soviet Union had insisted that the borders had to be recognized as unchangeable (*nezyblemyy*); the West Germans, on the other hand, had been willing to "respect" the borders and not to violate them by force but had refused to recognize them as unchangeable because to do so would have excluded the possibility of any future reunification (the "German option") as well as integration into a wider West European framework (the "European option"). The final wording was thus a compromise. By accepting the borders as "inviolable" (*nerushimyy* in Russian; *unverletzlich* in German), the West Germans simply agreed not to change them by force.[9] The wording still left open legally the issue of "peaceful change" of the borders. Thus, it kept alive the theoretical possibility of reunification at some future date—a key West German goal—as well as preserved the "European option." This was an important compromise by the Soviet Union. It appears to have been accepted only after considerable internal debate and after substantial resistance had been overcome—not only from Ulbricht but also from certain elements in the Soviet leadership.[10]

Furthermore, the benefits from the renunciation of force treaty and the process of détente which the treaty produced are by no means as one-sided as Meissner seems to suggest. The resolution of the German problem was regarded by the Soviet Union as a prerequisite for a wider, more all-encompassing détente with the West which would increase Soviet influence in Western Europe while solidifying it in Eastern Europe. In practice, however, neither of these expectations has been fulfilled.

Instead of becoming more stable, Eastern Europe has shown signs of growing instability. Nowhere have these been more evident than in Poland, where the growth of the independent trade union movement has sent shock waves throughout the country and posed a de facto challenge to the authority of the party. While to date events in Poland have had little direct spillover effect elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Polish experiment—if it succeeds—is over the long run likely to have a profound impact on politics in the region, and to some extent on the Soviet Union as well.

From Moscow's point of view, one of the most disturbing aspects of the increased ferment in Eastern Europe has been its manifestations in the GDR. With the signing of the treaties between the Soviet Union and Poland and particularly the

[7] This thesis is hardly new. It has been put forward often by critics of the Brandt-Scheel *Ostpolitik*, particularly by Helmut Allardt, former West German ambassador to the Soviet Union, in his memoirs, *Moskauer Tagebuch* (Moscow Diary), Düsseldorf, Bertelsman Verlag, 1974. In fact, Meissner relies quite heavily on Allardt's memoirs to support many of his contentions. However, Allardt, a career diplomat who conducted the initial phase of the exploratory talks leading up to the conclusion of the Renunciation of Force Agreement before his abrupt replacement by Egon Bahr, Chancellor Brandt's personal envoy and confidant, is hardly an unbiased source. His memoirs provide some insightful glimpses into West German policy in 1969–71, but as historical source material, they must be treated with considerable care.

[8] During the negotiations, Gromyko stated: "We have not foreseen any exceptions. That is the answer to your internal political discussion. I emphasize the word 'exclusively.'" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), Dec. 14, 1971.

[9] Compare the final wording of the treaty in *Pravda*, Aug. 13, 1970, with Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet on July 10, 1969 (ibid., July 11, 1969), where the word "unchangeable" (*nezyblemyy*) is used throughout. For a good discussion of the semantic debate, see Klaus Mehnert, "The Moscow Treaty," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), December 1970, pp. 809–30.

[10] On possible resistance within the Soviet leadership to rapprochement with Bonn, see Larrabee, op. cit., pp. 312–13. On Ulbricht's resistance, see Gerhard Wettig, *Die Sowjetunion, die DDR und die Deutschlandfrage 1965 bis 1976: Einvernehmen und Konflikt im sozialistischen Lager* (The Soviet Union, the GDR and the German Question 1965 to 1976: Harmony and Conflict in the Socialist Camp), Stuttgart, Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1977, passim; and Larrabee, op. cit., pp. 248–92.

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Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR, it was widely assumed that the German problem had been laid to rest and that the GDR would become more stable. Certainly, these were Soviet hopes. But recent developments have called such assumptions into question. Rather than more stable, the GDR has in fact become less stable—one of the main reasons why the East German leadership has reacted so sharply in word and deed to events in Poland.

Over the last few years, for example, the GDR has begun to be plagued by many of the economic dislocations facing other East European countries: mounting energy shortages, rising foreign debt, and growing trade imbalances, especially with the Federal Republic. For political reasons, nonetheless, the leadership has been reluctant to raise the price of consumer goods, for fear that this might spark unrest.[11]

At the same time, there has been growing restlessness among the intelligentsia. After a period of relative liberalization in the early 1970's, the East German leadership began to crack down on the intelligentsia soon after the signing of the Helsinki agreement in 1975, forcing prominent figures such as songwriter Wolf Bierman, writer Reiner Kunze, and critic Wolfgang Harich to emigrate to the West. The expulsion of these and other writers has been part of an orchestrated campaign to try to halt what one analyst has termed the process of "inner erosion" in the GDR.[12] In August 1979, the crackdown on dissent was broadened to the general population with the introduction of a sweeping new amendment to the criminal code designed to control dissent more tightly and to restrict contacts with Westerners.[13]

The normalization of relations that followed the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972 has also had an important impact on the relationship between the two Germanies. For one thing, the rapid expansion of inner-German trade that has occurred since normalization has served to bind the two states more closely together economically. For another, normalization has resulted in a significant expansion of contacts and communication, at both the personal and governmental levels, and has increased the exposure of GDR citizens to Western ideas. At the same time, it has led to a growing recognition of the degree to which both states share a common culture and heritage.[14] All of these developments have limited the ability of the East German leadership to pursue a policy of *Abgrenzung* (demarcation) and strengthen its legitimacy.

Moreover, as a result of the growing proliferation of ties and communication, inner-German relations have taken on an intensity and dynamic of their own. The momentum and intensity of this process have been viewed with mixed emotions both in Warsaw and in Moscow. Despite the closer cooperation which has marked relations between Moscow and East Berlin since Walter Ulbricht's fall in May 1971, the Soviets appear to be ambivalent about the long-term consequences of any FRG-GDR rapprochement. On the one hand, they see rapprochement as a useful constraint on Bonn's room for maneuver, which they may be able to manipulate to their own political advantage; on the other, they seem to fear what one West German journalist has aptly termed a "reverse Schröder doctrine": that an intensified West German-East German dialogue could leave Moscow *odd man out*.[15] For its part, Warsaw seems to fear a new Rapallo: that at some point Moscow may be tempted to make a deal with the FRG at Poland's expense.[16]

It should be noted, however, that the recent upheaval in Poland has had an adverse impact on relations between the two Germanies. Faced with the prospect of unrest spreading across its borders, the East German leadership has re-

[11] The potential political dangers of any decline in the standard of living were well illustrated by the domestic unrest provoked by the disappearance of cheap coffee in 1977. This unrest forced the Ministry of Trade and Supply to issue a public promise to improve the situation. See *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Sept. 23, 1977.

[12] For a comprehensive treatment of this process of inner erosion, see the excellent article by Hartmut Zimmermann, "The GDR in the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1978, pp.1-40. On the cultural dimensions, see William Treharne Jones, "East German Literature," ibid., pp. 71-77.

[13] The new statutes stipulate that the promulgation of any news or information deemed by authorities to be detrimental to the state interests of the GDR will be punishable by two to twelve years in prison. See Ronald D. Asmus, "The GDR Five Years After Helsinki," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Background Report, No. 201 (GDR), Aug. 12, 1980.

[14] One of the more fascinating aspects of this process has been the manner in which the GDR has recently "rehabilitated" such historical figures as Martin Luther and Frederick the Great. The rehabilitation of Luther and Frederick the Great, as well as Prussia generally, are part of a more active campaign on the part of the East German leadership to demonstrate to the GDR population that the GDR is the true spiritual heir of the Germanic past. For a detailed discussion of this process of *Rehistorisierung*, see Ronald D. Asmus, "The Search for Historical Roots in the GDR," *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report, No. 192 (GDR), Aug. 1, 1980.

[15] Rolf Zundel, *Die Zeit*, Apr. 17, 1975.

[16] The evidence for this fear is more indirect than direct. It derives primarily from conversations between Polish officials and representatives of the US government, including the author. The concern is more long-term than short-term, however.

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trenched, clamping down internally and curtailing contacts with the FRG. The most dramatic example of this retrenchment has been the quadrupling in October 1980 of currency exchange requirements for visitors and the removal of exceptions for pensioners, minors, and the handicapped. As a result, visits have dropped by more than half.[17] The GDR has also revived its demand that the FRG recognize East German citizenship—a demand that the FRG cannot consider since such a step would be tantamount to formal diplomatic recognition—and has stepped up its criticism of the FRG in the media.[18] All these moves underscore the extent to which the developments in Poland have heightened the insecurity of the East German leadership.

At the same time that Moscow has had to contend with growing ferment in Eastern Europe, détente with the West has lost much, if not all, of its earlier momentum, and Moscow has seen its initial hopes for an expansion of its influence in Western Europe gradually erode. As a result primarily of Soviet actions in Angola, Ethiopia, and, most recently, Afghanistan, the USSR's relations with the United States have deteriorated significantly, with little prospect of immediate improvement. This deterioration of relations between the two superpowers has inevitably had an adverse impact on Soviet relations with Western Europe. While many West European countries still maintain a strong interest in preserving the fabric of détente, this has become increasingly difficult as relations between the two superpowers have grown more troubled. Even French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has felt compelled to drop the word "détente" from his vocabulary, preferring instead to speak of the need for a "stabilization" of East-West relations.[19]

Not surprisingly, the chill in East-West relations in recent months has had a visible impact on Soviet–West German relations. While relations between Bonn and Moscow had shown signs of stagnation well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the deterioration of relations between the US and the USSR since the invasion has accentuated differences between Bonn and Moscow and made it much harder for Bonn to pursue its *Ostpolitik*. At the same time, Bonn's willingness to agree to the deployment of new medium-range missiles on its soil—a decision taken at the December 1979 NATO ministerial meeting—has also exacerbated friction with Moscow and led to a harsher tone in Soviet commentary on the FRG. Finally, despite the signing of the Four Power Agreement in 1971, differences over Berlin—particularly the permissible nature of Bonn's ties to West Berlin—continue to mar relations and have contributed to their stagnation.

Even in the economic field, where Soviet–West German relations have improved the most over the years, the expansion of ties has fallen short of Moscow's expectations. While the volume of Soviet–West German trade has doubled since 1973 (and quadrupled since 1971), trade with Moscow still makes up only slightly more than 2 percent of the Federal Republic's total trade.[20] Moreover, many of the major projects initiated in the wake of the Bonn-Moscow treaty, such as the large steel mill at Kursk, have been plagued by long delays and bureaucratic snafus, while other cooperative ventures, such as the power plant at Kaliningrad, which was to supply West Germany with electricity, have had to be shelved as a result of political obstacles—in this case, the opposition from the GDR to the inclusion of West Berlin within the electrical grid. Currently, it is true, Bonn is in the process of negotiating a controversial long-term deal for Soviet natural gas which, if completed, would increase West German dependence on Soviet natural gas to 30 percent by 1990. But the deal has yet to be concluded, and its final consummation will depend to a large extent on developments in Poland.

WHEREAS Meissner concentrates exclusively on Soviet–West German relations, Ernst Nolte, in his book *Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg*, is more ambitious—and ultimately less successful. Written from a broad historical perspective, the book is a long, somewhat disjointed interpretive essay on the German question, examined within the wider context of international developments since 1945. Nolte tries to do too much, however, and his ambitiousness contributes to a certain lack of focus, and at times superficiality. For instance, he devotes only 15 pages out of some 600, to a discussion of the Brandt/Scheel *Ostpolitik* and only 8 pages to a discussion of developments between 1966 and 1969. Yet in terms of foreign policy, this was clearly one of the most dynamic and interesting periods in postwar German foreign policy. Similarly, there is little attempt to rigorously analyze developments in the GDR after 1961 or to present an in-

[17] *The New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1981.
[18] See Honecker's speech in Gera, *Neues Deutschland* ([East]) Berlin), Oct. 14, 1980.
[19] *The New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1981.
[20] Der Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, *Der Deutsche Osthandel* (German East Trade), Bonn, June 1980, p. 12.

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depth treatment of the shift in Soviet policy after 1969. Admittedly, Nolte's purpose was to examine the relationship of the German question to the cold war, and this may have led him to concentrate heavily on the early years after 1945. Nonetheless, his scanty treatment of the post-1965 period is a major weakness. Thus scholars will have to look to recent works of other writers for a fuller analysis of the later period.[21]

Hans Wassmund's book, *Kontinuität im Wandel*, deals with one of the most interesting phases in Soviet-German relations—the period immediately after Stalin's death, when the Soviet leadership (or at least some members of it) were apparently seriously considering reunification as part of a wider policy of reducing tensions with the West. Much of the material that Wassmund covers is relatively well known to students of Soviet-German relations and has been dealt with in various forms elsewhere. However, Wassmund's purpose is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of Soviet policy toward Germany at this time but rather to explore the linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy, and he persuasively demonstrates that Soviet policy closely coincided with different phases of Nikita Khrushchev's ascendency in his feud with Georgiy Malenkov. In Wassmund's view, Malenkov's resignation in February 1955 and Khrushchev's rise thereafter marked the final stage in the formal transition to a two-state policy in the summer of 1955.

Had Wassmund limited his study to the period immediately after Stalin's death, he would have been better off. However, for some reason he felt compelled to add a short concluding section on Soviet–West German relations since 1955. This section is disappointing. It lacks the rigor and careful research that characterizes the bulk of the book and adds little to our knowledge of the post-1955 period. On balance, nonetheless, Wassmund's book is a solid study of one of the most intriguing periods in Soviet-German relations and will be of particular interest to those concerned with the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy.

THE FINAL book, *Entspannungspolitik in Ost und West*, edited by Hans-Peter Schwartz and Boris Meissner, does not deal with the German problem directly but addresses the wider question of East-West détente. It contains a series of essays by West German specialists which analyze the different conceptions of détente propounded by various East and West European states as well as by several West European Communist parties. A concluding chapter by Schwartz attempts to tie the essays together and draw up a balance sheet on détente.

Like Meissner, but on a broader scale, Schwartz sees the balance sheet as largely negative. Détente, in his view, has failed to live up to initial expectations. It has led neither to a "domestication" of Soviet foreign policy nor to an internal liberalization of the Soviet system. More important, it has obscured, and to some extent contributed to, a shift in the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union.

Although it is hard to quarrel with Schwartz's basic conclusion that détente has failed to live up to initial expectations concerning it, his argument is too one-sided and simplistic. Détente has brought substantial benefits to many Europeans—especially the West Germans, in the form of increased emigration of Germans from Poland and the USSR, an expansion of trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a reduction of tensions around Berlin, and closer contacts with the GDR. For Bonn, the problem is not that détente was a failure, but that it succeeded all too well. A decade after the signing of the West German–Soviet treaty, the FRG finds itself enmeshed in a complex web of interrelationships with the East which significantly affect its vital interests—and to some extent its freedom of maneuver. Having invested heavily in the *Ostpolitik*, Bonn is today reluctant to see the fruits of a decade of labor jeopardized. Moreover, over the past decade the *Ostpolitik* has acquired an important domestic constituency, particularly within the left wing of the Social Democratic Party.

Bonn's strong stake in the *Ostpolitik* presents Moscow with certain opportunities to manipulate the German problem and an incentive "to play the German card" to further Soviet regional and global interests. Given the close integration of Soviet and East German policies, any action that Bonn takes inimical to Soviet interests can eas-

[21] For more comprehensive recent treatments, see in particular Peter Bender, *Die Ostpolitik Willy Brandts* (The *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt), Hamburg, Rohwolt Verlag, 1972; Waldemar Besson, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik* (The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic), Munich, R. Piper and Co., 1970; Karl E. Birnbaum, *East and West Germany: A Modus Vivendi*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1973; Dettmar Cramer, *Deutschland nach dem Grundvertrag* (Germany After the Basic Treaty), Stuttgart, Bonn Aktuell, 1974; Peter C. Ludz, *Deutschlands doppelte Zukunft* (Germany's Double Future), Munich, Hanser Verlag, 1974; Richard Löwenthal, *Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik* (From Cold War to *Ostpolitik*), Stuttgart, Seewalt Verlag, 1974; Peter H. Merkl, *German Foreign Policies, West and East*, Santa Barbara, CA, Clio Press, 1974; and Günther Schmid, *Entscheidung in Die Entstehung der Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik 1969/1970* (Decision in Bonn: The Genesis of *Ostpolitik* and German Policy 1969/1970), Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1979.

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ily have a negative impact on the FRG's relations with the GDR. This connection acts as a constraint on Bonn's room for maneuver and affords Moscow a certain leverage. It also gives Moscow a vested interest in keeping the idea of reunification alive—albeit as an abstract, rhetorical concept.

Thus, it is "no accident"—to use Soviet parlance—that GDR First Secretary Erich Honecker mentioned reunification in a recent speech for the first time in several years.[22] However, Honecker's remarks must be seen not only against the background of the deterioration in East-West relations over the last several years but also within the context of the debate set off in West Germany on the *Begriff der Nation* (concept of the nation) by the publication of a highly controversial article by Günther Gaus, the former West German representative in the GDR.[23] In his article, Gaus was critical of West German policy toward the GDR, arguing that the West Germans have never really accepted the GDR, and called for the abandonment of the concept of the nation. Gaus's remarks—and the controversy they provoked—are a cogent reminder that the German question is by no means dead.

Moreover, with the stagnation of Soviet relations with the United States and little chance of their marked improvement in the near future, Moscow is likely to focus increasing attention on Europe, especially the FRG, in an attempt to exploit Bonn's interest in détente and drive a wedge between the United States and its principal European ally. This probability, too, suggests that the German question, rather than lose its relevance, will instead probably remain very much in the forefront of East-West relations.

[22] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt), Feb. 17, 1981.

[23] *Die Zeit*, Feb. 6, 1981. For the response to Gaus's article, see in particular the pieces by Karl-Heinz Janssen, ibid., Feb. 13, 1981; Hans Dieter Jaene and Heinrich August Winkler, ibid., Feb. 20, 1981; and Dieter Zimmermann, ibid., Feb. 27, 1981.

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Mongolia and Socialism

By Tania A. Jacques

ROBERT RUPEN. *How Mongolia Is Really Ruled: A Political History of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1900–1978*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

SECHIN JAGCHID and PAUL HYER. *Mongolia's Culture and Society*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979.

THIS JULY witnesses the 60th anniversary of the present regime in Mongolia (since 1924 known officially as the Mongolian People's Republic, or MPR). The commemoration of its founding has already begun, and what promises to be the main theme of the anniversary has already been sounded by Yumjagiin Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP):

During these sixty years the Mongolian people may be said to have stepped across centuries in their historical development. Once one of the most backward semicolonial nations of the East, it has become a rapidly developing socialist state. Not a trace has remained of the dismal feudal past, of the disinheritedness and poverty of the people.[1]

A spate of publications, both Mongol and Soviet, will no doubt follow suit. *Years Equal to Centuries*, by the Soviet diplomat and journalist V.I. Ivanenko, is one of the first examples scheduled to appear.[2]

As Mongolia celebrates its passage from a "feudal" state to a modern "socialist" state, it is appropriate for us in the West to take stock of the last 60 years in Mongolia. Have the Mongol people been compelled to abandon traditional attitudes and values, and have they joined with other fraternal socialist peoples on the basis of proletarian internationalism? The questions are important, for the answers are today being worked out in an area that may be of great strategic importance in the coming decades.

If we begin with the premise that "people who speak the Mongolian language are Mongols and that the land they inhabit is Mongolia, irrespective of the present temporary, political circumstances,"[3] such questions go far beyond the boundaries of the MPR to embrace all the Mongol peoples, indeed all the peoples of Inner Asia.[4] The officially independent Mongolian People's Republic, the single area most compactly Mongol, may be regarded as the purveyor of traditional Mongol national attitudes and values and is represented to the world at large as Mongolia. Indeed, as a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the United Nations, and other international organizations, it is often held up to the emerging nations of the Third World as a socialist model of economic and social progress. In addition, both the USSR and People's Republic of China (PRC) have sizable Mongol (and Inner Asian) minorities. In the USSR, the Buryat and Kalmyk peoples have autonomous regions set aside for them, although, as is well known, the Soviet political system is dominated by a Eurocentric viewpoint. In China, the Mongols have their own Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, although in practice the Chinese have treated their Mongolian minority in much the same fashion as the imperial and republican Chinese treated all those whom they regarded as "barbarians."

The Sino-Soviet conflict, the current phase of the centuries-old

[1] Yumjagiin Tsedenbal, "Hallmarks of Socialist Co-operation," *Mongolia* (Ulan Bator), May 1980, p. 8.

[2] V.I. Ivanenko, *Gody, ravnyye vekam: K 60-letiyu MNR* (Years Equal to Centuries: Toward the 60th Anniversary of the MPR), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1981.

[3] Jagchid and Hyer, p. 7.

[4] Inner Asia encompasses the Transcaucasus, the Volga-Ural region, Siberia, Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang, Tibet and the Himalayan states, the MPR and Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria and the Soviet Far East. For the historical geography of Inner Asia, see Denis Sinor, *Inner Asia*, 2nd rev. ed., Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1971, pp. 8–17.

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contest between Russia and China for domination over Inner Asia, is perhaps the most important—yet most misunderstood—factor in the analysis of Inner Asian societies. The Mongols and other peoples of Inner Asia have seemingly been placed in the anomalous position of having their entire national territories function as buffer zones between core Russian and Han lands. Yet, at the same time, they have been organized as integral parts of three separate state systems. Does this duality of function promote a self-sustaining sense of national identity among the peoples of Inner Asia, or does it further the disparity among them?

THE TWO BOOKS under review provide differing perspectives from which to view Mongolia's progress from a "feudal" to a "socialist" state.

Robert Rupen's book, published in the Hoover Institution's series "Histories of Ruling Communist Parties," is a compact, highly readable handbook which traces the history of the MPR from its revolutionary roots in the Russo-Japanese war (1904–05) through the age of Choibalsan (1928–52) up through the present phase of Tsedenbal's rule, with attention to political, social, economic, and military developments within the country. The book's two appendixes—"Ninety Principal Participants in the Mongolian Revolution, 1921" and the biographical list of CC MPRP members elected in June 1976 at the 17th Congress—are especially valuable. It is regrettable, although not unusual, that the author has not drawn upon available Mongolian-language sources and has been compelled to rely upon Soviet sources. Nonetheless, he does not fall victim to Soviet biases.

Rupen does fall victim to his own biases. He generally argues that the MPR must be studied within the political context of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The direct result of this dispute, he maintains, is that Mongolia "has inevitably been used as a pawn and bargaining chip repeatedly with very little control over its own fate" (p. 2). This view represents the conventional wisdom among many Western scholars. But, it should be emphasized, there are differences even among its exponents. For example, Rupen emphatically rejects the conclusions of Harrison Salisbury's *War Between Russia and China*, one of the "most widely read and influential works dealing extensively with Mongolia in the last decade and a half" but a work which "overdramatizes . . . the Sino-Soviet conflict, the role of the MPR, and the racial-prejudice overtones" (pp. 197–98). Rupen views Mongolia and the USSR as being closely linked in a more harmonious communion, in which shared economic advantages, mutual cultural enrichment, scholarly exchange, military considerations, and the "fact that the Russians fear and oppose China as much as the Mongols do" make it harder for the Mongols "to realize the full extent of the Russian 'occupation' of Mongolia" (p. 128).

When Rupen answers the question "nationalism or socialist internationalism?" he again supports the conventional wisdom, in which Mongols are essentially captives of the Russians, eager to follow the Soviet lead for the standard economic and strategic reasons but unable to assert their national identity owing to an inferiority complex. Thus, he asserts, has their unique culture and identity fallen victim to Soviet domination, especially among Mongolian elite, CC, or mere party members whose "importance" has led them to abandon Mongol ways and to speak Russian, ape Russian dress, hold Soviet university degrees, live in apartments rather than in yurts, use chauffeur-driven cars or private cars, and travel abroad (pp. 113–14).

Here, in a work devoted primarily to Mongolian politics, Rupen exaggerates to an extreme the bleak possibilities envisaged by C.R. Bawden in his classic work on Mongolian history—namely, that the fraternal relationship of Mongols with the USSR, along with the implementation of Communist theories, would crush the Mongols spiritually and physically: "What outwardly distinguishes the Mongol from his Russian and Chinese neighbours will be eroded to the point where the average Mongol will be a city dweller working in factory or office, or a rural farm labourer tilling the soil . . . ."[5]

This typical interpretation is inspired by the bold and striking changes in Mongolia during the past few decades under the impact of Russian and Chinese domination and the pressures of the 20th century. Pastoralism has given way to a settled agrarian society with industrial ambitions. The Mongolian writing system has gone from Uighur script to Latin script to Cyrillic (and in China from Uighur to Cyrillic and back to Uighur), and bilingualism has become a necessity of life, both within the MPR and within the multinational states of the USSR and the PRC.

At the same time, the Russians and the Chinese, who understand the necessity of keeping the Mongols friendly and who also hope to use Mongol and Inner Asian unity for their own ends, have been forced to bid for Inner Asian loyal-

[5] C.R. Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, New York, NY, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, p. 423.

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ties through an appeal to national and cultural unity! Even the very symbol of Mongol nationalism, Chingis Khan, has at various times become an issue of intense debate between the Russians and the Chinese, with each side attempting to modify or glorify his role to its own purposes.

So again one asks, while the Russians and the Chinese loudly broadcast the song of minority nationalism, what has been the response of the Mongols?

UNFORTUNATELY, our concepts of Inner Asia betray little understanding of the Mongol view. We have not gone much beyond the concepts formulated some years ago by Western scholars who were only just beginning to examine the nationality question in Communist societies and its relevance to the Sino-Soviet conflict. The result has been the perpetuation of a somewhat dated and restricted view in which we see Mongolia from the outside in. First, as Owen Lattimore so refreshingly stated it in a recent interview, "We in the West sit on the outside of Asia trying to classify facts that we get chiefly out of printed material."[6] Most of these materials are not even in the Mongolian language, but in Russian and Chinese, much as if they were intended for export, not for an exclusively Mongol dialogue. Moreover, there is still an urge to classify Mongolia, or any other part of Inner Asia, as a "pawn," "hinge of the universe," or "cul-de-sac." However, these clichés are valid only when Inner Asia is viewed through the prism of convention, which excludes the changes that have occurred in Inner Asian societies and polities over the past several centuries. For example, W.A. Douglas Jackson's interpretation of Soviet nationality policies is the most incisive and penetrating analysis to date, and a very popular one. Nevertheless, if one is going to cite it, one must keep in mind his own caveat that the end result of these policies—"the death of any true national identity and of the traditions of a proud people inherited from time immemorial"—would occur only "*if* such a policy were carried to the ultimate."[7] To paraphrase Bawden, we have been giving the Russians and Chinese credit which they do not deserve for a control which they do not possess.[8] Finally, we have not been giving credit to the peoples of Inner Asia for anything beyond their seemingly "miraculous" skill in surviving as long as they have. In many respects, this is due to the common fallacy, among many students of Sino-Soviet affairs, of identifying the problems of the Mongols and other Inner Asians with the rupture of Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1960's. But since there was never a genuine understanding between Moscow and Beijing, it is impossible to point to any action by either country in Inner Asia which was entirely selfless. The Mongols were and still are quite aware of this. Even during the high point of Russian-Chinese cooperation, when the Chinese poured into the MPR to help build socialism, the Chinese were allowed and actually encouraged by Beijing to settle down and take Mongol citizenship. If the Mongols survived Sino-Soviet "friendship," one must assume they are quite capable of adjusting to Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Thus, the answer to the question of nationalism in Mongolia lies not in how others view the Mongols, but in how the Mongols view themselves. The volume by Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer is particularly valuable in this regard because it presents a view of Mongolian society from within. Essentially a treatment of Mongolian society and culture, it describes the Mongol cultural heritage and traces the continuity of Mongol culture and the Mongol sense of national identity through 800 years of history. Even though the book abstains from a discussion of Mongolian politics, it is particularly useful in providing information that helps us to understand how current social and cultural developments in Mongolia, and in Inner Asia more generally, contradict several basic assumptions of Western analysts. For example, it is not true that bilingualism inevitably leads to biculturalism and ultimately to assimilation by the dominant—Russian or Chinese—culture. Bilingualism can also give the native language a broader platform from which to express itself. Recent statistical data indicate not only a wider use of the mother tongue by these minority nationalities but also actual instances of competition between Russians and Inner Asians for jobs.[9]

The Jagchid-Hyer book also handily refutes those who mourn the death of Mongol culture. It points out that what they have

[6] William O. McCagg, Jr., "A Conversation with Owen Lattimore," in William O. McCagg, Jr., and Brian D. Silver, Eds., *Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers*, Elmsford, NY, Pergamon Press, 1979, pp. 254–55.

[7] W.A. Douglas Jackson, *The Russo-Chinese Borderlands*, Princeton, NJ, D. van Nostrand, 1968, pp. 82–83. Emphasis added.

[8] Bawden, op. cit., p. 239.

[9] Richard Pipes, "Introduction: The Nationality Problem," in Zev Katz, Ed., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, New York, NY, The Free Press, 1975; Ann Sheehy, "Demographic Trends Moving in Uzbeks' Favor," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 442/80, Nov. 20, 1980; Mikhail Cheifets, "National Antagonism in Kazakhstan," *RFE-RL Opinion Research* (Munich), Background Report 12–80, Nov. 29, 1980.

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been mourning are but the trappings of a society, trappings shed in order to accommodate that society to the 20th century. A Mongol is no less a Mongol whether he rides a pony and lives in a yurt, or drives a jeep and lives in an apartment—if he himself knows he is a Mongol. The Mongols are busily preserving and maintaining their identity by intensively researching their cultural heritage, art, folklore, and religious treatises, but, as Jagchid and Hyer put it, "while seeking to retrieve a lost heritage, the Mongols . . . have very deliberately avoided an attempt to revive a dying culture" (p. xiii).

THE SAME CONCEPT which shapes the modern Mongol's sense of national identity with his historical past also contributes to nation-building among other Inner Asian peoples, with whom the Mongols share a sense of community. The Mongol-Turkic-Tibetan cultural unit, which was supposed to have been broken beyond all repair over the past several centuries by different religious orientations, by partition between the Russian and Chinese empires, and more recently, by the imposition of "scientific" Marxist-Leninist nationality policies, is still extant. While the Inner Asian peoples have been integrated into the political, social, and economic life of the USSR and the PRC, the essentials of their national outlook have remained virtually unchanged.

Unlike Disraeli's fictional Mr. Kremlin (who had only one idea and that was wrong), the Kremlin leaders are well aware of this regeneration of Inner Asian cultures within the socialist framework. And if they want to compete successfully with the Chinese for Inner Asian loyalties, they will have to support policies with genuine mass appeal among the Inner Asian peoples. Victor Louis defined the problem facing the Kremlin when he wrote:

In its struggle against Chinese colonization, Eastern Turkestan has always turned toward Central Asia for help. Tibet has always looked to the Buddhist world [i.e., Mongolia]. But the eyes of the Mongols have always been turned toward Russia. It would, of course, be more than naive to explain this by any feelings of love for the Russians on the part of the Mongols.[10]

[10] Victor Louis, *The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire*, with a Dissenting Introduction by Harrison E. Salisbury, New York, NY, Times Books, 1979, p. 27.

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Communism and Nationalism in Vietnam

By Stephen B. Young

DOUGLAS PIKE. *History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1976.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

DAVID G. MARR, Ed. *Reflections from Captivity: Phan Boi Chau's Prison Notes and Ho Chi Minh's Prison Diary.* Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 1978.

LE DUAN. *This Nation and Socialism Are One,* ed. by Tran Van Dinh. Chicago, IL, Vanguard Books, 1977.

G. NGUYEN TIEN HUNG. *Economic Development of Socialist Vietnam, 1955-80.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

WILLIAM J. DUIKER. *The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1941.* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1976.

GUENTER LEWY. *America in Vietnam.* New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1978.

WILFRED BURCHETT. *Vietnam: Un + Un = Un* (Vietnam: One + One = One), Paris, François Maspero, 1977.

W. SCOTT THOMPSON and DONALDSON D. FRIZZELL, Eds. *The Lessons of Vietnam.* New York, NY, Crane, Russak, 1977.

BRIGITTE FRIANG. *La Mousson de la liberté: Vietnam du colonialisme au stalinisme* (The Monsoon of Liberty: Vietnam from Colonialism to Stalinism). Paris, Plon, 1976.

THERE ARE, no doubt, tides in the affairs of men which, if taken at the flood, lead one to fortune. Yet the outcomes of revolutions, electoral or military campaigns, and other expressions of mass human effort are not preordained, nor are such phenomena usually recognized as successful until after the fact. Foreknowledge of tides and—most of all—of their floods would therefore seem to be the most desirable of human political skills. Unfortunately, prospective determination of "inevitable" outcomes is quite hazardous. On the other hand, tides are easily defined in retrospect. If history is not to be written retrospectively only by the victors and made to seem as if every occurrence were a necessary one, the "ifs" of history must become the most important points of inquiry. This injunction is particularly valid regarding the modern history of Vietnam.

Although there are a thousand "ifs" regarding events in Vietnam, as of now the common consensus is that in recent years the Communist tide was at the flood due to mass popular support from the Vietnamese people. And yet, if the Communist flood is so compelling in Vietnam, how can one explain tens of thousands of "boat people" fleeing their homeland? At no previous time, under French rule, Japanese occupation, or American hegemony, have large numbers of ethnic Vietnamese frantically taken to the sea to escape their native land. Something about the new government of the Vietnamese Communists must be deeply repugnant to large numbers of its subjects. (Ethnic Chinese citizens have fled from a more express program of persecution.) Perhaps, then, the Communist triumph was not a necessary result of inevitable internal Vietnamese political and social developments. Nor do Hanoi's recent policies—war in Kampuchea, alliance with the Soviet Union, and hegemony over Laos—seem responses to contemporary popular aspirations. Thus, there are indications that the Communist regime is primarily an expression of something other than the national will of the people of Vietnam.

HOW THEN did the Communists win in Vietnam? Bluntly, they won through the successful exploitation of foreign powers. They secured resolute allies when they needed them, made the best possible tactical accommodations with less sympathetic powers when necessary, and manipulated French and American domestic political proc-

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esses against the policies of governments in Paris and Washington when required.

Briefly, in August 1945 the Communists seized power in Hanoi by posing as the local representatives of the United States and its allies. This left the leaders of the small Communist faction in a position to dominate a new national government in whose formation other Vietnamese acquiesced with more or less enthusiasm. Then, bribery of a Chinese nationalist warlord bought weapons and several months of time, during which the party used the existing colonial administrative structure to place Communist cadres in positions of political power. In March 1946, the Communists signed an agreement with the French which permitted the return of French military forces to North and Central Vietnam, an action that explicitly confirmed the Communist-led government as master of the local administration in those parts of the country. With French help, overt and covert, Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues then murdered nationalist leaders or drove them into exile and crushed armed nationalist units in sharp battles. On the other hand, in Cochin China to the south, where the Communists were unable to monopolize the administrative apparatus of the state, success on the scale achieved in North and Central Vietnam eluded them. This indicates the importance that administrative power had for achievement of political prominence in Vietnam.

Victory over the French in the 1947–54 struggle was achieved only with Chinese military aid and the help of French political movements sympathetic to the Communists. Later, in the struggle with the Americans, Hanoi's victory was sealed by decisions taken by the American Congress in 1973, 1974, and 1975 to reduce military aid to South Vietnam. Such decisions were the result of Hanoi's strategy of weakening American popular support for the war (1) by fighting a war of attrition where casualties were inflicted on American forces at a rate unacceptable to American public opinion and (2) by using Vietnamese front groups to give the Communists' drive for conquest the color of authentic local legitimacy. The Communist offensive of 1975, which finally brought down the Saigon regime, was made possible by Soviet aid—another example of Hanoi's success in manipulating foreign powers.

In the period 1945–75, the Communists made headway with only limited assistance from the Vietnamese people. All the Communists needed from their own countrymen were a servile manpower pool and loyal cadres who could draw from that pool, as needed, the soldiers and other resources demanded by the party. To be sure, the Communists had their core of supporters all along, but in the South, the Viet Cong by 1972 had been defeated in their effort to generate large-scale indigenous support. The Communists were able to win by using their police control over North Vietnam to mount an invasion of the South and, what was critical, by eliciting sufficient Soviet aid to make that invasion a powerful one. Such a victory—made possible only through access to foreign power—would seem less "inevitable" than victory obtained primarily through use of domestic political strength.

THIS ANALYSIS of Vietnamese Communist success not only flies in the face of Hanoi's propaganda but also, more significant, challenges the general understanding of Vietnamese communism which has become current among many leading Western commentators.[1] However, Douglas Pike's history of the Vietnamese Communists helps flesh out the thrust of my alternative interpretation. Pike, who has previously written on the organizational techniques of the Viet Cong,[2] readily perceives the interaction between a small, organized elite and amorphous masses. Several observations in Pike's *History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1976* bear out my thesis:

. . . Communism came to Vietnam as an import, the result of alien initiative. As an institution it was conceived outside Vietnam, launched from foreign soil, managed from abroad during its formative years and, to a degree, fostered and sustained by interests largely irrelevant to Vietnam. (p. 3)

The Party structure created in 1930 was original, innovative, durable, and one that much later could claim a large share of the credit for Communism's ultimate victory. (p. 16)

Pike notes that on the eve of World War II, after 10 years of struggle, the Vietnamese Communists had yet to become a predominant force in Vietnamese politics.

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[1] One might cite Paul Mus, *Viet-Nam: Sociologie d'une Guerre* (Vietnam: Sociology of a War), Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1952; John T. McAlister, *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution*, New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969; Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Political History*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1968; Francis FitzGerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam*, New York, NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972; George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam*, New York, NY, Dell, 1967; Jean Lacouture, *Vietnam Between Two Truces*, New York, NY, Random House, 1966; and the work by William Duiker reviewed herein.

[2] Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1966.

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He concludes that it was the impact of that war on Vietnam which gave the Communists an opportunity to eclipse their rivals and bear the palm alone.

Pike records that the party's Eighth Plenum in May 1941 focused on the need to prepare for the "historic opportunity" *(thoi co)* which the war was sure to bring about in one way or another. The plan of the party was not to gain power through elaborate organization of popular support but rather to wait for international events to create a domestic crisis in Vietnam—a crisis which would suddenly present the party with a chance to seize state administrative organs in urban centers (p. 47). This was an orthodox Leninist approach to the problem of revolution as seen by a self-appointed vanguard party.

As related to me by Vietnamese politically active at the time, Japan's sudden surrender after Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the expected *thoi co.* The Japanese controlled Vietnam in August 1945, having displaced the French in March of that year. Upon Japan's unconditional surrender, no one effectively ruled Vietnam, and power was up for grabs. The monarch Bao Dai had an administration but no army. French officials and soldiers were in custody. The Japanese had troops but quietly awaited the arrival of Allied forces. Bao Dai's government and other Vietnamese nationalist groups—the Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai, and the major Dai Viet party (more on these below)—were all more or less compromised in Allied eyes by past association with the Japanese. In August 1945, it was not their place to seize power in Vietnam and assert against the Allies the legitimacy of Vietnam's independence under their nationalist leadership. Communist leader Ho Chi Minh presented himself and his Viet Minh front (League for Vietnamese Independence, under whose standard the Communist party then operated) as America's agents in Vietnam and produced officers from the US Office of Strategic Services in his retinue as evidence. Under the circumstances, other Vietnamese leaders felt constrained by the times to acquiesce in Ho's claim to power. Bao Dai abdicated, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established. On that occasion Ho borrowed from the American Declaration of Independence for the similar statement he composed for Vietnam. There was a particular tide flowing in Vietnam in August and September 1945, but it was a tide of happenstance. Clearly, the Communists succeeded in making the most of it.

Fortunately, Pike, unlike so many other commentators, sees not only the importance of these fortuitous circumstances for Communist success but also the work required to keep the party in office once power had been seized. His analysis moves beyond the myth of national liberation which seemed to give Vietnamese Communist success the aura of historical inevitability and returns us to an older truth—the advantages of the Leninist method in a struggle for state power. We may also note that with the Leninist method, foreign support for the governing elite grows increasingly important because the regime's domestic support becomes more problematic the longer it stays in power.

Pike's study puts the Vietnamese Communists in a proper international perspective. Their commitment to Bolshevik values and beliefs becomes apparent; the rhetoric of nationalism and national liberation is seen as just that—rhetoric. Recent policies of Hanoi only serve to confirm the accuracy of Pike's analysis. Vietnam's adoption of the title of a "socialist republic" in 1976, entering into an alliance with Moscow in November 1978, and assertion that its revolution should encompass all of Indochina should come as no surprise to anyone who reads Pike's book. The constitution of December 1980 pledges Vietnam to a foreign policy of "proletarian internationalism," the standard Leninist formulation for world order.

WRITINGS by Ho Chi Minh and by Le Duan recently available in English tend to confirm Pike's view of Vietnamese history. The first selection, included in the volume *Reflections from Captivity* edited by David Marr, consists of poems written by Ho while in a Chinese prison during World War II. As can be seen from the excerpts printed on page 83, these poems reveal Ho as a supreme opportunist, whose sole vision is of himself in power giving directions. Clearly, his enforced absence—in provincial Chinese jails—from political struggle as the *thoi co* approached, rankled Ho grievously. These are the words of another—like Lenin—who would be great, who seeks to lead. Left unspoken are the reasons why he should rise above others. Ho sees it as natural, predestined, for him to be superior—he is a "true dragon," a "cock" whose role is to arouse the people, a "potentate," and a "fighter." When reasons justifying superiority are not given, egoism is present. And egoism unrestrained by respect for others leads to opportunism; no tactic is too base if it draws the goal closer. Thus, Ho could bring the French army back to North and Central Vietnam in 1946 if it would help him destroy his Vietnamese rivals and sustain his hold on the government.

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Regrets for Lost Time

On purpose Heaven blocks a fighter's path
Eight months I've wasted wearing cangue and cuffs.
Each day is worth a thousand pounds of gold.
When can I ever hope to be set free?

* * *

On the Way to Nanning

Hard irons have replaced the rope of hemp.
They trinkle like jade bracelets at each step.
I got locked up in a prison as a spy.
But like some erstwhile potentate I strut.

* * *

Listening to the Cock's Crow

You're just like a common, ordinary cock.
Dawn after dawn you crow and herald day.
One cry arouses people from their dreams.
Yours is no common, ordinary job.

* * *

Wordplay

A man, once freed from jail, will build his country.
Misfortune is the test of loyalty.
He earns great merit who feels great concern.
Unlock the cage—the true dragon will fly.

—Ho Chi Minh.

Our other sample, by Le Duan, now senior leader of the Vietnamese Communists, makes this aspect of Ho Chi Minh's career into dogma. In the essay on "Problems of Revolutionary Strategy," written in 1971 and included in *This Nation and Socialism Are One,* Le Duan praised Ho Chi Minh's "flexible tactics" for carrying the party through "seemingly insuperable difficulties" after August 1945:

We would reach a temporary compromise with Chiang Kai-shek to be free to cope with the French colonialists, only to do the same with the French in order to drive out Chiang Kai-shek's troops and wipe out the reactionaries and their agents. Thus we gained time to consolidate our forces and prepared for nationwide resistance to the inevitable French colonial aggression.

In the article "Principles and Methods of Revolutionary Action"—written in 1970 and likewise included in the collection edited by Tran Van Dinh—Le Duan asserted that revolution "cannot succeed without imagination and ingenuity" and that "the art of revolutionary leadership lies in knowing how to win judiciously step by step." The maxim is "nothing succeeds like success." Each success generates momentum and pushes the movement on to a higher level. Le Duan continued, "In practice, new factors and possibilities keep emerging, so that one must take them into account by changing or correcting actions and quickly working out new plans to insure that the strategic and tactical guidance keeps pace with the changing situation."

Such flexibility (one might better call it opportunism) is essential, Le Duan argued, because a revolution can succeed only when a revolutionary situation prevails. Such a situation "means that the problem of the seizure of power is immediately at hand." Revolution is seen by Le Duan in Leninist fashion, as settling only the issue of who holds political power. Economic and social reforms do not enter into the business of revolution properly understood. Socialism can be created *after* the revolution is successful. (And even then the socioeconomic process is not guaranteed success. Nguyen Tien Hung's book *Economic Development of Socialist Vietnam, 1955–80* provides evidence that Communist efforts to build a productive socialist economy in Vietnam have not achieved dramatic results.)

We find in Le Duan neither a proponent of popular support as the basis of revolution nor a prophet of inevitable explosions of mass anger bringing on revolution. Rather, he emerges as a technician of power calling upon a skillful leadership to use every means possible to capitalize upon the moods and opportunities of each separate moment.

This approach to revolution is carried further in Le Duan's essay on cadres (Tran Van Dinh, pp. 49–95), in which he looks to that elite of trained activists as decisive for revolutionary success. The cadres make possible the seizure of the opportune moment. Disciplined and energetic, they can be adroitly used by the party leadership to exploit the situation to advantage. Through cadres, the party must "create a single, organic system which will enable it to utilize and mobilize all the material and spiritual potential of society." For Le Duan, ideology alone can achieve nothing. It must be embodied in an organization in order to prevail in society. Revolutions, for Le Duan, are made, not born.

THE FAILURE of many Westerners

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to see the limited (and largely foreign) basis for Communist power in Vietnam arose because scholars and commentators did not examine Vietnamese nationalism carefully. As long as communism in Vietnam was seen as enveloped in a nationalist wrapper (an image fostered by the Communists through the use of front groups such as the Viet Minh, Lien Viet,[3] and National Liberation Front), nationalism in Vietnam could not be seen as something unique. Perceptions that the conflict there between Communists and non-Communists was guided more by universal cleavages of socio-economic class than by an indigenous Communist/nationalist rivalry obscured the special aspects of Vietnamese politics critical to genuine nationalist strength in a Vietnamese cultural context.

No better recent example of this misperception of Vietnam exists than William Duiker's *The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1941*. Duiker concludes that as of 1941 only the Communists in Vietnam had the understanding and the will necessary for victory and that nationalism as something other than communism was for all relevant purposes nonexistent. Nationalism in Vietnam he saw only as a response to French colonialism.

In his introduction, Duiker avoids what he calls "a lengthy theoretical discussion of the nature of nationalism." But then, without benefit of such a discussion, he makes two telling assumptions, which determine and weaken his ultimate conclusions.

First, Duiker posits that true nationalism must be sophisticated about the world beyond the borders of the nation-state and thus can be found only in the most modern sectors of society. Vietnam's heritage of a unique ethnic identity he dismisses as a "proto-nationalism" (pp. 287–88). Thus, he has nothing to say about the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects as nationalist movements.

But where Ho Chi Minh prior to his seizure of power recruited Vietnamese by the thousands, those sects recruited them by the hundreds of thousands. In Vietnamese terms, the sects touched more profound popular nerves than the Communists ever did. The sects were able to organize on a mass scale even though they never controlled the police, an army, or a central administration, as the Communists did from August 1945 on. The sects had a mass base, but the Communists ultimately won the last battle with foreign help from their Communist allies.

The Hoa Hao descend directly from a series of 19th-century Buddhist sects, located in the Mekong Delta, that made obligation to country a religious duty. This credo not only made for a popular Buddhism, but also led the sects to involvement in anti-French activities. Such sects looked back to Vietnamese tradition—to the Zen Buddhism of the Tran monarchs, who had defeated the Mongols in the 13th century—and wedded it to popular notions of apocalyptic fate found in geomancy and astrology. After World War II and until his murder by the Communists in 1947, Hoa Hao founder Huynh Phu So organized a political party and led resistance to the French. He was no mere religious leader but a highly politicized Vietnamese nationalist.

The Cao Dai sect preserved, similarly in religious guise, the early 20th-century nationalism of Prince Cuong De and a traditional sense that the white man should not rule in Asia. During World War II, the Cao Dai cooperated with the Japanese, and the Cao Dai pope —Pham Cong Tac—was consequently exiled by the French to Madagascar. The Cao Dai had a clear vision of a Vietnamese Vietnam and a complex political organization.

Not to discuss the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai in a book on Vietnamese nationalism is a serious omission.

For his second controlling assumption, Duiker posits that the Communists were nationalists because they proposed, among other things, a solution for the national question of independence. This assumption obscures the distinction between Communists and nationalists. All Vietnamese are then easily seen as nationalists, and class rivalries become more salient to analysis of political conflict than differences in degree of fidelity to a national ethic. From this point of view, the Communists as nationalists can be easily seen as the most vigorous Vietnamese force, combining both mass national feelings and more precise class grievances.

Duiker assumes into being the very thing he seeks to investigate and comes up with a Vietnamese nationalism structured so that communism is "inevitable." But once the terms of indigenous conflict are hidden by such an approach, it quickly becomes impossible for outside observers to understand the real motive forces behind political developments.

Duiker also has a problem making Vietnamese nationalism fit the

[3] The Lien Viet front, or Mat Tran Lien Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam, was created by the Communist-dominated National Assembly in November 1946 to provide an umbrella over the Viet Minh so that persons suspicious of Viet Minh leadership would have another organization to join, albeit an organization under Communist control still. The front was abolished in 1955 when the party took full power over North Vietnam. Similarly, the National Liberation Front and its Provisional Revolutionary movement were terminated once the party achieved rule in the South in 1976.

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mold he has established, for whatever sense of ethnic loyalty the Vietnamese do have, it cannot immediately be situated among the concepts of Western social science. This failure of Vietnamese political drives to match perfectly our notions of what nationalism should be reflects the inability of social scientists to formulate adequate conceptual baskets in which to place human phenomena.

The limitations of relying, in discussions of Vietnamese events, on Western notions of what is important for political success are evident as well in Guenter Lewy's *America in Vietnam,* a postwar reflection on the images and issues which dominated informed American discussion during the war. This book is an important corrective for excessively critical evaluations of American conduct in Vietnam so popular during the years when there emerged a "counterculture" rivaling an older establishment.

Lewy also concludes, for reasons long fashionable in antiwar circles of the American political establishment, that the United States could not have won the war because the war could have been won only by the South Vietnamese themselves and the latter were so riven by internal socioeconomic conflicts that they could not develop the will and leadership necessary to defeat the Communists. Nothing the US did or could have done, in Lewy's opinion, could have changed that central fact of the matter. In my judgment, Lewy profoundly underestimates Vietnamese nationalism.

For Lewy's thesis to hold, he must come to terms with Saigon's pacification effort of 1968–72. This successful endeavor, which underlay the Vietnamization program for withdrawal of American combat units, changed the character of the war and revealed impressive political, organizational, and leadership capabilities among the South Vietnamese. During these years, the Viet Cong were defeated in South Vietnam, and by early 1972, only North Vietnamese divisions remained a dire threat to South Vietnam's independence. In the Communist offensives of 1972 and 1975, North Vietnamese units crossed borders to invade pacified, populated, and rather prosperous areas of South Vietnam.

It is perhaps not surprising that Wilfred Burchett's *Vietnam: Un + Un = Un,* told as it is from the viewpoint of Hanoi's combatants, ignores the Viet Cong defeat and the North's reliance on a conventional invasion for its final seizure of power. But it is less understandable that Lewy chooses to minimize the effect of the pacification campaign. Of course, in some sense he can argue that pacification did not make any difference, that "Vietnamization" is to be measured by the performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in main-force, big-unit warfare with North Vietnam's regulars. Since the ARVN collapsed in the last battles, the American effort to turn the war over to nationalist Vietnamese can be considered to have failed. But such an assumption as to what kind of performance is the most important to measure eliminates any need to give the South Vietnamese credit for defeating the insurgency and, consequently, any need to explain the reasons for their success in doing so. Hidden in that success, however, were the seeds of possible success even in the main-force war, Lewy's area of prime concern.

Peasant nationalism made pacification work. The combination after 1968 of asking Vietnamese to defend their own villages, giving them a stake in the economy, and allowing local elections to tap local leadership provided a rural base for the Saigon government. Left to themselves, Vietnamese do not like communism. Among the Vietnamese, pacification was pushed by the Tan Dai Viet, a secret nationalist party founded in 1964 by members of the old Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang of 1938 who refused to follow the dictatorial theories of its leader, Ha Thuc Ky. Tan Dai Viet ideas were adopted by President Nguyen Van Thieu when he needed the support of that party. Thieu joined the old Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang in 1963. His brother helped found the Tan Dai Viet party one year later. On the American side, the military strategy of General Creighton Abrams and William Colby's notion of turning the people's war concept against the Communists matched the Tan Dai Viet program. The result was a three-year partnership between Vietnamese and Americans after 1968 that gave priority to popular participation as the basis of pacification and to pacification as the basis for the defeat of the Communists. The nationalist leadership that made pacification successful might have flourished in the ARVN as well had the United States insisted that President Thieu allow it a chance to do so.

Lewy's weakness is also Duiker's. Both concentrated on documents and thus wound up with conclusions far removed from the actual dynamics driving historic individuals forward. Consequently, while both Lewy and Duiker have interesting observations on what, where, and when, they leave us short of a basic understanding of who, why, and how. In addition, they do not help us see all the "ifs" and the "might have beens." Analysis of those alternatives would have brought out the complexity of the human tragedy which was the

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war in Vietnam.

Although the series of papers and comments edited by Professor W. Scott Thompson and Col. Donaldson Frizzell covers the same ground as Lewy's discussion of American successes and failures, it is more rewarding because it consists of statements by major participants giving direct access to the quality of their thought. In addition, it adds many perspectives on pacification and technology beyond Lewy's interest. This book shows how Americans in the field came to grips with a strange war and learned to fight it rather well.

But clearly missing from all of these studies and from the minds of policymakers in Washington was an adequate awareness of the goals and values of Vietnamese nationalism. With such an awareness, the US national leadership would not have felt so compelled to fight the war for the Vietnamese, and the American cause would have been seen as more just, more defensible, and more fitting for a nation committed to democratic principles.

BUT EVEN TODAY there is really no work in English or French which presents the substance of Vietnam's ethnic peasant nationalism. While works of Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Pham Van Dong, and Van Tien Dung have appeared in English,[4] the same cannot be said for the works of Huynh Phu So of the Hoa Hao, for the Dai Viet theory, called Dan Toc Sinh Ton, for the nationalist novels of the 1930's, or for historic works such as the *Uc Trai Tap* (Collected Works of [Nguyen] Trai), the *Gia Huan Ca* (Song of Family Education), or the *Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu* (Complete History of Great Viet), all of which define the content of Vietnam's nationalism.

In the early 1980's, the Tan Dai Viet followers, the Hoa Hao, and the Cao Dai still lead movements within Vietnam in opposition to the Communists. We are as ignorant of why they are doing this against all odds as we ever were of why the Vietnamese disliked their Communist Party but could not effectively coalesce around the leaders of the various Saigon regimes supported by the Americans. Brigitte Friang in her book *La Mousson de la liberté* provides some evidence in the form of the diary of a young South Vietnamese intellectual who supported the Communists in May 1975 but became disillusioned as they dropped all pretext of being Vietnamese nationalists.

As the diary in part illustrates, nationalist groups arose in response to the challenge laid down by the mandarin Phan Boi Chau in the opening years of this century. Phan Boi Chau saw that the neo-Confucian heritage of imperial Vietnam was irrelevant to the modern world. But rather than find a new neo-Confucian kind of ideology in the West as the Communists did, Chau sought to peel off the layers of neo-Confucian thought that the Vietnamese had borrowed from China and thereby to release the energies of Vietnamese nationalism pent up in the villages and within individuals. He called upon Vietnamese to find within themselves the will and the strength to once again establish Vietnam as an independent country, by violently overthrowing French rule just as Vietnamese had always fought against Chinese dominion. He updated an ancient heritage which was as relevant in the 1900's as it had been in the 1420's and the 1780's.[5]

A short autobiography by Phan Boi Chau is translated as the first selection in *Reflections from Captivity*. This work affords us at least some access to the flood tide of the most pervasive political movement in modern Vietnam—the desire for the assertion once again of a strong Vietnamese polity. Chau's appeal is to the old heroes, to patriotism, and to individual action. Duiker dismisses Chau and his life's struggle as the product of "protonationalism," but whatever the force is which called Chau to sacrifice and to political action, it today still moves many Vietnamese to give of themselves for their nation and to resist a Communist regime.

Chau's life was spent seeking aid from some foreign power—first Japan and then post-imperial China—to obtain the guns unavailable in French Indochina but necessary for revolt against the French. In this endeavor, Chau failed. The obstacle facing nationalists like Chau then and the Tan Dai Viet leadership now is that foreign powers are committed to their own national interests and provide others with assistance only to the degree that such aid advances the foreign power's objectives.

Communists, in contrast, tend to suffer fewer disabilities in this re-

[4] In addition to the volumes cited above, see Bernard Fall, Ed., *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1967; Truong Chinh, *Primer for Revolt: The Communist Take-over in Vietnam*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1963; Vo Nguyen Giap, *Big Victory, Great Task*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1968; Pham Van Dong, *Selected Writings*, Hanoi, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977; and Van Tien Dung, *Our Great Spring Victory*, trans. by Tran Van Dinh, New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1977.

[5] David G. Marr in *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1971, discusses the career of Phan Boi Chau from the perspective of a Western modernist. My article "Vietnamese Marxism: Transition in Elite Ideology," in *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), August 1979, emphasizes the role of neo-Confucian thought in non-nationalist Vietnamese political developments.

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gard, for their ideology creates a potential bridge to reliable foreign assistance. The Vietnamese Communists drew incalculable material and psychological benefit from this imbalance. In this sense, the Communist tide in Vietnam after August 1945 did have an inherent advantage over the nationalist one, but *if* the Americans had known more, who can say that the end would still have been the same?

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Notes & Views

Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1980

EDITORS' NOTE: By arrangement with Richard F. Staar, Director of the International Studies Program of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, we present for the first time in these pages the latest in an important series of documentation on Communist affairs. The "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts," which regularly appears in the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs,* published by the Hoover Institution Press under the editorship of Mr. Staar, is one of the few systematic and regular sources of information available to scholars working in this field. The text of the Checklist published below represents a slightly modified version of that which is shortly to appear in the forthcoming 1981 edition of the *Yearbook*. Contributions to future annual Checklists in the form of corrections, additions, or amendments will be appreciated. Such contributions may be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA, or to Richard F. Staar, Director, International Studies Program, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, 94305.

By Richard F. Staar

The "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts" for 1981 printed on pages 90–92 takes as its point of departure the "more than 90" countries in which there exists a Communist party or similar movement recognized by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[1] Included also are parties of several subnational entities—the Faroe Islands, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Puerto Rico, Réunion, and West Berlin.

The Checklist gives January 1, 1981, national population estimates, claimed or estimated membership figures for the Communist party (parties), the legal status of the party, its results in the latest election (*percentage of votes and/or seats in the legislature*), and how the party orients itself in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The Checklist reflects splits within the Communist movements of a number of the countries in which there is a Moscow-recognized party. In most cases, data are for the pro-Moscow party of a given country. However, in others (noted in footnotes), data are for either (1) an independent or pro-Beijing party, or (2) the totality of Marxist parties in the given country. Generally, where parties have published membership data, the figures have been accepted (one exception is Afghanistan). Most membership figures are estimates from the profiles of individual parties provided by contributors to the 1981 *Yearbook*.

The total estimated worldwide membership of the Communist parties derived by the above methodology is 76.7 million, up 1 million from estimates for 1979. This is quite close to authoritative Soviet estimates.[2]

[1] The "more than 90" was cited in Vadim V. Zagladin, "The Great October and the Communist Movement: Past and Present," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), November 1980, p. 26.

[2] Zagladin, loc. cit., p. 27, gives the total for Communist party members throughout the world as "more than 75 million."

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Estimates for Africa and the Middle East remain essentially unchanged. This is due, in part, to the paucity of information available.

Claims or estimates for many movements in Latin America registered substantial changes during 1980. The largest increases were in Costa Rica (an estimated gain of 200), Cuba (a gain of 200,000 members claimed), El Salvador (an estimated gain of 575), and Honduras (an estimated gain of 850). Decreases occurred in Chile (55,000), the Dominican Republic (3,350), Guyana (400), Peru (1,500), and Venezuela (5,500).

Turning to Asia and the Pacific, we find the ruling movement in Afghanistan continuing to claim 100,000 members, but the Checklist accepts the lower Western estimates of some 50,000. The Chinese Communist Party announced in 1980 new membership figures representing an increase of only 1 million members over 1979, a smaller year-to-year increase than in recent years. The estimate for the Communist Party of India (150,000) is well below the highly inflated 546,000 claimed in 1979.

Modest gains in membership since 1979 have been claimed by most ruling parties in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The exception was Albania, which did not release any new figures.

Among the most important movements in Western Europe, only the Italian Communist Party (PCI) claimed a gain from 1979 to 1980; most other parties in the region suffered significant decreases. The faction-ridden Spanish Communist Party (PCE) is estimated to have suffered a sharp decline (from 200,000 to 140,000).

During 1980, some 17 of the Moscow-approved parties held party congresses (see Table 1).

In 17 cases, the party recognized by Moscow is currently in power, although not necessarily allied with Moscow.[3] During 1980, only 27 of the Moscow-recognized parties found themselves proscribed by local authorities; of these clandestine organizations, 10 are in Latin America, 9 in Africa and the Middle East, and 8 in Asia.

Excluded from the Checklist are a broad range of radical "liberation movements" encompassing some Marxist elements and manifesting pro-Soviet tendencies, e.g., the African National Congress and the South-West African People's Organization. Also omitted are a variety of self-proclaimed "Marxist-Leninist" ruling parties that, according to Moscow, have only a "socialist orientation" and hence are not considered full-fledged Communist organizations. Such is the case with the Socialist Party in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), Movimento Popular de Libertação para Angola-Partido de Trabalho (MPLA-PT), Partido Africano de Indépendence de Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), Parti Congolaise du Travail in the People's Republic of the Congo, and the Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin.[4] Most of these one-party governments follow an "Afro-Marxist" ideology, while relying on the USSR for military and economic assistance.[5]

At the conclusion of the Checklist is information on international Communist front organizations. All 13 of these organizations continue to represent important instruments in the USSR propaganda effort, estimated to cost the Soviet Union more than $63 million a year (see the breakdown in the chart).[6]

Table 1. Communist Party Congresses in 1980

Country	Number of congress	Dates
Austria	24th	Dec. 6–8
Bangladesh	3rd	Feb. 24–28
Colombia	13th	Nov. 7–11
Costa Rica	13th	June 14–17
Cuba	2nd	Dec. 17–20
Denmark	26th	Apr. 4–6
Egypt	1st	Early Sept.
Guadeloupe	7th	May 16–18
Hungary	12th	Mar. 24–27
Japan	15th	Feb. 26–28
Luxembourg	23rd	May 31–June 1
Martinique	7th	Apr. 12–13
Netherlands	27th	June 6–8
North Korea	6th	Oct. 10–15
Panama	6th	Feb. 8–10
Poland	8th	Feb. 11–15
Réunion	5th	July 12–14

[3] The figure of 17 includes the ruling movements of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, which are not openly acknowledged by the CPSU as pure Communist parties.

[4] Moscow has referred to such regimes as "revolutionary democracies," or governments that have chosen to follow the noncapitalist path. Radio Moscow on January 16, 1980, listed regimes in 12 African countries as having a "socialist orientation": Algeria, Angola, Benin, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Cape Verde Islands, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Ethiopia.

[5] The 26th Congress of the CPSU held in late February 1981 may provide fresh evidence regarding how the Soviet party views these political organizations.

[6] There were no new membership data released by these organizations during 1980, although at least four of them have increased the number of their affiliates. These are the International Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the International Organization of Journalists.

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Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts

Africa and the Middle East	January 1, 1981, population (est.)	Communist party membership[1]	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[2]	Status	Sino-Soviet dispute
Algeria	19,026,000	400–500 est.	—(1976)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Egypt	42,636,000	500 est.	—(1979)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow[3]
Iran	39,097,000	1,500 est.	—(1980); none	Legal	Split (3)
Iraq	13,596,000	2,000 est.	—(1980); none	Allowed	Pro-Moscow
Israel	3,814,000	1,500 est.	4.6 (1977); 5 of 120 ("Democratic Front")	Legal	Split (2)
Jordan	3,158,000	–500 est.	No elections since 1967	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Lebanon	3,059,000	2,500 est.	—(1972); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Lesotho	1,305,000	Negligible	1970 elections nullified	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Morocco	21,274,000	1,500–3,000 est.	—(1977); 1	Allowed	Pro-Moscow
Nigeria	73,382,000	Unknown	—(1976)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Réunion	494,000	2,000 est.[4]	32.8 (1978); none in Paris	Legal	Independent
Saudi Arabia	10,112,000	Negligible	No elections scheduled	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Senegal	5,757,000	2,000 est.	0.32 (1978); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
South Africa	28,697,000	Unknown	—(1977)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Sudan	19,028, 000	1,500 est.	—(1980)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Syria	8,955,000	5,000 est.	—(1977); 6 of 195	Allowed	Pro-Moscow
Tunisia	6,554,000	100 est.	—(1974)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
TOTAL	299,495,000	24,800			

The Americas	January 1, 1981, population (est.)	Communist party membership[1]	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[2]	Status	Sino-Soviet dispute
Argentina	27,874,000	70,000 est.	No elections scheduled	Proscribed	Split (3)
Bolivia	5,420,000	3,500 est.[5]	—(1980) elections voided	Proscribed	Split (7)
Brazil	123,388,000	10,000 est.[5]	—(1978) ; 5[6]	Proscribed	Split (4)
Canada	24,033,000	2,000 est.[5]	0.1 (1980); none	Legal	Split (3)
Chile	11,091,000	20,000 est.	Elections promised	Proscribed	Split (4)
Colombia	27,025,000	11,000 est.[5]	1.9 (1978); 3 of 311	Legal	Split (4)
Costa Rica	2,269,000	3,200 est.	2.7 (1978); 3 of 57	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Cuba	9,796,000	434,000 claim	91.7 (1976); 441 of 481	In power	Pro-Moscow
Dominican Republic	5,762,000	1,650 est.[5]	—(1978); none	Legal	Split (13)
Ecuador	8,124,000	2,000 est.[5]	3.2 (1979); 1 of 69	Legal	Split (2)
El Salvador	4,879,000	800 est.	—(1976)	Legal	Split (4)
Guadeloupe	317,000	3,000 est.[4]	—(1979); 7 of 36 locally	Legal	Independent
Guatemala	7,166,000	750 est.	—(1974)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Guyana	850,000	100 est.	20.4 (1980); 12 of 65	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Haiti	5,878,000	350 est.	—(1973)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow[3]
Honduras	3,838,000	1,500 est.	—(1980)	Proscribed	Split (3)
Jamaica	2,255,000	400 est.[4]	—(1980); none	Allowed	Split (2)
Martinique	312,000	1,000 est.[4]	—(1979); 3 of 36 locally	Legal	Independent
Mexico	68,236,000	100,000 est.[4]	5.1 (1979); 18 of 300	Legal	Split (2)
Nicaragua	2,465,000	1,200 claim[5]	—(1974)	Uncertain	Split (4)
Panama	1,939,000	550 est.	—(1972); none	Allowed	Split (2)
Paraguay	3,230,000	3,500 est.[5]	—(1973)	Proscribed	Split (5)
Peru	17,843,000	3,200 est.[5]	2.8 (1980); 4 of 60[7]	Legal	Split (7)
Puerto Rico	3,300,000[8]	125 est.	0.3 (1976); none	Legal	Split (2)
United States	223,186,000	20,000 claim	0.05 (1976); none	Legal	Split (3)
Uruguay	2,934,000	7,500 est.	Elections promised by 1981	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow[3]
Venezuela	15,284,000	4,500 est.	1.1 (1978); 1 of 195[9]	Legal	Split (4)
TOTAL	608,066,000	705,825			

[1] Arrived at by taking the midpoint when the estimate is given as a range.
[2] A dash "—" indicates that either the party did not participate in the election or the percentage was not available.
[3] The fact that fraternal greetings were sent to the 11th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (August 1977) suggests the existence of pro-Beijing elements.
[4] The membership figure is for a group that either takes a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet dispute or is generally independent.
[5] The membership figure is a combined total for all Marxist parties.
[6] At least five Communists were elected under other party labels.
[7] The percentage of votes and the number of seats cited represent the total of those received by Left Unity (UI), which included the Peruvian Communist Party and the Socialist Revolutionary Party.
[8] The Puerto Rico population estimate is for April 1, 1980.
[9] Overall, the Venezuelan Left garnered 9.0 percent of the vote in 1978. *The Movement to Socialism* (MAS) won 11 seats; *the Movement of the Revolutionary Left* (MIR), 4; *the People's* Electoral Movement (MEP), 3; the Venezuelan CP, 1; and the Communist Vanguard, 1.

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Asia and the Pacific	January 1, 1981, population (est.)	Communist party **membership**[1]	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[2]	Status	Sino-Soviet dispute
Afghanistan	15,193,000	50,000 est.	No elections scheduled	In power	Pro-Moscow
Australia	14,676,000	2,000 est.	—(1980); none	Legal	Split (3)
Bangladesh	91,700,000	2,500 est.[3]	—(1979); none	Legal	Split (11)
Burma	34,842,000	3,000 claim[4]	—(1978)	Proscribed	Pro-Beijing
China	1,034,364,000	38,000,000 claim[4]	Indirect elections	In power	Pro-Beijing
Hong Kong	5,156,000	2,000 est.[4]	None in city council	Legal	Pro-Beijing
India	686,131,000	100,000 CPM est.[5]	—(1980); 35 of 525	Legal	Neutral
		150,000 CPI est.	—(1980); 10 of 525	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Indonesia	152,754,000	1,000 est.[3]	—(1977)	Proscribed	Split (2)
Japan	117,266,000	440,000 claim[5]	10.4 (1980); 29 of 511	Legal	Split (4)
Kampuchea	5,565,000	Unknown	Elections "forthcoming"	In power	Pro-Moscow
Laos	3,499,000	15,000 est.	No elections scheduled	In power	Pro-Moscow
Malaysia	14,179,000	3,425 est.[5 3]	—(1978)	Proscribed	Split (2)
Mongolia	1,681,000	67,000 claim	99.9 (1979); all 354	In power	Pro-Moscow
Nepal	15,153,000	6,500 est.[3]	—(1959)	Proscribed	Split (3)
New Zealand	3,152,000	400 est.[3]	0.2 (1978); none[6]	Legal	Split (5)
North Korea	19,627,000	2,000,000 claim[5]	100.00 (1977); all 579	In power	Neutral
Pakistan	87,720,000	Several 100 est.	1979 elections postponed	Proscribed	Split (2)
Philippines	49,481,000	3,000–4,000 est.[3]	—(1978)	Proscribed	Split (2)
Singapore	2,406,000	350 est.[4]	—(1976)	Proscribed	Pro-Beijing
Sri Lanka	14,973,000	6,000 est.[3]	1.9 (1977); none	Legal	Split (6)
Thailand	48,328,000	1,200 est.[4]	—(1979)	Proscribed	Pro-Beijing
Vietnam	54,382,000	1,533,000 claim	99.0 (1976); all 492	In power	Pro-Moscow
TOTAL	2,472,228,000	42,387,175			

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union	January 1, 1981, population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[2]	Status	Sino-Soviet dispute
Albania	2,705,000	101,500 claim	99.9 (1978); all 250 to Democratic Front	In power	Independent
Bulgaria	8,885,000	821,600 claim	99.9 (1976); all 400 to Fatherland Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Czechoslovakia	15,375,000	1,532,000 claim	99.7 (1976); all 350 to National Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
East Germany (GDR)	16,759,000	2,130,671 claim	99.9 (1976); all 500 to National Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Hungary	10,730,000	811,833 claim	99.3 (1980); all 352 to Patriotic People's Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Poland	35,746,000	3,040,000 claim	99.5 (1980); all 460 to Front of National Unity	In power	Pro-Moscow
Romania	22,303,000	3,003,164 claim	98.5 (1980); all 369 to Front of Socialist Unity	In power	Neutral
USSR	266,754,000	17,193,376 claim	99.9 (1979); all 1,500 CPSU approved	In power	Pro-Moscow
Yugoslavia	22,451,000	2,006,000 claim	—(1978); all 308 to Socialist Alliance	In power	Independent
TOTAL	401,708,000	30,640,144			

[1] Arrived at by taking the midpoint when the estimate is given as a range; "several hundred" was arbitrarily taken as 300.
[2] A dash "—" indicates that either the party did not participate in the election or the percentage was not available.
[3] The membership figure is a combined total for all Marxist parties.
[4] The membership figure is for a pro-Beijing party.
[5] The membership figure is for a group that either takes a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet dispute or is generally independent.
[6] The total is a combined total for parties of the Left. The pro-Beijing Communist Party of New Zealand boycotted the 1978 elections.

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Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts

Western Europe	January 1, 1981, population (est.)	Communist party membership[1]	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[2]	Status	Sino-Soviet dispute
Austria	7,506,000	25,000 est.	0.96 (1979); none	Legal	Split (3)
Belgium	9,861,000	9,000 est.	3.25 (1978); 4 of 212	Legal	Split (2)
Cyprus	629,000	12,000 est.	30.0 (1976); 9 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Denmark	5,133,000	7,750 est.	1.9 (1979); none	Legal	Split (4)
Faroe Islands	44,000	Negligible	—(1977); none	Allowed	Split (2)
Finland	4,784,000	45,000–48,000 est.	17.9 (1979); 35 of 200	Legal	Independent[3]
France	53,853,000	600,000 claim	20.6 (1978); 86 of 491[4]	Legal	Split (3)
Great Britain	55,966,000	20,599 claim	.05 (1979); none	Legal	Split (5)
Greece	9,556,000	27,500 est.[5]	9.0 (1977); 11 of 300	Legal	Split (3)
Iceland	229,000	2,200 est.[6]	19.7 (1979); 11 of 60 People's Alliance (AB)	Legal	Split (4)
Ireland	3,431,000	600 est.	—(1977); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Italy	57,089,000	1,814,740 claim	30.4 (1979); 201 of 630	Legal	Split (9)
Luxembourg	365,000	600 est.	4.8 (1979); 2 of 59	Legal	Split (2)
Malta	348,000	100 est.	—(1976); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow[7]
Netherlands	14,182,000	13,000 est.	1.7 (1977); 2 of 150	Legal	Split (5)
Norway	4,092,000	2,500 est.[6]	5.2 (1977); 2 of 155	Legal	Split (2)
Portugal	9,915,000	164,713 claim	16.7 (1980); 41 of 250	Legal	Split (10)
San Marino	21,000	300 est.[6]	21.1 (1978); 16 of 60	Legal	Independent
Spain	37,610,000	140,000 est.[6]	10.4 (1979); 23 of 350	Legal	Neutral
Sweden	8,322,000	17,000 est.[6]	5.6 (1979); 20 of 349	Legal	Split (5)
Switzerland	6,328,000	5,000 est.	1.5 (1979); 3 of 200	Legal	Split (2)
Turkey	46,139,000	Negligible	—(1977)	Proscribed	Split (5)
West Germany (FRG)	61,388,000	40,000 est.	0.2 (1980); none	Legal	Split (5)
West Berlin	2,100,000	7,500 est.	1.1 (1979); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
TOTAL	397,257,000	2,956,602			
Grand total	4,178,754,000	76,714,546			

International Communist Front Organizations	Year founded	Claimed membership	Headquarters	Number of affiliates	Soviet support
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization	1957	No data	Cairo	No data[8]	$1,260,000
Christian Peace Conference	1958	No data	Prague	Ca. 48	210,000
International Association of Democratic Lawyers	1946	Ca. 25,000	Brussels	Ca. 65	100,000
International Federation of Resistance Fighters	1951	5,000,000	Vienna	22	125,000
International Institute of Peace	1958	No data	Prague	9	260,000
International Organization of Journalists	1946	Over 150,000	Prague	Ca. 111	515,000
International Radio and TV Organization	1946	No data	Prague	Ca. 28	50,000
International Union of Students[9]	1946	Over 10,000,000[10]	Prague	Ca. 118	905,000
Women's International Democratic Federation	1945	Over 200,000,000[11]	East Berlin	Ca. 115	390,000
World Federation of Democratic Youth[9]	1945	Over 150,000,000[12]	Budapest	Ca. 111	1,575,000
World Federation of Scientific Workers	1946	Ca. 450,000	London	Ca. 31	100,000
World Federation of Trade Unions[9]	1945	Ca. 190,000,000[13]	Prague	Ca. 71	8,575,000
World Peace Council[9]	1949	No data	Helsinki	Over 130	49,380,000
TOTAL					$63,445,000

[1] Arrived at by taking the midpoint when the estimate is given as a range.
[2] A dash "—" indicates that either the party did not participate in the election or the percentage was not available.
[3] The Finnish Communist Party does have internal factional differences but not divided over the Sino-Soviet dispute.
[4] The PCF vote is that registered on the first ballot; the seats resulted from the second stage of balloting.
[5] The membership figure is a combined total for all Marxist parties.
[6] The membership figure is for a group that either takes a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet dispute or is generally independent.
[7] The fact that fraternal greetings were sent to the 11th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (August 1977) suggests the existence of pro-Beijing elements.
[8] AAPSO-affiliated committees exist in most countries of Asia and Africa.
[9] Has official status with United Nations organizations.
[10] The bulk of membership comes from Communist-ruled states.
[11] Figures are for 1966; none have been issued since then.
[12] Most members live in party-ruled states; others generally represent small groups attached to local Communist parties.
[13] Some 90 percent live in party-ruled states, including 107 million in the USSR. China is not a member.

SOURCES: The population data are from US Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook, 1981*, Washington, DC., and from the Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce. Figures on membership claimed during 1980 are from party newspapers or journals. Membership estimates, vote percentages and seats in legislatures, and information on party legal status and orientation in the Sino-Soviet dispute are from the individual party profiles provided by contributors to the 1981 *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs; World Factbook, 1981;* US House of Representatives, *Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight, Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive*, Washington, DC, Committee Print, No. 6, Feb. 19, 1980, pp. 79–80; and US Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda*, Washington, DC, Feb. 6, 1980, pp. IV/11A–11D. The last-mentioned report documents Moscow's financing of international front organizations.

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